Essays In Experimental Economics by Huang, Zheng Jai Jennie
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2019
Essays In Experimental Economics
Zheng Jai Jennie Huang
University of Pennsylvania, jenniehuang130@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3345
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huang, Zheng Jai Jennie, "Essays In Experimental Economics" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3345.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3345
Essays In Experimental Economics
Abstract
This dissertation examines how social preferences and norms affect decision making in a variety of settings
using experimental methods.
The first chapter investigates the role of transaction utility on consumer choice. I design two laboratory
paradigms to mirror shopping experiences using discounts and mark-ups (Study 1) and coupons (Study 2). In
my experiments, participants purchase virtual products, allowing me to isolate transaction utility from
inferences of product quality. Results reveal that consumers experience transaction utility even over these
virtual products and will sacrifice monetary payoffs for transaction utility. My estimates suggest consumers’
marginal rate of substitution between study earnings and transaction utility is: 37-57 cents to gain a dollar of
perceived discount and 37-78 cents to avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up.
Chapter 2 investigates the role of gender in negotiations. While conventional wisdom holds that women are
“worse” negotiators, we find that men have a disadvantage in a setting with explicit verbal communication
relative to a control game without communication. This is driven by men’s failure to optimally tailor their
negotiation strategy based on their partner’s gender. In particular, men are significantly less likely to use tough
(but effective) negotiation strategies against female compared to male partners. Male-male pairs have the
worst overall joint performance, indicating that women create efficiency gains without losing out on
individual payoffs. We suggest these findings may be related to gender-specific social norms influencing
communication strategies.
Finally, research from the last three decades suggests that fairness plays an important role in economic
transactions. However, the vast majority of this evidence investigates behavior in a full-information
environment. In chapter 3, we develop a new experimental paradigm---which nests the widely used
Ultimatum Game---to show that the role of fairness in economic transactions depends fundamentally on the
information structure. We find that when transacting agents are less informed inequality increases. In the
absence of information, proposers give less-fair offers and report believing that responders will accept them.
Responders do, in fact, accept less-fair offers when proposers are uninformed, suggesting that responders are
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
Zheng Jai Jennie Huang
Judd B. Kessler
This dissertation examines how social preferences and norms affect decision making in a
variety of settings using experimental methods.
The first chapter investigates the role of transaction utility on consumer choice. I design two
laboratory paradigms to mirror shopping experiences using discounts and mark-ups (Study
1) and coupons (Study 2). In my experiments, participants purchase virtual products,
allowing me to isolate transaction utility from inferences of product quality. Results reveal
that consumers experience transaction utility even over these virtual products and will
sacrifice monetary payoffs for transaction utility. My estimates suggest consumers’ marginal
rate of substitution between study earnings and transaction utility is: 37-57 cents to gain
a dollar of perceived discount and 37-78 cents to avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up.
Chapter 2 investigates the role of gender in negotiations. While conventional wisdom holds
that women are “worse” negotiators, we find that men have a disadvantage in a setting
with explicit verbal communication relative to a control game without communication.
This is driven by men’s failure to optimally tailor their negotiation strategy based on their
partner’s gender. In particular, men are significantly less likely to use tough (but effective)
negotiation strategies against female compared to male partners. Male-male pairs have the
worst overall joint performance, indicating that women create efficiency gains without losing
out on individual payoffs. We suggest these findings may be related to gender-specific social
norms influencing communication strategies.
Finally, research from the last three decades suggests that fairness plays an important role
vii
in economic transactions. However, the vast majority of this evidence investigates behavior
in a full-information environment. In chapter 3, we develop a new experimental paradigm—
which nests the widely used Ultimatum Game—to show that the role of fairness in economic
transactions depends fundamentally on the information structure. We find that when trans-
acting agents are less informed inequality increases. In the absence of information, proposers
give less-fair offers and report believing that responders will accept them. Responders do,
in fact, accept less-fair offers when proposers are uninformed, suggesting that responders
are concerned about their social image or proposers’ intentions.
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CHAPTER 1 : Transaction Utility and Consumer Choice
1.1. Introduction
Standard theory assumes consumers make purchasing decisions by comparing the perceived
value of a good to its selling price. In practice, however, there is robust evidence that
consumers respond to whether they believe they are getting a good deal. A notable exam-
ple comes from JCPenney’s short-lived switch from coupons to an “everyday low-pricing”
structure in 2012 (Tuttle, 2012). In the first quarter after their new pricing structure was
implemented, the company reported a $163 million net loss, suggesting consumers were
more likely to buy when getting to use coupons and seeing discounts than when they sim-
ply faced low prices. While seeing discounts appears to encourage purchase, a large number
of false-advertisement class action lawsuits allege that firms use “fictitious” original prices
to create perceptions of discounts and trick consumers into buying.1
To explain seemingly “irrational” decisions linked to perceived discounts and mark-ups,
Thaler (1985, 1999, 2008) proposed that consumers get two kinds of utility from a purchase:
consumption utility, the value of the good obtained relative to its price, and transaction
utility, the perceived value of the “deal.”2 Consistent with this theory, marketing research
over the past 20 years has shown that “comparative price advertising,” such as providing
an original price, can distort consumers’ purchasing behaviors (for reviews, see Compeau
and Grewal (1998); Krishna et al. (2002)). However, this prior work suffers from a potential
confound: consumers may use a reference price to update their valuation of the quality of a
good (Rao and Monroe, 1989).3 For example, consumers seeing a bottle of wine selling for
1See Berkoff v. Homegoods Inc., United States District Court Central District of California Eastern
Division, No. 5:15-cv-01480, July 23, 2015; Berkoff v. Marshalls of CA, LLC, United States District Court
Central District of California Eastern Division, No. 5:15-cv-01475, July 23, 2015; Gennock v. Ann Inc.,
United States District Court Southern District of New York, No. 1:16-cv-03340-JPO, May 5, 2016; Munning
v. The Gap, Inc., United States District Court Northern District of California, No. 3:16-cv-03804-TEH,
July 7, 2016; Anderson v. Kate Spade and Company, United States District Court Southern District of New
York, No. 1:16-cv-07300, September 19, 2016; Holter (2011); Kang (2015).
2Thaler (1985, 1999, 2008) refers to consumption utility as “acquisition utility.” For the purpose of clearer
exposition, I rename this term “consumption utility,” but retain the same definition and mathematical
structure.
3Also see Plassmann et al. (2008); Lewis and Zalan (2014).
1
$20 might think it is of medium quality; however consumers seeing a bottle of wine with
an original price of $40, now selling for $20, might infer that the wine is of high quality,
even though it is also selling for $20. Therefore, it is hard to disentangle the effect of
transaction utility (i.e., getting a $20 discount) from an inference about product quality
(i.e., the wine being high quality). In addition, prior work shows that perceived discounts
increase purchase intentions but do not provide evidence that reference prices can lead
consumer to make suboptimal purchase decisions.4
Understanding whether and how transaction utility distorts consumer choice has important
economic implications for firm pricing strategy and for policymakers and regulators, who
may worry about the prospect of transaction utility being used to exploit consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to isolate transaction utility from product quality inference and
to quantify the value of transaction utility in dollar terms. This paper uses two incentivized
experiments, which mirror the shopping experience using discounts and mark-ups (Study
1) and coupons (Study 2), to test whether consumers respond to irrelevant original prices,
whether consumers are willing to suffer a monetary loss to capture transaction utility, and
how much of a loss consumers are willing to sacrifice for transaction utility. In both experi-
ments, I experimentally control consumers’ values by having participants make purchasing
decisions over virtual products. Since products are virtual, I am able to exogenously assign
participants’ valuations for products (in dollars) and there by shut down the quality infer-
ence channel. The experiments reveal that participants are willing to suffer a monetary loss
in exchange for transaction utility.
The Discount and Mark-up Game (Study 1) mirrors the shopping experience of receiving a
discount or mark-up by allowing participants to compare the selling price, at which they can
transact, to an original price that sets a reference point but does not affect study earnings.
In this game, participants were endowed with a valuation for the virtual product, a selling
price they had to pay, and an original price that was irrelevant for their monetary payoffs
4For example, see Compeau and Grewal (1998); Krishna et al. (2002).
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but might reflect a discount or mark-up—and thereby affect their transaction utility—and
they had to decide whether they wanted to purchase the virtual product. If participants
chose to purchase, they received the difference between their assigned value and the selling
price as earnings, and they earned $0 otherwise. I find that participants respond to the
“irrelevant” original prices. Participants are more likely to purchase the virtual product if
the “irrelevant” original price is above the selling price, suggesting a discount, and signifi-
cantly less likely to purchase the virtual product if the “irrelevant” original price is below
the selling price, suggesting a mark-up. In addition, the rate of purchasing is increasing in
the size of the discount and decreasing in the size of the mark-up. In a subsequent study, I
stress-test this result by displaying participants’ potential earnings on their decision screen.
I find that participants respond to “irrelevant” original prices in the same way. This result
suggests that consumers receive transaction utility from the terms of the deal itself.
To explore a different channel through which transaction utility may affect choices, I de-
signed a second experiment, the Coupon Game (Study 2), which mimics a shopping expe-
rience with a coupon. In this game, participants were endowed with preferences for two
virtual products, shown the original prices for each product, given a “$5.00 discount coupon
valid for one item,” and had to decide which product they wanted to purchase. Participants
received the difference between their value for the product and the selling price (i.e., the
original price after applying the coupon) of the purchased product as study earnings. In
the game, one product always generated higher earnings but lower transaction utility and
the other always generated higher transaction utility but lower earnings. Thirty percent of
the time, participants sacrifice earnings to purchase the good that created higher transac-
tion utility. This result suggests that coupons may induce consumers to purchase a more
expensive product—to use more of the coupon and achieve a larger discount—even though
it comes at the expense of consumption utility.
In each game, I can price transaction utility. In the Discount and Mark-up Game, I use
the randomly assigned variation between earnings and perceived markups. In the Coupon
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Game, I use the randomly assigned variation between earnings and perceived discount.
Estimates from the Discount and Mark-Up Game suggest that participants are willing to
sacrifice 37-78 cents to avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up.5 Estimates from the Coupon
Game suggest participants are willing to pay 37-57 cents to gain a dollar of perceived
discount.
These findings have important implications for firm strategy and consumer policy. Results
suggest that transaction utility is an important component of demand and therefore should
influence firm pricing. Moreover, fictitious original prices can meaningfully distort consumer
purchasing behavior, leading to material losses for consumers, which may be of interest to
regulators, policymakers, and litigators.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing incentive-compatible evidence
that consumers care about the terms of the transaction separately from the value of the
product itself. This direct evidence in support of transaction utility builds on a large
literature about reference dependence and its effects on demand (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991; Thaler, 1999).6 It also adds to a large set of marketing studies exploring the effect
of advertised reference prices on the perceived value of an offer and purchase intention
(Berkowitz and Walton, 1980; Urbany et al., 1988; Lichtenstein et al., 1989; Moore and
Olshavsky, 1989; Dodds et al., 1991; Grewal et al., 1998; Bitta et al., 1981; Mobley et al.,
1988; Scot et al., 1993; Biswas and Burton, 1994; Sinha and Smith, 2000; Muehlbacher
5By design, I cannot to directly calculate the trade-off between consumption and transaction utility in the
Discount and Mark-Up Game when participants are provided with a perceived discount because discounts
increase transaction utility and earnings simultaneously.
6While reference dependence and loss aversion have been used to explain such deviations in economics
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Thaler (1999) rejected the idea that
costs incurred by buyers in markets are viewed as losses. Since then, a number of other models incorporating
a reference structure have been introduced. These models posit that consumers are loss averse over quantities
they were expecting to consume (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2014), that a consumer’s
attention is drawn towards salient attributes of goods (Bordalo et al., 2013), or that a consumer’s “disen-
chantment” towards the firm affects purchasing behavior (Sibly, 2004). These models predict deviations
from the traditional rational model, but the theories may be intractable because they rely on endogenous
reference prices, which are hard to determine. Furthermore, these models may not always explain pricing
patterns observed in the market such as “perpetual” sales from an essentially fictitious “regular price” seen
in furniture and rug stores (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2014).
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et al., 2011).7 I build on this work by disentangling the effect of transaction utility from the
effect of inference about product quality that potentially confounds previous studies (Rao
and Monroe, 1989; Armstrong and Chen, 2012).8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a review of Thaler’s theory
of transaction utility and a simple model to fix ideas. Section 1.3 presents two studies
using the Discount and Mark-up Game to demonstrate that an “irrelevant” original price
can distort purchasing behavior due to transaction utility. Section 1.4 presents two studies
using the Coupon Game to provide additional evidence of transaction utility and to show
that coupons can trap consumers into purchasing the “wrong” product. Section 1.5 discusses
the potential welfare implications associated with “fictitious” sales, future areas of research,
and how the findings of this paper affect firm pricing decision and consumer policy.
1.2. A Review of Transaction Utility
To explain why consumers might purchase a product at a price above their valuation for
that product or forgo purchasing a product that might seemingly make them better off,
Thaler (1985, 1999, 2008) proposed that consumers derive two kinds of utility from a pur-
chase: (1) consumption utility and (2) transaction utility. Thaler defined transaction utility
as the perceived value of the “deal,” and it is some function of the selling price relative to
a reference price. Examples of external reference prices include a seller’s cost, the manu-
facturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP), the posted price, and the original price of a good.
Furthermore, Thaler posited the most important factor in determining the reference price
7Other studies have also looked into the believability of a price offer (Scot et al., 1993; Suter and Burton,
1996), promotion frequency (Krishna et al., 1991; Kalwani and Yim, 1992), and search intentions (Bitta
et al., 1981; Urbany et al., 1988; Biswas and Burton, 1994). Also, see Monroe (1973); Peterson et al. (1985);
Rao and Monroe (1989); Biswas et al. (1993); Lichtenstein and Bearden (1988); Biswas and Blair (1991);
Biswas and Burton (1993); Kaicker et al. (1995); Grewal et al. (1996); Urbany et al. (1997); Darke and Dahl
(2003); Darke and Chung (2005); Weaver and Frederick (2012); Ngwe (2017). Other consumer decision and
reference point studies have explored the effects of specific product comparison sets (Jahedi, 2010), anchoring
(Dodonova and Khoroshilov, 2004), quantity limits (Inman et al., 1997), or time-inconsistencies (Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2011) to show that these reference prices affect willingness to pay.
8Also see Plassmann et al. (2008); Lewis and Zalan (2014).
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is fairness, which depends in large part on the cost to the seller.9
To fix ideas, consider a simple model of the consumer’s decision problem in a framework
similar to Thaler’s model, making some simplifying assumptions and notation changes for
clarity. I assume that a consumer chooses whether to purchase a single product, x ∈
{buy=1 ,not buy=0}, to maximize:
Ux(P,O;α) =

V − P︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption utility
+ α[O − P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
transaction utility
if x = 1
0 if x = 0
Where V is the value obtained from the product, P is the selling price, O is the reference
price (e.g. an “original price”), and α is the coefficient of transaction utility (or the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and transaction utility). If the consumer chooses
to not buy, assume his utility is 0. Consumers will choose to buy the good if U1(P,O;α) ≥ 0.
⇒ [O − P ] ≥ 1
α
[P − V ]
Incorporating transaction utility into the consumer’s decision problem leads to two testable
hypotheses. First, all else equal, as the reference price O increases, consumers are more
likely to buy the product because it increases the difference between the reference price
and the selling price, thus increasing the perceived discount. Second, under certain circum-
stances, if transaction utility is sufficiently high, consumers will buy the product even if its
consumption utility is negative, because the positive gains from getting a good deal will
offset any negative consumption utility.10
9Adding transaction utility into consumers’ purchase evaluations can lead to two suboptimal outcomes:
(1) some products that would not have been purchased absent transaction utility may be purchased because
they are perceived as a good deal, and (2) some products that would have been purchased absent transaction
utility may be avoided because they are perceived as a bad deal. See Thaler (1985, 1999, 2008).
10We can extend the model of transaction utility to a two-good setting where consumers choose to purchase
one of two available goods. Imagine two products where x ∈ X = {X1, X2}, {V1, V2} are the values obtained
from the products, {P1, P2} are the selling prices, and {O1, O2} are the reference-prices. Assuming consumers
have to buy one of the two products, consumers will choose X1 if U(X1, P1, O1;α) ≥ U(X2, P2, O2;α).
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Furthermore, we can rearrange the equation to predict consumers’ willingness to pay for a
product taking into account transaction utility:
WTP = V + αO1 + α
First order conditions show how the reference price (O) changes the consumer’s willingness
to pay for the product. In particular, ∂WTP∂O =
α
1+α , suggesting that changes in the con-
sumer’s willingness to pay due to changes in the reference price is constant and depends on
the weight consumers place on transaction utility (i.e., the consumer’s type α).11 Further-
more, note that a dollar increase in the reference price leads to less than a dollar increase in
willingness to pay. This is because changing the selling price alters both consumption and
transaction utility. As such, a model incorporating transaction utility could imply that con-
sumers are more (selling) price sensitive compared to a model without transaction utility.
This suggest that transaction utility, if empirically relevant, could have suboptimal effects
on consumer behavior and firm pricing strategy.12
Note that these hypotheses deviate from the neoclassical rational model in which consumers
make purchasing decisions to maximize consumption utility alone.13 However, in practice,
consumers might infer information from the reference price. One could imagine a model,
absent transaction utility, where the valuation of a good is a function of the reference price,
Equivalently, if [O1 −P1] ≥ 1α [(V2 −P2)− (V1 −P1)] + [O2 −P2], consumers will purchase X1. Results from
this model may differ if transaction utility has diminishing marginal returns. A number of additional factors
could also be incorporated into the model, including the credibility of the reference price and the salience of
transaction utility.
11The first order condition is constant due to the assumption that transaction utility is linear.
12Consumers who care about transaction utility could be more price sensitive, meaning that transaction
utility could increase the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand. Since firms with market power
set mark-ups in proportion to the inverse elasticity of demand, this suggests that transaction utility can
have effects on firm pricing strategy. Furthermore, the presence of a well-established reference price could
further influence firm pricing. For example, firms in a market with a well-established original price might
be encouraged to provide more discounts in order to take advantage of increased demand due to higher
consumption and transaction utility as selling prices decrease. On the other hand, a firm that is able to
establish or manipulate their own original price would optimally set the original price to the highest credible
original price and then provide a discount to stimulate demand.
13Under a traditional rational economic model, consumer would purchase the good if (V − P ) ≥ 0. Note
that the original price does not factor into the consumer’s decision problem.
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and this model would derive similar predictions as the transaction utility model.14 As such,
to show that transaction utility exists, I test these hypotheses using an “irrelevant” original
price, that is, an original price that contains no information to influence consumption utility
but that can alter transaction utility.
In my experiments, participants make purchase decisions about virtual products (i.e., no
physical products are used). Using virtual products provides three benefits. First, the
experimenter can exogenously assign to participants their valuation of a virtual product,
shutting down the quality inference channel. Second, participants can be rewarded in
money, based on their purchasing decisions, providing a clear measure of consumption
utility. Third, since there are no actual products that participants may have encountered
outside of the lab, participants should not have internal reference prices that will influence
their purchasing decisions, providing a clean environment to test the effect of transaction
utility obtained from “irrelevant” original prices on consumer behavior.
1.3. Study 1: Discount and Mark-up Game
The Discount and Mark-Up Game was designed to test how participants respond to per-
ceived discounts and mark-ups produced by an “irrelevant,” randomly assigned original
price. This game mimics discounts and mark-ups observed in practice, where consumers
are shown a selling price and an original price and make comparisons between them to
obtain a perceived discount or mark-up.
I ran two versions of the Discount and Mark-Up Game, Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B:
With Earnings Displayed. In Study 1A: Baseline, I test whether participants respond to
“irrelevant” original prices consistent with predictions from a transaction utility model. In
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, I test the robustness of transaction utility by displaying
participants’ potential earnings, thereby highlighting their consumption utility. Below, I
14Under a model where consumers infer information from the reference price, O, but without transaction
utility, consumers would purchase the good if E[V |O] − P ≥ 0. Also see Bagwell and Riordan (1991);
Armstrong and Chen (2013) for models where high prices signal product quality and change demand.
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describe the general design of both versions and then highlight their differences.
1.3.1. Experimental Design
The Discount and Mark-Up Game included 358 participants randomly assigned to one of
two versions.15 All participants received a $10 show-up fee for completing the 25-minute
study.16
In this game, all participants were assigned the role of buyers and decided whether to buy a
virtual product at a randomly assigned selling price (P ). Since this was a virtual product—
that is, no actual product was used—buyers were assigned their value of the virtual product
and the seller’s cost.17 All buyers valued each virtual product at $9 and the seller had a
cost of $6. To create consumption utility, participants were rewarded in earnings based on
their purchasing decision: if the buyer decided to buy the product then the buyer’s earnings
were the value of the product less the selling price ($9− P ), and the seller’s earnings were
the selling price less their cost (P − $6), otherwise both received $0. To create transaction
utility, buyers were also shown an original price (O) which provided irrelevant information
in terms of the buyer’s earnings or consumption utility ($9−P ) but it could alter transaction
utility (O − P ), the perceived level of discount obtained.18
The Discount and Mark-Up Game relies on a 4 × 8 within-subject design where a partic-
ipant’s selling price and original price were randomly assigned to create variation in two
dimensions: the earnings and perceived discount or mark-up from purchasing (see Figure
1.1 for an example).19
15Participants are students from the University of Pennsylvania across a wide range of disciplines. They
participated in 1 of 24 sessions at the Wharton Behavioral Lab in January and February 2018 (12 sessions
each month) with 178 participants randomly assigned to Study 1A: Baseline and 180 participants randomly
assigned to Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed.
16Individuals participated in a Coffee Drink Experiment, the Discount and Mark-up Game, and the Coupon
Game in the 25-minute study. Results from the Coffee Drink Experiment are presented in a companion paper
(Huang, 2018).
17Thaler (2008) posited that the seller’s cost is an important component of fairness and reference price
formation. The seller’s cost is also another way consumers can infer quality. As such, it is important to
hold the seller’s cost constant to further control for any product quality or other inferences participants may
make from the original price.
18See Figure 1.1 for examples of the buyer’s decision screen.
19If participants chose to not purchase the virtual product, their earnings were $0. I assume that if
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In total, participants saw four different selling prices {$6.72, $7.51, $8.03, $8.42}, which cor-
responded to four different levels of buyer’s earnings: {$2.28, $1.49, $0.97, $0.58}.20 For each
possible level of earnings, participants made eight different purchasing decisions. Condi-
tional on each level of buyer’s earnings, I manipulated the original price shown to create
seven levels of perceived discount or mark-up and a control set of decisions where no original
price was shown. To facilitate comparisons, original prices were selected such that the selling
price as a percentage of the original price was: PO ∈ {60%, 80%, 90%, 100%, 110%, 120%, 140%},
creating three discount decisions, one without a discount or mark-up decision, and three
mark-up decisions for each payoff level.21
All participants saw each selling price and original price combination in a random order,
for a total of 32 purchasing decisions. At the end of the laboratory session, participants
answered a series of demographic questions, and one decision and two participants were
randomly selected for payment: one buyer and one seller.22
To ensure the quality of participants’ responses, all participants had to answer and pass
two comprehension questions before proceeding to the game. The comprehension questions
consisted of two multiple choice questions, each with 10 choices (see Figure A.5.1 in the
Appendix for an example).23 This ensured that all participants understood the game, and
participants chose not to purchase the virtual product, their perceived discount or mark-up obtained was
also $0.
20The selling prices were selected to avoid numbers that would be easily remembered. I also allowed for
variation in the buyer-seller split of the pie to account for inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
21Note, the original prices were selected such that the selling price contained a perceived discount or mark-
up of 0%, 10%, 20%, or 40%. If an original price was presented, participants were also told “the original
price was offered to other participants in this study.” To make this a deception-free study, all original prices
were offered to a small sample of participants who were excluded from the results below.
22Participants were also told: “You should make all your decisions assuming you are the buyer. Each
round is independent of the others. Note that the price may be different from item to item. Please make
each of your choices carefully. Remember, you may be selected as the buyer, in which case one of your
rounds will be selected for payment. Since only one round is randomly chosen for payment you should treat
each round as if it is the one and only round chosen for payment.” See section A.5.1 in the Appendix for
experimental protocol.
23Participants were shown a hypothetical scenario with the same decision screen as the game and were
asked: (1) What are your earnings (in dollars) if you choose to purchase the item? (2) What are your
earnings (in dollars) if you choose to NOT purchase the item? Participants were told to select their answers
from two drop down lists. Each drop down list contained 10 choices ranging from $0.00 to $9.00 in one
dollar increments. There is a 1% chance of correctly guessing both comprehension questions.
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Figure 1.1: Examples of Participant’s Decision Screen (Study 1)
Study 1A: Discount and Mark-up Game (Baseline)
(a) Perceived Discount: PO = 60%
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Original Price: $14.03
(This original price was offered to other participants in this study.)
(b) No Discount/Mark-up: PO = 100%
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Original Price: $8.42
(This original price was offered to other participants in this study.)
(c) Perceived Mark-up: PO = 140%
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Original Price: $6.01
(This original price was offered to other participants in this study.)
(d) No Original Price (Control)
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Note: In each decision of the Discount and Mark-up Game, participants were shown their assigned values of the
virtual product and the seller’s cost, which were always constant at $9 and $6. They were also shown the selling
prices and the original prices which were randomly assigned. The four panels in this figure hold the selling price
constant at $8.42 (corresponding to buyer’s earnings of $0.58 if they buyer decided to purchase the virtual product)
but vary the original price such that the selling price appeared discounted, equaled to, or marked-up compared to
the original price. Panel A shows an example where the selling price appeared 40% discounted; Panel B shows an
example where the selling price equaled the original price so there was no discount or mark-up; Panel C shows an
example where the selling price appeared 40% marked-up; and Panel D shows an example where participants were
not provided with an original price (control) decision.
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97% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first try.24
The key feature of this design is that participants were paid their earnings, calculated as the
difference between the assigned value of the product and the selling price if they chose to
purchase the virtual product. Thus, in terms of payoff, the original price provided irrelevant
information.
1.3.1.1. Difference between Study 1A and Study 1B versions
In both versions, Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, participants
played the Discount and Mark-up Game with the same incentives and the same 32 pur-
chasing decisions in a random order. The only difference between the two versions was
that participants’ earnings were displayed before making their decisions in Study 1B: With
Earnings Displayed.
Figure 1.2: Examples of Participant’s Decision Screen With and Without Earnings
Displayed (Study 1)
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
(a) Study 1A: Baseline
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Original Price: $14.03
(This original price was offered to other participants in this study.)
(b) Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
Game A: Item 1
Your value of Item 1 is $9.00
Seller's cost of Item 1 is $6.00
Your Price: $8.42
Original Price: $14.03
(This original price was offered to other participants in this study.)
(If you choose to purchase this item your earnings are $0.58)
Note: In both versions of the Discount and Mark-up Game, participants played the same game with the same
incentives and the same 32 purchasing decision in a random order. Panel A shows an example of participants
decision screen in Study 1A: Baseline, and Panel B shows an example of participants’ decision screen in Study 1B:
With Earnings Displayed where their potential earnings were displayed.
In Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, participants saw the same decision screen as Study
1A: Baseline but participants’ potential earnings were displayed with the following message:
“(If you choose to purchase the item, your earnings are $__).” Figure 1.2 provides examples
of participants’ decision screens in both versions. Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed is
24In Study 1A: Baseline, 98% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first try and in
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, 96% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first
try. My results are the same including all participants or only participants who passed the comprehension
check the first time.
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used to stress-test the robustness of transaction utility. By displaying potential earnings, I
encourage each participant to consider his consumption utility; as such, we should expect
transaction utility effects to be considerably reduced or eliminated.
In the next subsection, I present the results from the Discount and Mark-up Game. First,
I present the main results from Study 1A: Baseline in Section 1.3.2, then I discuss results
from Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.2. Showing consumers experience transaction utility
All analyses will focus on the average rate of purchasing the virtual product. I identify the
effect of providing an “irrelevant” original price by comparing the presence of an original
price that is above, equal to, or below the selling price to decisions where the original price
is absent (i.e., control decisions). I do so conditional on the participants’ randomly assigned
expected earnings if they purchase the virtual good. I also explore the trade-off between
earnings and perceived mark-up on a participant’s probability of purchasing the virtual
product.
Figure 1.3 Panel A shows the average purchase rate when no original price was shown
(control) and when the selling price appeared discounted, equaled, or marked-up compared
to the original price. Purchase rates are nearly identical in the control decisions and when
the selling price equals the original price (82.7% in control and 82.1% when the selling
price equals the original price; this difference is not statistically significant in a regression,
p = 0.696). This result suggests that in the absence of an original price, buyers behave as
if the selling price is equal to the original price. Furthermore, while participants’ earnings
increase if they choose to purchase the virtual product (compared to not purchasing, leading
to earnings of $0), it is not surprising to see a purchase rate lower than 100% due to
inequality aversion. Different selling prices lead to different buyer-seller splits of the $3
surplus. Figure A.1.1 in the Appendix presents the average purchase rate across conditions
by selling price and shows that as the buyer-seller split becomes less favorable for the buyer,
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participants are less likely to purchase the virtual product in the control decisions. This
result is consistent with the theory that individuals are inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).
As evidence of transaction utility, Figure 1.3 Panel A shows that providing an “irrelevant”
original price can distort purchasing behavior. Participants are more likely to purchase
the virtual product when the selling price appears discounted. Providing an original price
above the selling prices leads to a 6.8 percentage point increase in the purchasing rate (in
a regression controlling for decision order and with robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level, p < 0.01). Moreover, the larger the perceived discount, the higher the
purchasing rate. A perceived discount of 10% leads to a 3.8 percentage point increase while
a perceived discount of 40% leads to a 10.7 percentage point increase in the purchasing rate
(see Table A.1.1 regression (1) in the Appendix, p < 0.01). Similarly, buyers are less likely
to purchase the item when the selling price appears marked-up, and the larger the mark-up,
the bigger the distortion. Providing an original price below the selling prices leads to a 27.1
percentage point decrease in the purchasing rate (in a regression controlling for decision
order and with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level, p < 0.01); a 10%
perceived mark-up leads to a 20.4 percentage point decrease; and a 40% perceived mark-up
leads to a 33.7 percentage point decrease in the purchasing rate (see Table A.1.1 regression
(1) in the Appendix, p < 0.01).25 These results are robust and significant with or without
controlling for selling price and decision order.26
Figure A.1.1 and Table A.1.2 Panel A in the Appendix show the perceived fairness between
the buyer-seller split of the pie causes a level shift in the purchase rate. However, identifying
25Table A.1.1 in the Appendix presents the results of the Discount and Mark-up Game in a regression
framework, testing the effect of an original price by percentage below, above, or equal to the selling price on
participants’ purchasing decisions. Also see Table A.1.2 Panel A regressions (9) and (10) in the Appendix.
26Table A.1.3 in the Appendix tests the marginal effect of a perceived percentage change between the
selling price and the original price on the purchasing rate. Results are consistent and significant. I find that
a perceived 10% change in perceived discount increases the probability of purchasing the virtual product by
2.70 percentage points while a perceived 10% change in mark-up decreases the probability of purchasing the
virtual product by 7.00 percentage points. This differential effects between perceived discounts and mark-
ups is consistent with prior findings that losses loom larger than gains with a 3:1 ratio (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).
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Figure 1.3: Participants Respond to an Irrelevant Original Price
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
(a) Study 1A: Baseline
(b) Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
Notes: Participants’ average purchasing rate of the virtual product by selling price as a percentage of the original
price. Panel A shows results for Study 1A: Baseline and Panel B shows results for Study 1B: With Earnings
Displayed. Robust standard error bars clustered at the individual level are shown around each mean.
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the effect of transaction utility using the slope of purchase rate with respect to discounts
and mark-ups across treatment decisions, I find that the effect of transaction utility is stable
across the different splits of the pie. The one exception is when the buyer received 76% of the
buyer-seller earnings split—that is, the selling price was $6.72 leading to buyer’s earnings
of $2.28—and participants were already purchasing 97% of the time in the control decisions
(i.e., when there was no discount or mark-up). In that case, the slope is estimated to be
smaller in magnitude due to a ceiling effect. Importantly, I find the same choice patterns
across all earning levels: when the selling price is equal to the original price, purchase rates
are nearly identical to the control decisions and participants are more likely to purchase
when the selling price appears discounted and less likely to purchase when the selling price
appears marked-up compared to the control decisions.
Furthermore, perceived mark-ups have a stronger effect on behavior than perceived dis-
counts. Figure 1.3 Panel A shows that introducing a mark-up of 10% leads to a larger drop
in the purchase rate than introducing a discount of 10%. We see this when we compare a
20.4 percentage point decrease in purchases due to a 10% perceived mark-up to a 3.8 per-
centage point increase due to a 10% perceived discount.27 This is consistent with a notion of
loss aversion over transaction utility, where consumers perceive negative transaction utility
as more meaningful than equivalent positive transaction utility (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991; Thaler, 1985).
Compellingly, this variation arose within subject. The same participants who were willing to
purchase the virtual product when the original price was absent or equal to the selling price
were “over-purchasing” when presented with a perceived discount and “under-purchasing”
when presented with a perceived mark-up. These distortions are produced by providing
information (i.e., the original price) that should be irrelevant in the participant’s earnings
calculations.
27The asymmetric response to discounts and mark-ups is present even when buyers are earning the minority
of the buyer-seller pie (see Figure A.1.1 in the Appendix) and so ceiling effects cannot be driving the result.
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I explore the trade-off between participants’ earnings and perceived levels of mark-up in
dollars on probability of purchase. This analysis parallels Thaler’s transaction utility model
with some simplifying assumptions. I assume the purchase rate is linear in consumption
utility (i.e., earnings) and transaction utility (i.e., the perceived discount or mark-up).
While there was no trade-off when the participants observed a perceived discount, in deci-
sions with a perceived mark-up, participants were trading off higher earning and negative
transaction utility when deciding whether to purchase the virtual product.28 I estimate a
linear probability model with the following specification:
Purchaseit = α+ β1 × Earningsit + β2 × PerceivedMark-upit + i
where Purchaseit is whether participants i decided to purchase the virtual product or not
in decision t in the Discount and Mark-up Game; Earningsit is the difference in earnings
(in dollars) between purchasing the virtual product or not (representing “consumption util-
ity”), and PerceivedMark-upit is the difference in perceived mark-up, in dollars (representing
“transaction (dis)utility”). I control for the decision order and cluster the random error, i,
at the individual level.
Table 1.1 Panel A presents the trade-off between earnings (consumption utility) and per-
ceived mark-up (transaction disutility) in Study 1A: Baseline. Focusing on regression (1),
increasing earnings by a dollar increases the purchase rate by 18.4 percentage points. On the
other hand, increasing the perceived mark-up by a dollar decreases the purchasing rate by
14.4 percentage points. Regression (2) provides a robustness check using a Probit model and
shows marginal effects (holding all other independent variables constant at their means).
Results demonstrate that the effect on perceived mark-up is nearly as large as the effect of
active earnings. I use the estimates from Table 1.1 to quantify the willingness to pay for
transaction utility in Section 1.3.5.
28For the purposes of this regression, I ignore inequity aversion.
17
Table 1.1: Trade-off Between Earnings and Perceived Mark-up
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Panel A: Study 1A Baseline
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
OLS Probit
(1) (2)
Earnings (in $) 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016)




Ind. Clusters 178 178
Order Control Yes Yes
Observations 2848 2848
R-Squared 0.129
Panel B: Study 1B With Earnings Displayed
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
OLS Probit
(1) (2)
Earnings (in $) 0.239∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016)




Ind. Clusters 180 178
Order Control Yes Yes
Observations 2880 2880
R-Squared 0.138
Notes: Trade-off between earnings and perceived mark-up on probability of purchasing the virtual
product. Panel A shows results for Study 1A: Baseline and Panel B shows results for Study 1B: With
Earnings Displayed. I control for game period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.2 provides robustness checks of these results. Regression (1) reports the baseline
specification for comparison. Regressions (2) and (3) subset the data to instances where
the buyer-seller earnings split is such that the buyer’s share is less than 50%, the cases were
inequity aversion might be particularly pronounced.29 Regression (2) shows the trade-off
between earnings and perceived mark-up when the selling price is $7.51, $8.03, and $8.42
and shows that increasing earnings by a dollar increases the purchase rate by 20.0 percentage
points. However this estimate incorporates the fact that increasing earnings also reduces
inequality. On the other hand, increasing the perceived mark-up by a dollar decreases
the purchasing rate by 14.5 percentage points. Regression (3) shows the trade-off between
earnings and perceived mark-up when the selling price is $8.03 or $8.42. This comparison
reduces the effect of decreasing inequality when the selling price decreases because the
inequity difference is smaller, that is, the buyer’s share of the pie only changes from 19% to
32%. Results show that increasing earnings by a dollar increases the purchase rate by 11.4
percentage points and increasing the perceived mark-up by a dollar decreases the purchasing
rate by 13.0 percentage points. It is important to note the coefficients estimated for a
perceived mark-up are stable across regression specifications. As such, inequity aversion
does not affect transaction utility.
Note that in Table 1.2 regressions (1) to (3), estimates of coefficients may contain loss
aversion over transaction utility. Regressions (4) to (6) examine the trade-off between
earnings and perceived mark-up “removing” loss aversion by estimating the trade-off using
perceived mark-ups of 10%, 20%, and 40%. Regression (4) shows that increasing earnings by
a dollar increases the purchase rate by 19.7 percentage points and increasing the perceived
mark-up by a dollar decreases the purchase rate by 8.5 percentage points. Regressions (5)
and (6) mirror the sample selection of regressions (2) and (3) and show consistent results.
Another way to separate loss aversion and transaction utility effects is by using a kinked
29Sub-setting the data provides an “upper” bound for the effect on earnings because decreasing the selling
price increases earnings and reduces buyer-seller inequality.
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linear regression with the following specification:
Purchaseit = α+ β1 × Earningsit + β2 × 1{Mark-upit}+ β3 × PerceivedMark-upit + i
where the only difference compared to the previous specification is that 1{Mark-upit} is
a dummy variable equaled to 1 for any decision where the perceived mark-up was greater
than 0%. This allows for a perceived mark-up to have a differential effect. Estimates from
regression (7) show that under this specification, the coefficients for earnings and perceived
mark-up are consistent with those in regression (4) and the effect of getting a mark-up
reduces the purchase rate by 14.5 percentage points in Study 1A: Baseline.30 Regressions
(8) and (9) mimic the sample selection of regressions (2) and (3) and show consistent results.
Table 1.2: Robustness Checks: Trade-off Between Earnings and Perceived Mark-up
Study 1A: Discount and Mark-up Game (Baseline)
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Mark-up 0-40% Mark-up 10-40% Only Loss Aversion Adjusted
Selling Price: All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03 All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03 All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Earnings (in $) 0.184∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.064 0.192∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.026) (0.038) (0.018) (0.028) (0.045) (0.017) (0.026) (0.038)
Perceived Mark-Up (in $) -0.144∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Mark-Up -0.145∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.029)
Constant 0.538∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.051) (0.059) (0.038) (0.045) (0.050)
Ind. Clusters 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2848 2136 1424 2136 1602 1068 2848 2136 1424
R-Squared 0.129 0.0874 0.0527 0.0856 0.0314 0.00809 0.136 0.0989 0.0645
Notes: Robustness checks for trade-off between earnings and perceived mark-up on the probability of purchasing the virtual
product for Study 1A: Baseline. I control for game period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at
the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.3.3. How robust are transaction utility effects?
While my experimental paradigm is simple for participants (i.e., participants can calculate
their earnings by subtracting the selling price from their assigned value), I can further sim-
plify this calculation. To stress-test transaction utility, Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
uses the same game but displays participants’ potential earnings if they choose to purchase
30Comparing the loss aversion effect and the coefficient of a perceived mark-up suggests that loss aversion
accounts for over 60% of the change in purchase rate (holding earnings constant).
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the virtual product. Not only does this perform the required math for participants, it also
makes consumption utility more salient. Note that displaying earnings does not provide
new information to participants, as they can easily calculate the earnings themselves. This
is a setting where we should not expect distortions due to an “irrelevant” original price,
yet finding evidence of transaction utility in this study would show how robust this effect
is and provides a lower bound for my estimates.31
Figure 1.3 Panel B shows the average purchasing rate by selling price as a percentage of
the original price (mirroring Figure 1.3 Panel A) for Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed.
Results show that displaying participants’ potential earnings reduces but does not eliminate
transaction utility. While participants exhibit a smaller purchase distortion compared to
Study 1A: Baseline, they are still significantly more likely to purchase the virtual product
under perceived discounts and less likely to purchase under perceived mark-ups compared
to the control decisions.32 This finding, that providing an “irrelevant” original price distorts
purchasing behavior even when participants’ earnings are displayed—encouraging them to
consider their consumption utility—suggests that transaction utility is a strong and robust
effect.33
Table 1.1 Panel B presents the trade-off between earnings and perceived mark-up in Study
1B: With Earnings Displayed (mirroring Table 1.1 Panel A). Focusing on regression (1),
increasing earnings by a dollar increases the purchase rate by 23.9 percentage points (com-
31Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed is a setting difficult to replicate in the field but could be viewed as
mapping onto situations where consumers have a rational actor (perhaps a friend) telling them to consider
the true “value” they are receiving from a product and to ignore the fact that the product is “on sale.”
32I note that participants are also less likely to purchase in the control decisions compared to Study
1A: Baseline. One plausible explanation for this effect is that displaying earnings makes the unequal split
between the buyer’s and seller’s share of the surplus more salient. Figure A.1.2 and Table A.1.2 Panel B
show the results by buyer’s share of the surplus. Results are consistent with the baseline setting where
participants are not explicitly shown their earnings.
33Table A.1.4 in the Appendix pools data from Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
to interact the perceived percentage change with earnings displayed and show its effect on participants’
purchasing decisions. Regression (5) shows, conditional on selling price, a perceived 10% change in mark-up
when earnings are displayed increases the purchasing rate by 4.6 percentage points but this is more than
offset by the coefficient of observing a perceived 10% change in mark-up (decreasing purchasing rate by 8.1
percentage points). Similarly, a perceived 10% change in discount when earnings are displayed marginally
decreases the purchasing distortion by 1.2 percentage points but this is more than offset by the coefficient
of observing a perceived 10% change in discount (increasing purchasing rate by 3.0 percentage points).
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pared to 18.4 percentage points in the previous study). On the other hand, increasing the
perceived mark-up by a dollar decreases the purchase rate by only 8.8 percentage points
(compared to 14.4 percentage points in the previous study). Regression (2) provides a
robustness check using a Probit model and shows marginal effects (holding all other inde-
pendent variables at their means). Table A.1.5 in the Appendix provides robustness checks
of these results (mirroring Table 1.2). Results follow the same pattern as those in Study
1A: Baseline and coefficient estimates are consistent.
Displaying earnings encourages participants to consider their earnings, which should make
consumption utility more salient. As such, the presence of transaction utility effects under
this stress-test shows how important the “value of the deal” is to consumers and provides
a lower bound for transaction utility.
1.3.4. Heterogeneity of transaction utility effect
While the sample of participants is fairly homogeneous, I am able to explore whether specific
consumer traits attenuate or amplify transaction utility effects. In particular, I look at gen-
der and whether a participant has taken a marketing 101 course. I also explore participants’
self-reported measures of caring about discounts and being averse to mark-ups. To do this,
I use a difference-in-differences regression that interacts the selling price as a percentage
of the original price (PO ) and a binary (or categorical) measure of the four heterogeneity
groups (see Table A.1.6 Panels A and B in the Appendix).
First, gender stereotypes depict women as enjoying shopping and buying things at discounts
more than men. As such, we might expect women to be more susceptible to transaction
utility effects compared to men. Using data from Study 1A: Baseline, I find that each 10
percentage point increase in the selling price (as a percent of the original price) decreases
the probability of purchasing the virtual product by an additional 2.8 percentage points for
female participants compared to male participants. This difference is statistically significant
and meaningful. The slope of purchase rate with respect to PO for women is 67% steeper than
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the slope for men.34 Effects are consistent when participants were shown their potential
earnings in Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed.35
Second, we might expect students who have previously taken a marketing 101 course to
know about discounts and promotion tactics that companies use to drive sales. As such,
we might expect transaction utility effects to be attenuated for those who have taken a
marketing course. Indeed, I find that participants who have taken a marketing 101 course
exhibit a less steep slope. In Study 1A: Baseline I find that the slope for students who have
taken a marketing 101 class is 35% flatter than those who have never taken marketing 101,
a difference that is significant at the 1% level.36
Third, in a post-survey, participants were asked to self-report how important discounts were
to them and how averse they were to surge pricing on a 5-point Likert scale.37 I find that
results are correlated with these self-reported measures of caring about discounts and being
averse to mark-ups. In Study 1A: Baseline, participants who stated that they cared more
discounts or were more averse to surge pricing displayed steeper slopes than participants
who stated they did not care about discounts or mark-ups, a difference that is significant
at the 1% level.38
1.3.5. MRS of consumption and transaction utility and WTP
Since I estimate reactions to earnings and transaction utility in dollar terms, I can estimate
participants’ willingness to pay for a $1 gain or loss of transaction utility. I use Table 1.1
34See Table A.1.6 Panel A regression (1) in the Appendix.
35See Table A.1.6 Panel B regression (1) in the Appendix.
36See Table A.1.6 Panel A regression (2). Results are weaker but directionally consistent in Study 1B:
With Earnings Displayed. See Table A.1.6 Panel B regression (2) in the Appendix.
37Participants were asked: “How important is it that your purchases contain a discounted price (that is,
a mark-down on the original price)? (Examples of sales or discounts include: store discount codes, purchase
rewards, or sales)”. Participants self-reported this measure using a 5-point Likert scale from “extremely
important” to “not at all important”. Participants were also asked: “How averse are you to make a purchase
knowing that the price is inflated (that is, a mark-up on the original price)? (Examples of inflated pricing
include: ride share (Uber or Lyft) services at rush hour, hotels prices during peak season, airfare ticket prices
during specific times, or sports events during high demand)”. Participants self-reported this measure using
a 5-point Likert scale from “extremely averse” to “not at all averse”.
38See Table A.1.6 Panel A regression (3) and (4) in the Appendix. Results from Study 1B: With Earnings
Displayed show that coefficients are directionally consistent but not significant or marginally significant (see
Table A.1.6 Panel B regression (3) and (4) in the Appendix).
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Panel A and compare the coefficients between earnings and perceived mark-up to estimate
a marginal rate of substitution between consumption and transaction utility. I find that
participants are willing to pay 78 cents to avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up.39 I use
Table 1.1 Panel B, which provides the effect of earnings and perceived mark-up in Study 1B:
With Earnings Displayed, to estimate a lower bound for the marginal rate of substitution.
Displaying earnings to participants prior to making their decision reduces this exchange
rate to 37 cents per dollar.
Using the simple model shown in Section 1.2, a change in the original prices leads to a α1+α
change in willingness to pay, where α is the marginal rate of substitution. By plugging in
the estimate from Study 1A: Baseline, I find that participants’ willingness to pay changed
by 44 cents for a dollar change in the original price.40 This suggests that firms that are able
to manipulate the original price of a product (e.g. by providing a inflated original price)
may be able to significantly manipulate consumers’ willingness to pay for a product.
1.3.6. Alternative Explanations?
The Discount and Mark-up Game shows that consumers gain transaction utility from dis-
counts and transaction disutility from mark-ups. These effects are robust to a setting where
consumption utility is made salient by showing study participants their potential earnings
prior to making a decision. Consumers appear to care about the terms of the deal separately
from the value of the product and selling price (that is, their consumption utility). In this
subsection, I explore, and rule out, other potential explanations for my experimental results:
complexity of the design, experience, anchoring, signaling, expectations, and experimenter
demand.
39Ngwe (2017) compares the change in purchasing probability between a dollar increase in fake sale or a
dollar decrease in the real price using sales data from a luxury handbag store and finds a similar estimate,
though this estimate is for perceived discounts and could potential contain a quality inference confound.
40Using the marginal rate of substitution from Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, I estimate a lower
bound effect: a dollar change in the original price leads to a 27 cents change in willingness to pay for a
product.
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1.3.6.1. The role of complexity
While the experimental design is simple and participants’ earnings are easy to calculate, one
could imagine that participants may not have understood how to calculate their earnings.
However, all participants had to answer two comprehension questions which consisted of
calculating their earnings if they chose to purchase the virtual product or not, and 97%
of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first try. This suggest that
individuals are capable of doing the correct earnings calculations, and this is a relatively
simple calculation. As expected, results are consistent when I restrict my sample to only the
97% of participants who passed the comprehension questions on the first try. Importantly,
participants’ purchasing rate is responding to both the selling price and the “irrelevant”
original price as predicted by the transaction utility model.
As an extreme way to help participants with calculations, Study 1B: With Earnings Dis-
played actually does the required math for participants by displaying potential earnings.
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed shows that displaying earnings information reduces the
effect but does not eliminate it, suggesting my transaction utility result is not simply a
result of complexity.
1.3.6.2. The role of experience
I identified the effect of transaction utility within an individual, so I can explore whether
distortions in purchasing behavior are reduced as participants gain experience over the 32
decisions in the Discount and Mark-up Game. To do this, I divide my sample into the first
and last 16 decisions of the game and use a difference-in-differences regression that interacts
the selling price as a percentage of the original price (PO ). I find no significant differences
between the first and second half of the game in Study 1A: Baseline or Study 1B: With
Earnings Displayed, suggesting that transaction utility is not mitigated with experience.41
41See Table A.1.6 Panels A and B regression (6) in the Appendix.
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1.3.6.3. The role of anchoring, signaling, and expectations
One might posit that participants anchor to an original price or that the original price
signals something about social norms associated with the transaction. Prior research has
shown that anchoring effects are stronger under judgment uncertainty (Kahneman, 1992).42
In my study, judgment uncertainty is removed or minimized by holding the buyer’s value
and seller’s cost constant. As such, anchoring effects should be minimal. However, if trans-
action utility exists, then individuals need a reference point to derive positive or negative
transaction utility. Since I provide virtual products with no prior reference price, partic-
ipants might “anchor” to the original price as the reference price to evaluate transaction
utility. In any case, this could mean that the formation of reference points and their effects
on consumer’s decisions may not be fully understood and this research seeks to further
understand the importance of reference points in the presence of transaction utility.
Moreover, if there are any additional signals from the original price, we might expect to see
a differential effect in the first half compared to the second half of the study—that is, after
participants have seen a large set of randomly assigned original prices, they should realize
that any signal from the original price is just noise. As previously stated, I find that the
effects in the first and second halves of the study are nearly identical.43
I can also rule out that participants make their purchasing decisions based on expectations
formed from perceived discounts or mark-ups seen in prior decisions.44 A regression con-
trolling for the perceived discount or mark-up seen in up to three prior decisions shows that
the effect of prior discounts and mark-ups is not significant.
42For example, when you are uncertain about the quality of wine you might anchor to the last two digits
of your Social Security Number or when you are uncertain about the number of countries in Africa you
might anchor to the (random) previous number you saw (Kahneman, 1992).
43See Table A.1.6 Panels A and B regression (6) in the Appendix.
44Note that all participants were told to treat each decision independently since only one decision would
chosen for payment if the participant was selected to be the buyer.
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1.3.6.4. The role of experimenter demand
Finally, one might worry that experimenter demand might be driving these results. Again, I
find this is not the case. First, we could expect participants who are regular lab participants
to be differentially susceptible to experimenter demand. I divide my sample into participants
who have below or above median participation in lab sessions at the Wharton Behavioral
Lab.45 I find no significant differences by this median split in either Study 1A: Baseline or
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed.46
Moreover, in the spirit of de Quidt et al. (2018), where experimenter demand can be bounded
by “deliberately inducing demand in a structured way,” Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
provides a test of experimenter demand. In Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, participants
are displayed their potential earnings prior to making their decisions. This could be thought
of as producing experimenter demand for participants to place more value on their earnings.
That transaction utility effects persisting in this setting provides a lower bound for this
effect.47
45In Study 1A: Baseline, participants’ number of lab sessions attended ranges from 1 to 160 and in Study
1B: With Earnings Displayed, participants’ number of lab sessions attended ranges from 1 to 126. In both
studies, the median number of lab sessions completed is 13.
46See Table A.1.6 Panels A and B regression (5) in the Appendix. Furthermore, Kessler and Meier (2014)
ran an experiment in the same lab using the same population, students from the University of Pennsylvania,
and show that of participants being asked to return some portion of a $3 endowment to the experimenter, on
average, only 10% of funds are returned and 75-80% of participants gave nothing back to the experimenter.
This suggests that few participants are willing to give money back to the experimenter even under an explicit
request.
47Participants were also asked to rate their selling price on a scale from 1-5 where 1 is a “very bad deal”
and 5 is a “very good deal”. This question was asked on the same decision screen where buyers made their
purchasing decisions and is used to construct a mediation analysis (in Figure A.1.3 and Table A.1.7 in the
Appendix). If asking participants to rate their selling price hinted to participants that this was a study
about deal perception, a counterargument could be that asking participants to rate the deal allowed them
to tell the experimenter that they know a particular selling price was a bad deal and still choose to purchase
the virtual product to get positive earnings without feeling foolish. This could attenuate the transaction
utility effect. In fact, I find that even participants who, conditional on earnings, always purchased the virtual
product would still rate the price as a bad deal when they observed a perceived mark-up. Figure A.5.2 in
Appendix A.5.1 shows an example of the rating question.
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1.3.7. Summary of Study 1
Results from the Discount and Mark-up Game suggest that consumers care about the terms
of the deal, it can distort purchasing behavior, and it can deter the purchase of products
that lead to higher consumption utility. I argue that alternative explanations are not
sufficient to explain the experimental results and finding significant heterogeneity effects
consistent with our expectations further strengthens this argument. Moreover, quantifying
participant’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and transaction utility
(i.e., their willingness to pay to avoid a dollar worth of perceived mark-up) suggests that
actual monetary losses due to transaction utility are non-trivial.48
Next, I use the Coupon Game, which mimics the shopping experience using a coupon, to
show that transaction utility is robust to a variety of settings and that it can lead consumers
to buy the “wrong” product (i.e, a product that leads to lower consumption utility).
1.4. Study 2: Coupon Game
Imagine walking to a store with a $5 coupon valid for one of two products at the store. The
first product is priced at $1 and the second product is priced at $8. Which product would
you choose to buy using your $5 coupon? While there could be a number of reasons to
purchase the $8 product, did it seem silly to use a $5 coupon on a product that was priced
at $1? What if you would have been better off buying the product priced at $1?
The usage of coupons presents a different (but common) way in which consumers can acquire
transaction utility.49 The Coupon Game mimics a shopping experience with a coupon,
mirroring the scenario above, and was designed to show that distortions due to transaction
utility are present in a very different context and that consumers may be manipulated into
not only spending more but also buying the “wrong” product.
48See Appendix A.1 for additional results on monotonicity and mediation.
49In 2016, the total value of coupons distributed in the United States was $307 billion. (See
https://www.statista.com/statistics/630086/total-number-of-coupons-distributed-in-the-us/)
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I ran two versions of the Coupon Game, Study 2A: Baseline and Study 2B: With Earnings
Displayed. In Study 2A: Baseline, I test whether participants respond to coupons achieving
different levels of transaction utility. In Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, I test the
robustness of transaction utility effects in this setting by displaying participants’ potential
earnings to highlight their consumption utility prior to their decision. Below, I describe the
general design of both versions and then highlight their differences.
1.4.1. Experimental Design
The Coupon Game included 204 participants randomly assigned to one of two versions.50
In addition to earning a $10 show-up fee, one decision and one participant were randomly
selected for payment in each session.51
In this game, all participants were assigned the role of buyers and decided between one
of two virtual products to buy using a “$5.00 off the original price discount coupon valid
for one item.” Again, since both items were virtual products—that is, no actual products
were used—buyers were assigned their values of both virtual products: item Y and item Z.
All buyers always valued item Y at $6 and item Z at $8. Participants were also provided
with the (randomly assigned) original prices (OY and OZ) of both virtual products. To
create consumption utility, participants were rewarded in earnings based on their purchasing
decision: buyers’ earnings were the value of the virtual product less the price they pay (that
is, the original price less the coupon value) for the chosen virtual product.52 Notice that
participants obtained transaction utility measured by the amount of coupon value used
or the discount (in dollars) gained. Crucially, all participants knew they were allowed to
purchase only one of the two virtual products. All participants were also told that if the
value of the coupon exceeded the original price of the chosen virtual product, they would
50Individuals participated in 1 of 12 sessions at the Wharton Behavioral Lab in January 2018 with 101
participants randomly assigned to Study 2A: Baseline and 103 participants randomly assigned to Study 2B:
With Earnings Displayed.
51See section A.5.2 in the Appendix for experimental protocol.
52If a buyer chose to purchase Item Y, his earnings were $6 value - [OY - “$5 coupon”] and if a buyer
chose to purchase Item Z, his earnings were $8 value - [OZ - “$5 coupon”].
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Figure 1.4: Example of Participant’s Decision Screen With and Without Earnings
Displayed (Study 2)
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
(a) Study 2A: Baseline
Item Y Item Z
Your value of Item Y is $6.00 Your value of Item Z is $8.00
Original Price of Item Y: $1.00 Original Price of Item Z: $8.00
Would you like to use the "$5.00 off the original price" discount coupon to 
purchase item Y or item Z?
Game B: Item 1
You received a "$5.00 off the original price" discount coupon valid for one 
item. 
(b) Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed
Item Y Item Z
Your value of Item Y is $6.00 Your value of Item Z is $8.00
Original Price of Item Y: $1.00 Original Price of Item Z: $8.00
Game B: Item 1
You received a "$5.00 off the original price" discount coupon valid for one 
item. 
(Note: If you choose to purchase item Y, your earnings are $6.00. If you choose to 
purchase item Z, your earnings are $5.00.)
Would you like to use the "$5.00 off the original price" discount coupon to 
purchase item Y or item Z?
Note: In each decision of the Coupon Game, participants were reminded they received a “$5.00 off the original
price” discount coupon valid for one item and shown their assigned values and original prices for each virtual
product. Panel A shows an example of the participant’s decision screen in Study 2A: Baseline, and Panel B shows
an example for Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed.
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not receive credit back (that is, they forfeit the remainder of the coupon value).
Figure 1.4 Panel A shows an example of the participant’s decision screen for the Coupon
Game. In this example, the participant values item Y at $6 and it has an original price of
$1; and the participant values item Z at $8 and it has an original price of $8. Choosing to
purchase item Y leads to $6 in earnings but only $1 worth of transaction utility (i.e., a $1
discount).53 On the other hand, choosing to purchase item Z leads to $5 in earnings, but
$5 of transaction utility (i.e., a $5 discount).54
The Coupon Game relies on a 2 × 3 within-subject design where participants’ original
price of item Y and item Z were randomly assigned to create variation in two dimensions:
(1) the difference in earnings and (2) the difference in discount gained between the two
virtual products. Participants observed 6 original price combinations in a random order:
(OY , OZ) ∈ {($6, $1), ($6, $3), ($6, $4.50), ($1, $8), ($3, $8), ($4.50, $8)}. Notice that, for all
six purchasing decisions, the original price of one virtual product is always greater than $5
and one is always less than $5. This was constructed such that one virtual product always
led to a $5 discount (but lower earnings) and one item always led to less than $5 in discount
(but higher earnings). Which virtual product led to a $5 discount, by using the full value
of the coupon to offset the original price, was randomly assigned. For the purpose of clear
exposition, I define the following terms:
• The coupon-trap good is the virtual product that led to a $5 discount but which,
by design, led to lower earnings.
• The alternative good is the other available virtual product that led to less than $5
in discount but led to higher earnings.
To achieve the two key sources of variation in my experiment, I selected the randomly
assigned original prices for each virtual product such that purchasing the coupon-trap good
led to either $1 or $3 less in earnings compared to purchasing the alternative good. I also
53Earnings from item Y: $6 value - [$1 - “$5 coupon” = $0] = $6; discount gained is $1.
54Earnings from item Z: $8 value - [$8 - “$5 coupon” = $3] = $5; discount gained is $5.
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independently varied the extra discount from purchasing the coupon-trap good (compared
to the alternative good), such that purchasing the coupon-trap good led to $0.50, $2.00, or
$4.00 in extra discount.
All participants saw each combination of original prices, for a total of 6 purchasing decisions,
in a random order. One decision and one participant were randomly selected for payment
in each session. At the end of the laboratory sessions, participants answered a series of
demographic questions.
To ensure the quality of participants’ responses, all participants had to answer and pass
two comprehension questions before proceeding to the game. The comprehension questions
consisted of two multiple choice questions, each with 11 choices (see Figure A.5.3 in the
Appendix for an example).55 There is less than 1% chance of correctly guessing both com-
prehension questions by random chance. If participants failed any comprehension question,
they had to try again until they passed both questions.56 This ensured that all participants
understood how to calculate their earnings by the time they played the game.
Calculating earnings for the Coupon Game required additional (and more complicated)
math than calculating earnings in the Discount and Mark-up Game. In this case, par-
ticipants first had to calculate the selling price they would be paying after applying the
coupon.57 Then, participants had to subtract the selling price from their assigned value to
get to their earnings. Indeed, I find that participants found this math more difficult: only
50% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first try.58 However, the
remaining 50% who did not pass on their first attempt had the opportunity to re-answer the
55Participants were shown a hypothetical scenario with the same decision screen as the game and were
asked: (1) What are your earnings if you choose to purchase the item Y? (2) What are your earnings if you
choose to purchase the item Z? Participants were told to select their answer from two drop down lists. Each
drop down list contained 11 choices ranging from $0.00 to $10.00 in one dollar increments.
56Participants were not told which of the two questions they answered correctly and were asked to select
the correct answer for both questions until they passed.
57The selling price was the maximum of the difference between the original price less the coupon value
and zero. In math, selling price = max{original price− coupon value, 0}.
58In Study 2A: Baseline, 52% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first try and in
Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, 48% of participants passed both comprehension questions on the first
try.
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comprehension questions until they passed. Thus, all participants learned and were capable
of calculating earnings by the time they played the game.59
The key feature of this design is that participants were paid their earnings—calculated as
the difference between the assigned value and the price they pay (that is, the original price
after applying the coupon) for their chosen virtual product. Thus, absent transaction utility,
the coupon should only matter as a way to increase participants’ earnings by reducing the
selling price. By construction, if participants only care about consumption utility, they
should always purchase the alternative good, leading to higher earnings.
1.4.1.1. Difference between Study 2A and Study 2B
In both versions, Study 2A: Baseline and Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, participants
played the Coupon Game with the same incentives and the same 6 purchasing decisions in a
random order. The only difference between the two versions was that participants’ earnings
were displayed before making their decisions in Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed.
In Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, participants saw the same decision screen as Study
2A: Baseline but participants’ potential earnings were displayed with the following message:
“(Note: If you choose to purchase the item Y, your earnings are $__. If you choose to
purchase item Z, your earnings are $__.)” Figure 1.4 provides examples of participants’
decision screens in both versions. As in Study 1, Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed is
used to attempt to stress-test the robustness of transaction utility. By displaying potential
earnings, I encourage participants to consider their consumption utility; as such, we should
expect transaction utility effects to be considerably reduced or eliminated in Study 2B: With
Earnings Displayed.
In the following subsection, I present results from the Coupon Game. First, I present the
main results from Study 2A: Baseline in Section 1.4.2, then I discuss results from Study 2B:
With Earnings Displayed in Section 1.4.3.
59My results are qualitatively the same including all participants or only participants who passed the
comprehension check on the first try.
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1.4.2. Consumers get transaction utility from using coupons
All analyses will focus on the average rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good. I look at the
effect of (randomly assigned) extra earnings and of extra discount if consumers were to pur-
chase the coupon-trap good (compared to the alternative good) on participants’ purchasing
decisions.60 I also explore the trade-off between extra earnings and extra discount gained
from purchasing the coupon-trap good (compared to the alternative good) on a participant’s
probability of purchasing the coupon-trap good.61
Figure 1.5 Panel A shows participants’ average purchase rate of the coupon-trap good by
the extra discount if the consumer purchased the coupon-trap good. I find that participants
are willing to sacrifice higher earnings to obtain a higher discount almost 30% of the time.
First, participants are willing to give up a dollar in earnings to gain an additional 50 cents
of discount 28.5 percent of the time. Conditional on earnings, when the coupon-trap good
leads to an extra $2.00 of discount, buyers are 2.5 percentage points more likely to purchase
the coupon-trap good (not significant). However, when the coupon-trap good leads to an
extra $4.00 of discount, buyers are significantly more likely to purchase the coupon-trap
good by 6.9 percentage points (see Table A.2.1 regression (1) in the Appendix, p < 0.05).
Moreover, as the earnings loss associated with purchasing the coupon-trap good increases
from $1 to $3, the purchase rate of the coupon-trap good decreases by 6.6 percentage points
(see Table A.2.1 regression (1) in the Appendix, p < 0.01).
To verify that participants are behaving consistent with predictions from a model with
transaction utility, I use the slope of the effect of extra discount if the consumer purchased
the coupon-trap good. Table A.2.2 regression (1) in the Appendix shows that participants
are more likely to purchase the coupon-trap good as the extra discount from buying the
coupon-trap good increases (slope coefficient of 0.020 is significant at the 5% level). More-
60This parallels the analysis in the Discount and Mark-up Game where I examined the effect of perceived
discount and mark-up achieved from choosing to purchase (compared to not purchase).
61This parallels the analysis in the Discount and Mark-up Game where I examined the trade-off between
earnings and perceived mark-up on a participant’s probability of purchasing the virtual product.
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Figure 1.5: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
(a) Study 2A: Baseline
(b) Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed
Note: Purchase rate of the coupon-trap good by extra discount from purchasing the coupon-trap good. The
coupon-trap good is the virtual product that led to a $5 discount which, by design, led to lower earnings. Panel
A shows results for Study 2A: Baseline and Panel B shows results for Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed.
Robust standard error bars clustered at the individual level are shown around each mean.
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over, splitting the sample by extra earnings lost, we can see that this effect is primarily
driven by decisions when extra earnings lost is $1 (i.e., rather than $3).62
Table 1.3 Panel A presents the results of a regression that exploits the variation in extra
earnings and extra discount gained if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap compared to
the alternative good in Study 2A: Baseline. The regression specification estimated is as
follows:
Purchaseit =α+ β1 × Extra Earningsit + β2 × Extra Discountit + i
where Purchaseit is whether participant i decided to purchase the coupon-trap good in deci-
sion t in the Coupon Game; Extra Earningsit is the extra earnings (in dollars) achieved if the
consumer purchases the coupon-trap (compared to the alternative good); and Extra Discountit
is the extra discount (in dollars) if the consumer purchases the coupon-trap good. I control
for the decision order and cluster the random error, i, at the individual level.
Results from regression (1), show that increasing extra earnings lost by a dollar decreases
the purchase rate of the coupon-trap good by 3.3 percentage points. On the other hand,
increasing the extra discount gained by a dollar increases the purchase rate of the coupon-
trap good by 1.9 percentage points. As a robustness check, regression (2) estimates a Probit
model and presents marginal effects (holding all other independent variables constant at
their means) and shows consistent results.63
Conditional on earnings, results suggest individuals are responding to changes in extra
discount gained. Notably, this was a within-subject design. Thus, the same participants
who bought the alternative good, revealing that they did value their earnings, “switched”
their purchase decisions when the extra discount from the coupon-trap good was sufficiently
high. That is, they were willing to give up actual money for transaction utility.
62See Table A.2.2 regressions (2) and (3) in the Appendix.
63See Table A.2.3 regressions (1) and (2) in the Appendix for estimates using only participants who passed
the comprehension questions on the first try.
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Table 1.3: Trade-off between Extra Earnings and Extra Perceived Discount Realized by
Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
Panel A: Study 2A Baseline
Dependent Variable: Purchase of Coupon-Trap Good
OLS Probit
(1) (2)
Extra Earnings (in $) -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)




Ind. Clusters 101 101
Order Control Yes Yes
Observations 606 606
R-Squared 0.0103
Panel B: Study 2B With Earnings Displayed
Dependent Variable: Purchase of Coupon-Trap Good
OLS Probit
(1) (2)
Extra Earnings (in $) -0.022∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)




Ind. Clusters 103 103
Order Control Yes Yes
Observations 618 618
R-Squared 0.00981
Notes: Trade-off between extra earnings and extra discount if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap
good on participants’ purchasing decisions. The coupon-trap good is the virtual product that led to
a $5 discount gained which, by design, led to lower earnings. Panel A shows results for Study 2A:
Baseline and Panel B shows results for Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed. I control for the game
period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.4.3. How robust are transaction utility effects?
I use Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed to stress-test the effect of transaction utility.
Recall that displaying earnings does not give the participant new information, as he can
calculate his earnings with the value, coupon, and original price provided. However, we
should expect smaller transaction utility effects in this setting since showing earnings may
encourage participants to think about their earnings, making consumption utility more
salient.
Figure 1.5 Panel B shows the average purchase rate of the coupon-trap good by the extra
discount if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap good compared to the alternative good
(mirroring Figure 1.5 Panel A) for Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed. Results are direc-
tionally consistent with a setting where participants are not explicitly shown their earnings
but differences between conditions are no longer significant in a regression (see Table A.2.1
regressions (5) and (6) in the Appendix). However, notice that participants are still choosing
to purchase the coupon-trap good 15-20% of the time. Limiting the data to the “smarter”
cohort of participants—participants who passed the comprehension questions on their first
attempt—shows results are marginally significant (see Table A.2.1 regressions (7) and (8)
in the Appendix).64
Focusing on the slope of extra discount if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap good,
Table A.2.2 regression (4) in the Appendix shows increasing the extra discount by a dollar
directionally increases the purchase rate by 1.5 percentage points (p-value=0.13). Similar
to the baseline study, splitting the sample by extra earnings lost, shows that this effect is
primarily driven by decisions where the extra earnings lost is $1 compared to $3. When
extra earnings lost from purchasing the coupon-trap good is $1, increasing the extra discount
by a dollar increases participants’ purchase rate of the coupon-trap good by 2.7 percentage
points, and this is significant at the 10% level.65
64Also see Figure A.2.2 Panel B in the Appendix.
65See Table A.2.2 regressions (2) and (3) in the Appendix.
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Table 1.3 Panel B presents the trade-off between extra earnings and extra discount if a
consumer purchases the coupon-trap good (mirroring Table 1.3 Panel A) for participants
in Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed. Estimates are directionally consistent with those
in the baseline study where earnings were not displayed. Increasing the earnings lost from
purchasing the coupon-trap good decreases its purchase rate by 2.2 percentage points. On
the other hand, increasing the extra discount by a dollar increases the probability of pur-
chasing the coupon-trap good by 1.5 percentage points but this is not. Regression (2) uses a
Probit model, and reports marginal effects (holding all other independent variables at their
mean), and shows a consistent story.66
1.4.4. Heterogeneity of transaction utility
Following Study 1, I explore consumer heterogeneity in the Coupon Game. Looking at
the same four groups as before: gender, whether a participant has taken a marketing 101
course, and participants’ self-reported measures of caring about discounts and being averse
to mark-ups, I use a difference-in-differences regression that interacts the extra discount
if consumers purchase the coupon-trap good and a binary (or categorical) measure of the
four heterogeneity groups. I do not find statistically significant differences between those
groups, possibly due to my lack of statistical power in this game with only 6 choices per
subject (see Table A.2.4 in the Appendix).
1.4.5. MRS of consumption and transaction utility and WTP
Using the Coupon Game, I perform the same coefficients comparison as before to estimate
participants’ willingness to pay for a $1 gain in perceived discount (that is, transaction
utility). I use Table 1.3 Panel A and compare the coefficients between extra earnings and
extra discount if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap good to estimate a marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and transaction utility. I find that participants are
willing to pay 57 cents to gain a dollar of transaction utility. Coefficients in Table 1.3
66See Table A.2.3 regressions (1) and (2) in the Appendix for estimates using only participants who passed
the comprehension questions on the first try.
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Panel B are noisy. As such, I use coefficients from the “smarter” cohort of participants in
Table A.2.3 to estimate a lower bound for the marginal rate of substitution: participants
are willing to pay a minimum of 37 cents to gain a dollar of transaction utility. Notice,
this willingness to pay is similar to the 37-78 cents estimated in the Discount and Mark-up
Game. While we might expect individuals to be willing to pay less for a perceived discount
than for a perceived mark-up, in accordance with loss aversion, it is possible that coupons
make transaction utility more salient.
Using the marginal rate of substitution of 57 cents suggests that increasing the original
price by a dollar increases participants’ willingness to pay for a product by 36 cents. Once
again, this suggests that coupons’ effectiveness may be due in large part to its effects on
transaction utility.
1.4.6. Alternative Explanations?
The Coupon Game, which mirrors buying products with coupons, showed that participants
respond to changes in discount gained in a manner consistent with a theory of transaction
utility. This suggests that coupons may trap consumers into purchasing more expensive
products to obtain higher discounts at the expense of consumption utility.67 Following the
approach in Study 1, I discuss and rule out alternative explanations for these experimental
results.
1.4.6.1. The role of complexity
As before, we might question the complexity of the Coupon Game and whether participants
understood how to calculate their earnings for each virtual product. Similar to Study
1, all participants had to correctly answer two comprehension questions which consisted
of calculating their earnings if they chose to buy item Y or item Z before proceeding to
the game. While it appears that this earnings calculation is difficult, with only 50% of
67This latter result is consistent with prior work showing that coupons may increase spending by consumers
(Milkman and Beshears, 2009); however, I show that it not only increases spending but may also lead to
suboptimal decisions, that is, it leads to lower consumption utility.
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participants passing both comprehension question on the first try, participants had to pass
the comprehension questions to proceed. As such, they are capable of doing the correct
earnings calculations. One could imagine that participants who passed the comprehension
questions on their first attempt are a “smarter” cohort. As a robustness check, I present
results for only participants who passed the comprehension questions on the first try in the
Appendix (see Figure A.2.2 and Table A.2.1). Results are robust to this subset of “smarter”
participants.68 Importantly, participants’ purchase rate of the coupon-trap good responds
to both changes in the extra earnings and to extra discount gained as predicted by the
transaction utility model.
Moreover, Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed actually does the required math for par-
ticipants by displaying potential earnings prior to making their decisions. However, even
in this game participants still sacrifice higher earnings for a larger discount 15-20% of the
time and results on the slope of coupon-trap good purchase with respect to discount are
marginally significant when isolating to decisions where the earnings lost is $1.
1.4.6.2. The role of anchoring
As stated in Section 1.3.6.3, judgment uncertainty is removed or minimized by assigning
the buyer’s value of the two products, so anchoring effects should be minimal. However,
if transaction utility exists, then individuals may anchor to the $5 value of the coupon as
the target amount of transaction utility to achieve. In a companion paper (Huang, 2018),
I provide suggestive evidence that coupon values may act as targets, increasing the weight
placed on transaction utility.
1.4.6.3. The role of experimenter demand
As in Study 1, one might worry about experimenter demand driving these results. Again, I
find this is not the case. First, I again find that there is no difference in transaction utility
68While there is a level change across all six purchasing decisions, effects due to changes in earnings and
perceived discounts if a consumer purchases the coupon-trap good persist.
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effects between rookie and veteran lab experiment participants.69
Moreover, in the spirit of de Quidt et al. (2018), Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, where
participants are displayed their potential earnings prior to making their decision, could
again be thought of as producing experimenter demand for participants to place more value
on their earnings. In Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, while the slope of extra discount
on the purchase rate of the coupon-trap good is only directionally consistent, participants
are still choosing to purchase the coupon-trap good 15-20% of the time (see Figure 1.5 Panel
B).70
1.4.7. Summary of Study 2
Results from the Coupon Game provide further evidence that consumers care about the
terms of the deal, it can distort purchasing behavior, and it can induce the purchase of
products that lead to lower consumption utility. I again argue that alternative explanations
are not sufficient to explain the experimental results. Moreover, quantifying participant’s
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and transaction utility (i.e., their will-
ingness to pay to gain a dollar worth of perceived discount) suggests that actual monetary
losses due to transaction utility are non-trivial.71
1.5. General Discussion
Do consumers place value on the perceived quality of a “deal” and, if so, can it lead them
to sacrifice consumption utility? This paper provides evidence that the answer is yes.
Two incentive-compatible laboratory experiments, mirroring the shopping experience with
discounts and mark-ups (Study 1) and coupons (Study 2), demonstrate that transaction
utility can shift demand and lead to perverse changes in consumption decisions. I find
that consumers gain utility from discounts and disutility from mark-ups, following past
69See Table A.2.4 regression (5) in the Appendix.
70Furthermore, focusing on only the smarter cohort of participants who passed the comprehension check
on the first try in Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed, I find that participants are 9.4 percentage points
more likely to buy the coupon-trap good when the extra perceived discount is $4.00 compared to $0.50 and
this is a marginally significant (see Table A.2.1 regression (7) and (8)).
71See Appendix A.2 for additional results on monotonicity.
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research on “transaction utility” (Thaler, 1985, 1999, 2008). Thus, individuals may choose
to purchase a discounted, inferior good, or refuse to purchase a marked-up, superior good,
to gain transaction utility or avoid transaction disutility. Indeed, my estimates suggest the
marginal rate of substitution between earnings and transaction utility is 57 to 78 cents.72
Moreover, these estimates suggest that a dollar change in the reference price (i.e., the
original price) can change consumer’s willingness to pay for a product by 36 to 44 cents.
These estimates suggest that transaction utility is highly relevant across a wide array of
consumer decisions and purchasing behaviors.
Importantly, results from both experiments were not driven by product quality inference. If
consumers are inferring quality from an original price, then updating of beliefs may play a
role in explaining distortions. However this is not possible for my study participants because
they are making decisions over virtual products with assigned valuations. Moreover, par-
ticipants had to successfully answer two comprehension questions to proceed to each game,
thus they had the ability to do the math. Finally, effects persisted to varying degrees even
after displaying potential earnings before participants made their decision. This suggests
results were driven by transaction utility.
Future research should further explore the effects of attention and prior beliefs on transac-
tion utility. Attention to “irrelevant” original prices may depend on the transaction context
and consumers’ prior experience.73 Well-informed consumers may respond less to “irrel-
evant” original prices or consumers may respond more to “irrelevant” original prices for
rarely purchased goods (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Armstrong and Chen, 2013). For ex-
ample, consumers rarely buy mattresses or rugs. Thus perceived sales from “irrelevant”
original prices may be more believable and effective for these products. On the other hand,
consumers may be less likely to be fooled by “irrelevant” original prices for products they
72Consumers are willing to pay 57 cents to gain a dollar of perceived discount and 78 cents to avoid a
dollar of perceived mark-up.
73Prior models have theorized the effect of references prices on consumers’ demand for a product using
signaling (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Armstrong and Chen, 2013), attention (Gabaix et al., 2006; Koszegi
and Szeidl, 2013), and bargain-hunting (Armstrong and Chen, 2013). These models suggest attention to
prior prices and experience could mediate transaction utility effects.
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purchase everyday.74 When faced with “irrelevant” original prices, consumers may find some
perceived discounts and mark-ups more believable than others, based on prior experience
and recall. Attention to “irrelevant” original prices may produce stronger responses from
less-informed and inexperienced consumers than more-informed and experienced ones.
Moreover, distortions of purchasing behavior due to transaction utility produced by “irrele-
vant” original prices may only last as long as the “irrelevant” original prices are believable.
Extremely high discounts and consistent sales may lead consumers to believe that the trans-
action utility gained is “fake” and thus diminish its utility. Further research is needed to
estimate consumers’ sensitivity to consistent sales as well as the credibility of “fictitious”
original prices. Additional research is also needed to compare different sales tactics and
explore how they perform relative to one another. Finally, future research should also focus
on understanding the “half-life” of transaction utility. How long-lasting is the experience
of getting a good deal? What is the depreciation rate of transaction utility? Understand-
ing how permanent transaction utility is could have important implications for consumer’s
welfare and long-term consumer policy and firm pricing regulations.
In general, understanding how transaction utility can affect demand is of great importance
for firm pricing strategy as virtually every retail firm engages in some form of discount or
sales tactic. For example, years after JCPenney’s pricing debacle, the company’s sales have
yet to recover fully, suggesting transaction utility could play an important role in short and
long-term firm pricing strategy (Mourdoukoutas, 2017).
Policymakers and regulators will also be interested in how transaction utility can be ma-
nipulated to exploit consumers. For example, research has shown an increase in the use of
inflated “fictitious” original prices by retailers. Some of the most egregious pricing prac-
tices had items offered “on sale” more than 75% of the time.75 Evidence from a large set of
74Although some consumers may be less likely to remember prior selling prices (Dickson and Sawyer,
1990).
75Beginning March 2017, Consumer’s Checkbook tracked the prices offered by 19 national chains for 20
big-ticket items at each store for 44 weeks. They found the use of inflated original prices and discounts
more widespread compared to similar research performed in 2014 and 2015. See Brasler (2018). Con-
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class action lawsuits alleging that firms use “fictitious” original prices to create perception
of discounts and trick consumers into purchasing suggests firms are exploiting consumers
using transaction utility.
Finally, from a litigation perspective, evidence of consumers being deceived and suffering
economic harm (i.e., welfare loss) due to “fictitious” original prices is a necessary condition
in court rulings. However, typical rulings favor the advertisers and sellers because assessing
material damages associated with fictitious pricing is difficult (Friedman, 2016). If firms
are using fake prices to trick consumers into purchasing then transaction utility achieved
is not only a non-pecuniary, intangible gain, but it but could also be considered as “fake
transaction utility.” Showing evidence that “fictitious” original prices distort consumer
behavior and lead to material losses is pertinent to such lawsuits. Moreover, quantifying
participant’s willingness to pay to gain a dollar of perceived discount or avoid a dollar of
perceived mark-up provides a benchmark for economic harm.
sumer’s Checkbook is an independent, non-profit consumer organization founded in 1974 to provide survey
information to consumers about vendors and service providers (see http://www.checkbook.org).
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CHAPTER 2 : The Myth of the Male Negotiator: Gender’s Effect on Negotiation
Strategies and Outcomes
2.1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that men outperform women in negotiations. However, this
popular tale has surprisingly little empirical support. We know that women negotiate less
than men (Leibbrandt and List, 2015; Small et al., 2007; Exley et al., 2016). We also know
that outside observers rate their performance worse (Bowles et al., 2007; Tinsley et al.,
2009; Bowles, 2012; Bowles and Babcock, 2013; Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013). But do
they actually get less at the negotiating table?
Apparent evidence for this gender gap in negotiation performance actually comes from
either one-shot bargaining games (i.e., ultimatum or dictator games) that explicitly do not
have a communication feature (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Sutter et al., 2009;
Ridgon, 2012; Demiral and Mollerstrom, 2017; Eckel et al., 2008) or alternating bargaining
with numeric offers only (Dittrich et al., 2012; Andersen et al., 2015; Hernandez-Arenaz
and Iriberri, 2016, 2018). If verbal communication is the essence of negotiation in practice,
we lack incentivized evidence of relative performance in this crucial domain.1
In this paper, we fill this gap by measuring relative outcomes in an incentivized verbal
negotiation. We might expect that the presence of verbal communication would exacerbate
the differences found in the no-communication bargaining literature, since men might exploit
women’s gender to target them with more aggressive communication strategies, mirroring
the finding in non-communication games where men play more “hawkishly” toward female
partners, anticipating a more “dovish” response (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Holm, 2000;
Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Houser and Schunk, 2009).2 What we find is precisely the opposite.
1There is evidence from other fields that examines performance in scenarios with no monetary incentives,
such as classroom negotiation exercises (Bowles et al., 2005; Kray et al., 2002, 2001; Walters et al., 1998;
Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999; Mazei et al., 2015).
2Moreover, the fact that women have been shown to be more generous, community-minded, and
inequality-averse in experimental games (Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni
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Relative to a control game where we replicate the literature’s finding of a male advantage,
we find that the introduction of verbal communication disadvantages men, leading to lower
payoffs.
Furthermore, by randomly assigning whether gender information is revealed or not, we
show that this wedge between the negotiation game and control game is created by the
use of gender information to tailor one’s strategies. In the non-communication game, men
optimally exploit gender information to be more hawkish toward female partners and less
so toward male partners, exactly as the literature would suggest. In the negotiation game,
however, strategy tailoring is inverted. By analyzing the natural language data created
by the chat negotiations, we find that while there are no significant gender differences in
communication strategy in the absence of gender information, with gender information,
men tailor their communication strategies in the negotiation game in exactly the opposite
direction one might expect based on the one-shot bargaining literature. Men are starkly
more aggressive toward men than women. For example, men issue ultimatums to male
partners 121% more frequently than toward female partners.
This behavior is not explained by a difference in optimal strategies between the negotiation
and the non-communication game. In fact, payoffs show that men’s use of aggressive and
yielding strategies appear mis-paired with whom they are most effective against. The use of
tough strategies, used much more with men, reduces payoffs against male, but not female,
partners. Similarly, yielding strategies, used far more frequently against women, increases
payoffs against male, but not female partners.
We thus posit that complying with social norms or non-pecuniary values may explain this
paradoxical result. Men may feel constrained in their use of aggressive strategies toward
women, or, in other words, derive negative utility from using aggressive communication
toward women. Similarly, they may derive some social or other non-pecuniary benefit from
and Vesterlund, 2001; Heinz et al., 2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) provides further evidence that targeting
them with more hawkish behavior could pay off.
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using such aggressive communication against men, even when it reduces their monetary
payoff.
This latter result could be referred to as a manifestation of “toxic masculinity.” In the non-
communication game, men curtail their naturally more aggressive play when they know
they are facing a male partner. However, in the negotiation game, men persist in their
use of aggressive strategies toward men, despite it increasing negotiation breakdown. This
leads to a startling result: Male-male pairs are the least efficient in the negotiation game,
earning $15.60 in joint payoffs compared to over $18 for other pair-types (and a possible
$20 at a fully efficient equilibrium). That is, adding a woman to the negotiation increases
joint payoffs, by around $3 out of $20.
Our experiment shows that situations with communication may be fundamentally different
than games with no interaction, and thus there are limits in the external validity of bar-
gaining games to what we think of as “negotiation” in the business or legal world. In doing
so, we poke holes in the myth of the “great” male negotiator. We show that, in our setting,
women perform equally well as men in the negotiation game with no gender information,
while introducing gender information, men perform worse in the negotiation game relative
to the control game. Moreover, having women at the negotiating table increases efficiency
of negotiations.
We additionally provide a methodological contribution to the literature, providing an in-
centivized game that can be used to easily measure outcomes in verbal negotiations without
confounding from overly complex negotiation scenarios. Our negotiation scenario can also
be easily implemented as a non-communication game, allowing comparability across commu-
nication settings. also be outcomes to settings without communication. Lastly, we design
a neutral framing negotiation game which mirrors the payoffs from Battle of the Sexes,
creating an incentive compatible (and replicable) game as well as.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents the experimental
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design, Section 2.3 shows the impact of gender information in settings with and without
communication based on our quantitative and qualitative data, Section 2.4 provides plau-
sible mechanisms, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Experimental Design and Hypothesis
Our experiment investigates the role of gender in negotiations using a neutral frame and
incentive compatible negotiation game.3 Participants are matched in pairs in a given round
and negotiate how to divide $20. Each participant could choose either $15 for themselves
or $5 for themselves. If they agree, meaning one chooses $15 while one chooses $5, the split
is implemented and participants receive their respective shares as earnings. If they fail to
agree, that is, both choose $15 or $5, then they both gets $0. Notice, these payoffs mirror




A (15, 5) (0,0)
B (0, 0) (5, 15)
The experimental design varies the availability of verbal communication and partner gender
information. In the negotiation game, negotiating partners were allowed to communicate
via unstructured chat for two and a half minutes. After the expiration of the chat period,
participants simultaneously made their choices without further communication. All par-
ticipants also played a control game without communication, this allows us to separately
identify the effect of verbal communication and compare it to outcomes in one-shot bar-
gaining literature. In the control game, participants play the same game but simply make
their choice simultaneously with their partner.
We also randomized whether participants were informed or not of their partner’s gender
information (at the session level).4 In order inform participants of their partner’s gender
3The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4Under the informed condition, gender information is public.
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without making it overly salient (and cuing this as a gender study), all negotiating pairs
were shown a partner information sheet with five plausibly relevant, but actually substan-
tively meaningless, partner characteristics prior to making their choices.5 When gender
information was public, an additional line containing their partner’s gender was simply
inserted as the first characteristic (see Appendix Figure A.6.3).
In total, we have four conditions: (1) an informed negotiation game, (2) a uninformed
negotiation game, (3) an informed control (non-communication) game, and (4) a uninformed
control (non-communication) game.6
The informed negotiation game can be thought of as the closest stand-in for real negotia-
tions, since, in practice, individuals rarely negotiate without actual communication or are
able to “hide” their gender. While the control game serves as a baseline on behavior that
mirrors the literature, the uninformed negotiation game serves to isolate the role of gender
information in creating the dynamics observed.
The full experiment proceeded as follows. Subjects played a total of eight rounds with their
partner randomly assigned in each round. First, subjects played four rounds of the control
game, followed by four rounds of the negotiation game. After all eight rounds, one round
is randomly selected and subjects received their earnings from that round (in addition to a
show-up fee). No information about the outcomes of each round was revealed until the end
to limit learning effects.7
In the control game, there are two pure strategy equilibria and a mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the pure strategy equilibria, either Participant 1 chooses $15 for themselves and Partici-
5The five characteristics revealed in the partner information sheet were: if their partner (1) is left-
or right-handed; (2) is an only child; (3) their month of birth; (4) could roll their tongue; and (5) had
hitchhiker thumbs. This partner information sheet was shown to subjects for 15 seconds before proceeding
to the “choice” window, and was also displayed on the “choice” window. This information was designed to
seem potentially relevant, and plausibly related to some other research objectives, but highly unlikely to
actually influence what a person would choose in the game, and thus have little effect on strategic behavior.
6See Appendix A.6 for experimental protocol.
7Prior to the eight game rounds, subjects played two practice rounds of the control game with the same
payoffs against a computer to understand the game, this also minimizes in-game learning (and we control
for order effects). At the end of the study, subjects also answered a post-survey.
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pant 2 chooses $5 for themselves or Participant 1 chooses $5 for themselves and Participant
2 chooses $15 for themselves, leading to those payoffs, respectively. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, each participant chooses $15 for themselves (i.e., their preferred choice) 75%
of the time, leading to an expected payoff of $3.75, which is a lower payoff than one would
achieve choosing randomly.
Like a typical negotiation, payoffs in our game are set up such that both participants
prefer an agreement to their outside option of $0, but there is disagreement over whom the
agreement favors (that is, who will choose $15 for themselves). Moreover, there is no strong
theoretical predictions for which one of the pure strategy equilibria will be selected, and
thus there is scope for this ultimate outcome to depend on the effectiveness of each party’s
communication.
Moreover, gender information can distort these predictions. We know from prior literature
that in the absence of communication (i.e, the control game) partner gender can act as a
coordination device with men choosing $15 for themselves more often (and women choosing
$5) leading to higher coordination in mixed gender pairs and men reaping the benefits of
this increased coordination. However it is unclear how the role of gender information will
impact payoffs in the negotiation game.
2.3. Results
A total of 232 subjects participated in the experiment yielding over 1800 observations.8
All individuals participated in both the control and negotiation games, thus the subject
pool is identical. Subjects in the informed and uninformed conditions are balanced on all
characteristics with the exception of being a US citizen.9
8Participants are students from the University of Pennsylvania across a wide range of disciplines. They
participated in 1 of 21 sessions at the Wharton Behavioral Lab in October 2016. We restricted only an equal
number of women and men to play the game, in order to have sufficient observations for male-female pairs.
If there were additional women or men in the session, these extra subjects were diverted to a separate game,
and excluded from our sample. The WBL subject pool skews female, and thus these exclusions were entirely
female (and randomly selected). We exclude data from three sessions that had only one male participant.
9See Appendix Table A.3.1. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of individual controls,
including being a US citizen, and session controls.
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2.3.1. Negotiation Payoffs by Gender
Our principal outcome is the payoff in the negotiation game—the number of dollars a player
ends each game with, whether $0, $5, or $15. We want to analyze the impact of gender and
the impact of verbal communication on this outcome. We thus run the following regression
specification:
Payoffi = β0 + β1malei × negotiationi + β2malei + β3 negotiationi + β4Xi + i
where negotiationi represents whether the payoff is from the communication game or the
control game and malei reflects whether the subject is male, and Xi reflects controls for ses-
sion timing, round order, and subject characteristics, added in even columns (odd columns
are raw data). We cluster standard errors at the individual level, since individuals play
multiple games.
Table 2.1, regressions (1) and (2), shows the results of this specification on the pooled
informed and uninformed treatments. These results show that men perform worse relative
to women in the negotiation game compared to the control game. Regression (1) shows that
men earn $0.88 more than women in the control game, but in the negotiation game, this
effect is more than reversed: their relative payoff is reduced by $1.25. Thus, the presence
of verbal communication disadvantages men.
Figure 2.1 shows the breakdown of the payoffs for men and women that underlay these
results, splitting them into the game with gender information and without. This breakdown
shows that this inversion of results between the communication and control games appears
in the treatment where gender information is provided.
When informed of gender, men outperform in the control game, but (more than) lose
this advantage in the negotiation game. Payoffs are naturally higher in the game with
negotiation, as coordination is increased versus the one-shot game, but this reverses, rather
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Table 2.1: Payoff by Treatment and Gender
Dependent variable: Payoff
All Informed Uninformed All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 0.884∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗ 1.964∗∗∗ 0.0455 0.177 0.0455 0.166
(0.397) (0.396) (0.561) (0.531) (0.542) (0.539) (0.541) (0.555)
Male × Negotiation -1.250∗∗ -1.304∗∗ -2.254∗∗∗ -2.361∗∗∗ -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136
(0.527) (0.527) (0.697) (0.697) (0.784) (0.789) (0.783) (0.785)
Male × Negotiation × Informed -2.118∗∗ -2.224∗∗
(1.047) (1.048)
Male × Informed 1.594∗∗ 1.740∗∗
(0.779) (0.772)




Negotiation 4.935∗∗∗ 5.271∗∗∗ 5.143∗∗∗ 5.655∗∗∗ 4.705∗∗∗ 4.850∗∗∗ 4.705∗∗∗ 4.986∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.614) (0.466) (0.877) (0.498) (0.860) (0.497) (0.695)
Constant 4.019∗∗∗ 5.769∗∗∗ 4.016∗∗∗ 5.362∗∗∗ 4.023∗∗∗ 6.533∗∗∗ 4.023∗∗∗ 5.305∗∗∗
(0.260) (1.156) (0.373) (1.559) (0.363) (1.781) (0.362) (1.235)
Ind. Clusters 232 231 122 121 110 110 232 231
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1856 1848 976 968 880 880 1856 1848
R-Squared 0.122 0.131 0.114 0.138 0.138 0.144 0.127 0.136
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Session controls include day of the week, within
day trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin politically liberal, being a US citizen,
being a native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Figure 2.1: Payoff by Treatment and Gender
Notes: Average payoff by treatment and gender. Standard error bars are shown around each mean.
than widens, the gender gap in payoffs. Meanwhile, when uninformed, men and women
perform equally well in both games. This suggests that differences in payoff between men
and women are not driven by the setup of the game but rather the availability of partner
gender information. Moreover, the role of gender information results in inverse payoff
patterns in the presence of verbal communication.
Regressions (3) and (4) show results under the informed treatment whereas regressions (5)
and (6) restrict to the uninformed treatment. This analysis demonstrates that the effect
is entirely driven by the public gender information setting, which is the setting. When
informed of gender, men outperform women in the non-communication (control) game,
earning on average $1.64 more (a substantial effect when average payoffs are around $4).
But this advantage is more than reversed in the negotiation game, with men earning $2.25
less in the negotiation game relative to the control game. Meanwhile, the uninformed
treatment shows shows that in both games men have no inherent edge over women—both
genders perform equally well in terms of payoff.
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Regressions (7) and (8) uses all the data and adds interactions between the two games and
information conditions, to confirm that the difference between the informed and uninformed
treatments is statistically significant. Indeed, communication does not impact payoffs for
men when partner gender is unknown, while significantly decreasing payoffs when gender
is known. This interaction suggests that, contrary to prior results in one-shot bargaining
games, verbal communication in a negotiation significantly reduces the value of gender
information to male participants. While men take advantage of gender information to
increase payoffs in the control game, gender information does not provide an advantage in
the negotiation game. This demonstrates that non-communication bargaining games are
limited in their external validity as a proxy for “real-world” negotiations, which involve
direct communication.10
2.3.2. Tailoring by Partner Gender
In this section, we explore the drivers of men’s apparent negotiation disadvantage, and in
particular their use of partner gender information to tailor their strategy. We show that
men’s payoff reversal between the negotiation and the control games is due to men failure to
tailor their actions and communication strategies based on partner gender in the negotiation
game.
2.3.2.1. Actions by Partner Gender
First we explore men’s probability of choosing $15 for themselves (i.e. their preferred
choice) in both games with and without gender information. As shown in Figure 2.2, in
the informed control game, both men and women choose $15 for themselves less often
against male compared to female partners. The tailoring by men is optimal from a payoff
perspective, because women choose $15 less often against male partners thus leading to
10Appendix Figure A.3.1 shows the average joint payoffs received by different gender-pair types in each
treatment. In the informed control game, men do better both against other male and female partners. In
particular, we observe gender information increasing coordination (and thus payoffs) with men in mixed-
gender pairs reaping the benefits and obtaining higher payoffs compared to their female partners. However,
in the informed negotiation game, men do not have an advantage against women, that is, we do not observe
the unequal split in payoffs in mixed-gendered pairs, and perform worse against male partners.
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increased coordination and payoffs.11
Figure 2.2: Choose $15 by Treatment and Gender-Pair
(a) Negotiation (b) Non-Communication (Control)
Notes: Average rate of choosing $15 for themselves by communication, information condition, and gender pair-type.
The gray bars are for subjects who are uninformed of their partner’s gender, the white bars are for subjects who are
informed that their partner’s gender is male, and the black bars are for subjects who are informed that their partner’s
gender is female. The solid horizontal gray line marks the theoretical mixed strategy equilibrium which is picking
$15 for themselves ($5 for their partner) 75 percent of the time. The dashed horizontal gray line marks 50 percent
probability which denotes equal split and full coordination. Standard errors bars are shown around each mean.
By contrast, in the informed negotiation game, men’s action when gender is known appears
to invert from the previously observed optimal tailoring. Men choose $15 for themselves
less often against female compared to male partners. These effects are absent when gender
is unknown, indicating that men’s negotiation disadvantage is driven by their inability to
capitalize on gender information and tailor their behavior optimally.
2.3.2.2. Communication Strategy by Partner Gender
Our experiment yielded 464 negotiation conversations giving us a rich dataset to further un-
derstand how the role of gender information affects the way men and women communicate.
Below, we first describe our textual analysis methodology and then present our results.
11See Appendix Table A.3.2 for results in a regression framework.
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Negotiation transcript coding
To analyze the negotiation transcripts, we used 310 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
workers to classify chat transcripts according to definitions we provided.12 MTurk work-
ers were blind to the gender of participants, whether participants were informed of their
partner’s gender, and the overall objective of the study. On average, five different MTurk
workers classified each negotiation transcript. We use the average score given by the MTurk
workers for each communication measure in each negotiation.
We defined two specific strategies used and two negotiation styles as our key communication
measures.13 On one side of the communication strategy spectrum, our two key “aggressive”
communication measures are hard commitment (a strategy) and tough talker (a style). We
defined hard commitment as one negotiating party intransigently insisting they are choosing
$15, and refusing to entertain any discussion to the contrary.14 If credible, this makes the
other party’s best response to choose $5, or face mismatch and thus $0, essentially turning
two-way communication into one-way communication.15 Of course, hard commitment is not
always effective. It can be met with countervailing “commitment” from the other partner, or
may destroy goodwill in the negotiation and result in mismatch. A tough talker was defined
as a “pushy” or “mean” negotiator that fights for the $15 and actively tries to convince the
other person to choose $5, but does not necessarily lay out the “all or nothing” ultimatum
implied by hard commitment.16
12See Appendix A.7 for negotiation transcript coding protocol.
13We defined several other metrics to examine the mechanisms behind paradoxical gender tailoring and
the robustness of our results. Usage rates for these secondary measures can be found in Appendix Table
A.3.7.
14Some participants described this trade-off explicitly to their partners, saying, “I’m choosing 15 no matter
what. So if you want anything you only have one option.”
15Previous work on coordination games has shown that while one-way communication can be very effective,
two-way communication can sometimes fail to resolve the issue, and becomes, in a sense, no communication.
In the presence of one-way communication, if one side communicates their move, the other side has a clear
best response to choose the coordinating move. However, with two-way communication, a tussle can develop
over who receives their preferred outcome (Cooper et al., 1989).
16For specific definition given to MTurk workers see Appendix A.7. We defined several other metrics to
examine the mechanisms behind paradoxical gender tailoring and the robustness of our results. Usage rates
for these secondary measures can be found in Appendix Table A.3.7.
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On the other side of the communication strategy spectrum, our two key “yielding” commu-
nication measures are offer $15 (strategy) and friendly negotiator (style). We defined offer
$15 as individuals who outright offer that their negotiating partner can take the higher
payoff of $15, thus guaranteeing coordination but yielding a lower payoff than the average
in the session. A friendly negotiator is a negotiator who is trying to build up-front rapport,
and acts friendly towards their negotiating partner.”
Paradoxical tailoring of communication strategies
We demonstrate that the paradoxical tailoring of men’s actions in the negotiation game is
an extension of their gendered communication strategy within the negotiation itself.
Based on both the literature and the non-communication game, we might expect men to be
more “hawkish” in their communication toward women, expecting a more “dovish” response,
just as their approach to the control game appears to anticipate less aggressive action by
women.
However, we find that men’s tailoring of their communication strategies goes in the opposite
direction. Figure 2.3 presents the average rate men and women used our four key commu-
nication measures by partner gender and show that men are substantially less likely to use
aggressive communication strategies against female compared to male partners. Likewise,
we find that men are more likely to use yielding communication strategies against female
compared to male partners.
Figure 2.3 Panel A shows that men are 14.7 percentage points less likely to use hard commit-
ment against known female compared to male partners, that is, men are 121% more likely
to use hard commitment against known male partners compared to known female partners.
Similarly, Figure 2.3 Panel B shows that men are 12.6 percentage points less likely to be
tough talkers towards female compared to male partners, that is, 129% more likely to be a
tough talker against known male partners.17
17Appendix Table A.3.3 Panel A shows that results are statistically significant at the 1% level for hard
commitment and tough talker. Men’s tailoring in response to gender information is so strong that it eliminates
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Figure 2.3: Aggressive and Yielding Communication Strategies
by Treatment and Gender-Pair
(a) Hard Commit (b) Tough Talker
(c) Offer $15 (d) Friendly Negotiator
Notes: Average rate that men and women use aggressive and yielding communication measures by information
condition and gender pair-types. The gray bars are for subjects who are uninformed of their partner’s gender, the
white bars are for subjects who are informed that their partner’s gender is male, and the black bars are for subjects
who are informed that their partner’s gender is female. Standard errors bars are shown around each mean.
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Figure 2.3 Panel C shows that men are directionally more likely to offer $15 to a known
female compared to male partner. Similarly, Figure 2.3 Panel D shows that men are 13.4
percentage points more likely to be friendly negotiators against known female partners
compared to male partners (that is, a 22% increase).18
One might worry that this behavior is not reflective of men’s responsiveness to gender
information, but rather a joint product of men’s and women’s behavior in the negotiation.
We show this is not the case, focusing on participants in the uninformed treatment we
find there is no significant tailoring of men’s strategies (see Appendix Table A.3.3 Panel
B). Moreover, we show that men’s use of hard commitment, being a tough talker, and
being a friendly negotiator toward women is significantly different when informed versus
uninformed.19 In other words, men only decreased their use of aggressive strategies and
increased their use of yielding strategies toward women when informed of their partner’s
gender. Our results are robust to limiting to those who hard commit as a first action,
further ruling out that it is a response to the other player’s behavior.20
2.4. Potential Explanations
In this section explore potential mechanisms for this paradoxical tailoring. We provide
suggestive evidence that tailoring in the negotiation game is suboptimal. We also rule out
the possibility of gender-specific altruism. Instead, we provide a third explanation: men
may be constrained in their strategy by gendered social norms.
the original gender effect in negotiation behavior—when men play against known female partners, they tailor
their communication behavior to the point of behaving like female players. Perhaps for this reason, we find
very little tailoring in women’s behavior (if anything, it goes in the opposite direction, with women acting
more aggressively toward other women), since, to them, male and female partners use aggressive strategies
at similar rates. Prior literature has shown that women are more responsive and tailor their negotiation
“persistence” more than men (Bowles and Flynn, 2010). However, in our case, male and female negotiators
behave very similarly when playing against known female partners, because of men’s paradoxical tailoring,
thus women may not need to tailor their behavior.
18Appendix Table A.3.3 Panel A shows that results are directionally consistent for offer $15 and statis-
tically significant at the 1% level for friendly negotiator. These findings are also supported by a subjective
rating of negotiator aggressiveness by MTurk workers, where men are rated as much more aggressive toward
other men than women, and a subjective measure of whether an agreement was reached at the end of the
negotiation, which is much lower in male-male pairs (shown in Appendix Table A.3.7).
19See Appendix Table A.3.4.
20See Appendix Table A.3.7.
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2.4.1. Optimal Strategy?
One explanation for this behavior is that it is the optimal strategy based on beliefs about
who is more receptive to which type of strategy. First, this would run counter to evidence
in the literature that women are expected to be more “dovish.” Second, in the control
game, men in the informed treatment chose to be more aggressive towards female partners
(believing they would behave more dovishly).21 Recall the type of game played was varied
within subject, thus, this explanation would contradict the beliefs of the same men who
chose to be aggressive towards women in the absence of communication (i.e., the control
game) and yielding in the presence of explicit verbal communication.
It is possible that the optimal tailoring approach based on gender could be different in a
setting with explicit verbal communication.22 For example, women might respond nega-
tively toward aggressive strategies when they know their partner is male, or it might pay
to try to “convince” other men aggressively, because the gain in getting the higher payoff
might balance out the loss from lower coordination. Thus we look directly at whether these
approaches are optimal given partner responses.
We find stark evidence that the inverse tailoring observed in the negotiation game is not
optimal from a payoff perspective. Table 2.2 shows the payoff for men using our four key
communication strategies against female compared to male partners. We note that evidence
from payoffs based on communication strategy is only suggestive since results are conditional
on men using the strategy (and those who use versus do not use a strategy may differ). First,
aggressive communication measures appear to perform far better against female versus male
partners. Regressions (1) and (2) show that men using hard commitment against a male
partner decreases payoffs by over $3, while using it against a female partner directionally
increases payoffs. Regression (4) shows directionally consistent evidence that being tough
talkers against male partners reduces payoffs, whereas this loss is canceled out when using
21See Figure 2.2 and Appendix Table A.3.2.
22In the negotiation game, there is opportunity for interaction, whereas in the control game (without
communication) there is just one shot to try to match responses.
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it against female partners. This suggests that, when using aggressive negotiation strategies
against male partners, the benefit of “convincing” the other party more often does not
appear to outweighs the negative impacts of negotiation breakdown.
Not only do male negotiators appear to not tailor their aggressive strategies optimally
to their partner’s gender, but male-male pairs leave significant value on the table due to
negotiation breakdown. Appendix Figure A.3.1 shows that male-male pairs are the least
efficient in the negotiation game when gender is known. In fact, male-male pairs’ joint
payoff is only $15.60 (out of a possible $20), and compared to an average of over $18 for
other pair types.23 This combined with evidence that men are more aggressive against those
players who are less likely to be receptive (i.e., other men) and that their payoff goes down
when gender information is introduced, suggests men are failing to maximize their possible
monetary payoff.




Communication Measure: Aggressive Strategies Yielding StrategiesHard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Strategy -3.029∗ -3.384∗∗ -3.073 -3.553∗ -3.791∗∗∗ -3.309∗∗ 3.912∗ 4.499∗∗
(1.813) (1.659) (1.886) (1.855) (1.199) (1.283) (2.006) (1.931)
Strategy × Partner Female 4.753∗ 5.272∗ 2.818 3.266 -3.219∗∗ -3.678∗∗ -5.268∗∗ -5.998∗∗
(2.692) (2.916) (2.604) (2.933) (1.506) (1.577) (2.401) (2.415)
Partner Female 0.239 0.185 0.600 0.567 2.680∗∗∗ 2.868∗∗∗ 3.847∗∗ 4.218∗∗∗
(0.754) (0.797) (0.803) (0.844) (0.988) (1.006) (1.521) (1.507)
Constant 8.614∗∗∗ 7.975∗∗ 8.487∗∗∗ 7.720∗∗ 8.790∗∗∗ 8.314∗∗ 6.017∗∗∗ 4.251
(0.642) (3.491) (0.636) (3.526) (0.827) (3.475) (1.191) (3.477)
Ind. Cluster 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
R-Squared 0.033 0.072 0.025 0.064 0.176 0.195 0.034 0.074
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Session controls include day of the week,
within day trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin liberal, being a US citizen,
being a native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
23On its own, this is not clear evidence that male players are mis-optimizing, since it may be individually
rational to be aggressive in order to try to get the higher payoff, even if it means risking negotiation
breakdown.
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In contrast, we find that yielding communication measures perform significantly better
against male partners. Table 2.2 regressions (5) and (6) show that offering $15 to one’s
partner helps reduce negotiation breakdown in male-male pairs. While, naturally, offering
$15 reduces payoffs against either gender, since it virtually guarantees the below-average
$5 payoff, the negative payoff impact is statistically significantly much greater, by over
$3, when using the strategy against female partners. Regressions (7) and (8) shows that
being a friendly negotiator actually increases payoffs against male partners. Moreover, the
interaction coefficient for using it against female partners more than cancels out this effect.
That is, against male partners, something as simple as opening with a friendly greeting is
correlated with higher payoffs by almost $4, showing just how sub-optimal overly aggressive
communication can be.
Moreover, we find that the presence of women in the negotiation significantly improves effi-
ciency. Table A.3.5 compared the joint payoff in the negotiation game by gender-pair types
with at least one female negotiator (i.e., male-female and female-female pairs). Regressions
(1) and (2) use all negotiation game data (with and without gender information) and shows
that having at least one women leads ot $1.92 increase in joint payoff. Regressions (3) and
(4) show this effect is primarily driven by the informed treatment where negotiating pairs
with at least one women earn $2.65 more compared to male-male pairs (a 17% increase).
Regressions (5) and (6) limit the data to uninformed treatment only and shows directionally
consistent results, indicating that men’s tendency towards more aggressive communication
is also associated with lower coordination in this setting. As a result, the two settings are
not statistically significantly different from one another (see regressions (7) and (8)). It
appears that the presence of gender information exacerbates men’s aggressive tendencies
toward one another, and the fact that it is associated with decreased payoffs shows this is
a response to the partner’s gender.
Evidence of communication strategy effectiveness is only suggestive as they may be being
used by the most effective people, against the most effective targets. It is possible that such
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strategies would lose effectiveness if more people employed them. However, the large effect
sizes indicate that there should be some marginal people who could benefit, monetarily,
from switching strategies. It also seems unlikely that men are making a mistake, and trying
to use the best strategy from a purely payoff perspective, since men demonstrate they are
aware of who is likely to be more or less aggressive in the control game. These findings
show that men could likely improve their payoffs by choosing to use less aggressive strategies
against male partners, and more aggressive strategies against female partners.
2.4.2. Gender-specific Altruism?
Another possible explanation is that men have a preference for giving female partners the
higher payoff. In other words, the negotiation setting created gender-specific altruism. How-
ever, this explanation is inconsistent with a number of facts. First, altruistic preferences
toward women would not explain the inefficient outcome in male-male pairs, and the ap-
parent “over-use” of aggressive strategies toward men. Secondly, altruism towards women
appears inconsistent with men’s behavior in the non-communication game, where they are
more hawkish toward women.24
More compellingly, if men truly had altruistic preferences, then in the presence of communi-
cation, they could easily simply grant the higher payoff to women more often. However, men
and women split the payoff approximately equally in the negotiation game with and without
gender information (see Appendix Figure A.3.1). If it were only some men with altruistic
preferences, and this effect was perhaps canceled out by women being worse negotiators
when they encounter men without these preferences, then we would expect a less favorable
split without gender information, where men could not correctly target their altruism (but
24In the control game coordination increases payoffs for both players versus mismatching. Thus, it is
possible that even with altruistic preferences toward women, men would want to behave more hawkishly
based on their beliefs about women’s actions, in order to create more coordination. Moreover, the difference
between our results in the negotiation and control game do not come from order effects or learning. We
control for game round, and find an insignificant impact of round on behavior (thus the huge switch from
the non-communication (control) game to the negotiation game cannot be caused by the negotiation rounds
coming later). Our results are also robust to restricting to the first period only, to limit the potential impact
of previous rounds on behavior (even though payoffs are not revealed). Results available upon request.
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women’s inferior negotiating would still be active).
Finally, we find suggestive evidence that men do try to get the higher payoff for themselves
against known female partners, but merely through non-confrontational means. Appendix
Table A.3.7 shows that men are significantly more likely to mention their previous choices
against female versus male partners. This is often used by players as a way to get the higher
payoff by appealing to a sense of fairness, saying they got $5 last time, and so should be
allowed to take $15 this time.25 Additionally, men are marginally significantly more likely
to claim to be alternating their choice as their strategy against female partners, which could
be another way to try to get them to agree to go with the lower payoff.
2.4.3. Constrained by gender norms?
If participants are not optimally responding to partner gender information and have not
developed gender-specific altruism, what could explain this behavior? We propose that
negotiations (which involve verbal communication) carry with it social norms, which then
constrain men’s behavior. That is, gender norms might encourage men to be more chivalrous
toward women in their communication behavior and show bravado toward other men.
In sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 we showed that men indeed prefer the higher payoff, even against
female partners, but dislike using aggressive communication strategies against female part-
ners, and like using these same strategies against male partners, even to the detriment of
their own payoffs. This is consistent with a model of an additional social reward or punish-
ment from complying with gender norms dictating more chivalrous behavior toward women
and tough behavior toward men. Here, men might have an aversion to feeling like they are
“beating up” on female participants, in violation of gender norms. Similarly, they might
enjoy the “pissing match” against other male participants.26 Complying with these norms
comes at a cost: the money left on the table in male-male pairs demonstrates the cost of
25Mentioning previous choices is positively correlated with the strategy of asking for $15 directly, and
negatively correlated with offering $15 at the outset.
26Similar to Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) finding that men choose to over-compete due to a preference
for competition itself.
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over-competitiveness, and potentially “toxic masculinity.”27
This is consistent with a body of literature showing that complying with norms, rules, and
social considerations can create utility that might offset losses from non-payoff maximizing
behavior. For example, lab participants stopping at (meaningless) “red lights” in a timed
game (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016), participants rejecting low or unfair offers in
an ultimatum game (Kahneman et al., 1986a; Thaler, 1988), and participants contributing
more to public goods when identified to other players (Kessler et al., 2017).
In our study, the utility obtained from complying with social norms is asymmetric based
on partner: chivalry toward women and bravado towards men. This shows that men do not
view male and female partners as equivalent, and thus is still a form gender inequality. While
here the outcome is perhaps positive (or at least neutral) for women, such “benevolent”
sexism has been linked to overall sexist beliefs.28 Moreover, Huang and Low (2017) shows
that norms of “appropriate” behavior toward each gender might be sensitive to role model
or leader effects, and could potentially flip to “hostile” sexism under the right conditions.
2.5. General Discussion
In this paper, we developed an incentivized negotiation experiment to study the impact of
gender on negotiation strategies and payoffs. We find that situations with communication
may be fundamentally different than games without verbal interaction. Relative to a control
game with no communication, men do worse compared to women in the same game with
communication (i.e., the negotiation game). This result is driven by men sub-optimally
tailoring their negotiation strategy in response to partner gender.
We show that men are more aggressive toward male than female partners, using hard com-
mitments towards male negotiating partners more than twice as often as they do with female
negotiating partners. Similarly, men are more likely to use friendly or yielding strategies
27We cannot say for certain if men could do better against women if they did not choose the paradoxical
tailoring of their approach.
28Chivalry has been described by psychologists as “benevolent sexism,” since women are still treated
differently due to their gender (Glick and Fiske, 1996).
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toward female partners than male partners. We present evidence from payoffs that men’s
use of aggressive and yielding strategies appear mis-paired with whom they are most ef-
fective against, suggesting that the optimal tailoring of strategies has not changed in the
negotiation game. Instead, we posit that men are constrained by social norms in their
communication strategy, leading them to be more chivalrous to women and tough toward
men, at the expense of their own payoff.
While chivalrous behavior may seem innocuous, such gendered behavior might reflect un-
derlying sexist views. Importantly, the chivalry we show is about how women are to be
treated (via the types of communication strategies used) but does not appear to reflect an
underlying desire to actually give women the higher payoff. Moreover, a social norm pred-
icated on differential treatment by gender might be sensitive to broader societal context.
Huang and Low (2017) showed that immediately following the 2016 Presidential election,
hostile behavior toward women strikingly increased, perhaps indicating a reduction in the
chivalry norm. Future research should examine how exogenously varying expected social
behavior can influence gendered interactions in the short and long run.
We also find manifestations of “toxic masculinity” in the negotiation game which can lead
to increasing negotiation breakdown. In our study, male-male pairs are the least efficient
in the negotiation game. In fact, adding a woman to a negotiation pair increases the pair’s
efficiency by $2.65 to $3.48 (a 17-24% increase). This behavior could have substantial
implications outside the lab. For example, toxic masculinity and over-competitiveness in
trading markets may lead to over-investments in risky options, something popular press
articles linked to the financial crisis.29
29For example, in response to a journalist’s question on women’s strength in times of crisis, Christine
Lagarde said: “if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters,” today’s economic crisis clearly would look
quite different.” See (Dealbook, 2010; NPR, 2014).
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CHAPTER 3 : The Value of Information and the Role of Fairness in Bargaining
3.1. Introduction
Research from the last 30 years suggests an important role of fairness in economic trans-
actions. The Ultimatum Game — which models the last round of a negotiation between a
buyer (proposer) and a seller (responder) — has been a workhorse of this literature. Results
from Ultimatum Games are far from the equilibrium prediction based on selfish agents, sug-
gesting that agents have powerful fairness concerns. These results helped spawn literature
exploring social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ockenfels and Bolton, 2000) and the
50-50 norm (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Simultaneously,
however, other research argued that fairness concerns were overblown, and the debate per-
sists (Levitt and List, 2007).1 In this paper, we demonstrate that the extent to which
fairness concern will be relevant in economic decisions of interest depends fundamentally
on the information setting. We find that fairness concerns are mitigated as agents become
less informed and explore the mechanisms for this result.
While the literature from the past three decades has reported results from a variety of
tweaks on the original Ultimatum Game, all the research — with fewer than a handful
of exceptions — has kept one feature of the original design: both agents have common
knowledge about the size of the pie and thus the share of the pie that is going to each agent
in the transaction.2 This focus on a setting with complete information is surprising given
that many transactions are made without common knowledge of the size of the pie. For
example, sellers rarely (if ever) know a buyer’s true willingness to pay for a good and buyers
are unlikely to know a seller’s cost of providing a good as costs of production are rarely
broadcast.
1Critiques on the extent to which fairness concerns should be incorporated into theoretical predictions
started as early as the first results from Ultimatum Games (Binmore et al., 1985; Neelin et al., 1988; Ochs
and Roth, 1989; Prasnikar and Roth, 1992; Güth and van Damme, 1998).
2In the full-information environment, variations of the Ultimatum Game include: set fair and unfair splits
(Kahneman et al., 1986b), with punishment (Kahneman et al., 1986b), two-stage games (Binmore et al.,
1985), differing proposer “property right” (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982), multi-stage games with various
lengths (Neelin et al., 1988) and different random partners (Ochs and Roth, 1989).
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How relevant are fairness concerns to outcomes in the (more realistic) environment with
less information? What is the role and value of information to either bargaining party?
The few examples from the literature that eliminate common knowledge of the size of the
pie have either given the buyer full information and restricted the information of the seller
(Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Croson, 1996; Kagel et al., 1996) or eliminated information
from both parties (Schmitt, 2004). These papers have generally found evidence of lower
offers and higher acceptance rates. Because each paper has a different setting, however,
it is not possible to establish the effect of information of each party on the outcome of
the Ultimatum Game or to fully explore the mechanisms driving the relationship between
information and fairness.
In this study, we introduce a new experimental paradigm that nests the standard full-
information Ultimatum Game and allows us to systematically vary the information of each
transacting party. We provide experimental results from bargaining games in which neither
party, only the buyer, only the seller, or both parties (i.e, the standard Ultimatum Game)
have information about the size of the pie. This design allows us to identify the value of
information and its effect on the role of fairness in a variety of information environments.
We find that fairness concerns are significantly muted in settings when less information is
available. This suggests that the standard full-information Ultimatum Game, which has
been the workhorse of this literature and has highlighted the importance of fairness in
bargaining, is a special case at the far end of the spectrum on the impact of fairness on
bargaining outcomes.
Looking at the last 10 rounds of the bargaining game, we find that the difference in earnings
between the buyer and the seller (i.e., a measure of inequity in outcomes that is 0% for 50-50
splits and 100% in the equilibrium prediction of selfish agents) is smallest in the Ultimatum
Game (10.22% of the possible surplus).3 Removing information from the buyer doubles
3We document significant evidence of learning over the course of our 30 round game, and so focus on the
last 10 rounds for our primary results. Results are very similar when we use all 30 rounds. See Appendix
A.4.2.
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this measure to 20.14% of the possible surplus. Removing information from the seller also
doubles this inequality measure to 20.60% of the possible surplus. Finally, removing infor-
mation from both the buyer and seller rises it to 24.98% of the possible surplus, inequality
that is nearly 150% larger than in the Ultimatum Game.
These large increases in inequality when one or both parties are uninformed arise from both:
(1) the buyer (proposer) making less-fair offers and (2) the seller (responder) accepting
less-fair offers when less information is available. We find evidence that buyers behave
strategically based on reported beliefs that a seller will accept a given offer. That is, when
a seller is uninformed, buyers report believing that they are more likely to accept a low offer.
Buyers with a high value (i.e., a large pie) respond strategically to their belief by mimicking
the offers of buyers with a low value (i.e., small pie). On the other hand, uninformed sellers
are more likely to accept a given offer when buyers are uninformed suggesting a role for
caring about the intentions of the buyer or for social image concerns of not wanting to
accept unfair splits when the buyer is aware of the inequity.
In addition, we find that the value of information for the parties is asymmetric. Sellers earn
more when they have information about the buyer’s value (and thus the size of the pie):
The share of possible surplus going to the seller increases by 10% when the seller is informed
compared to uninformed. Buyers, meanwhile, do not gain from additional information, and
they do worse with information if the seller is also informed. This suggests that the seller
has an incentive to get information, but the buyer has an incentive to remain uninformed.
In a setting where information is available and there is common knowledge of information
acquisition, the outcome in which the seller is informed and the buyer is not informed is an
“absorbing state,” which might be particularly likely to arise. This particular information
structure has not previously been studied experimentally.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the experimental design.
Section 3.3 shows our main results: removing information increases inequality, the two major
reasons driving this pattern, and the asymmetric value of information. Finally, Section 3.4
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concludes.
3.2. Experimental Design and Hypothesis
In this section, we describe a new experimental paradigm designed to investigate the role
of information on behavior and outcomes in a bargaining game. This game allows us to
vary what information players have and explore the effect of fairness concerns in different
information settings. We also provide the subgame perfect equilibrium of this bargaining
game assuming agents have no fairness concerns and care only about their own earnings.
3.2.1. Experimental Design
In this experiment, buyers (proposers) and sellers (responders) meet in a given round with
the opportunity to trade. It is common knowledge that the buyer’s value for the good V
is either 70 or 90 experimental units (each with 50% chance) and that the seller’s cost to
produce the good C is either 10 or 30 experimental units (each with 50% chance).4 In each
round, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer P to the seller to purchase the good. If
the offer is accepted, the buyer receives piB = V − P and the seller receives piS = P − C,
where piB and piS are denoted in experimental units. If the offer is rejected, both players
get 0 experimental units, so piB = 0 and piS = 0. The seller cannot accept an offer for which
P < C.
The experimental design varies what information players have about the realization of the
value V and cost C. The buyer always knows her value and the seller always knows his
cost. In the Incomplete Information treatment, this is all the players know. In additional
treatments, we provide additional information (about V and C) to either: the buyer, the
seller, or both. In all treatments, the information structure is common knowledge. In total,
we have four information treatments, shown in Table 3.1. Our design embeds a version of a
standard Ultimatum Game as the Complete Information treatment in which both players
are informed of the buyer’s value V and the seller’s cost C and thus the size of the pie.
4The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Table 3.1: Treatments of Experiment
Buyer (Proposer) Knows
Value Value & Cost
Seller (Responder) Knows
Cost Incomplete Information Buyer Knows(II) (BK)
(46 Buyers & 46 Sellers) (49 Buyers & 49 Sellers)
Value & Cost Seller Knows Complete Information(SK) (CI)
(47 Buyers & 47 Sellers) (45 Buyers & 45 Sellers)
Notes: The experimental design contains four treatments differing only in the information available to buyers and sellers.
Our design embeds a version of a standard Ultimatum Game as the Complete Information treatment in which both players
are informed of the buyer’s value V and the seller’s cost C and thus the size of the pie.
Subjects play 30 rounds of the bargaining game as either a buyer who makes proposals
or a seller who responds to proposals and are randomly assigned to a new partner of the
opposite type in each round. Subjects play all 30 rounds in the same information treatment.
Subjects are informed or reminded at the end of each round only of their own action and
the action of their partner, as well as the information they had in that round. Subjects
were paid their earnings for a randomly selected round with each experimental unit worth
$0.50.
As shown in Table A.4.1, after the 30 rounds, subjects answer additional questions that
depend on their treatment and role. In this paper, we will focus on one of these questions.
Buyers in all information conditions were asked in an incentive compatible way to report
the probability that offers made by other buyers in their treatment were accepted by sellers.
These questions allow us to generate a distribution of beliefs for buyers.
3.2.2. Hypothesis
Before presenting our results, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium assuming agents
have no fairness concerns and care only about their own earnings. While a large literature
suggests that we should not expect the point predictions of such a model to hold, the
comparative static predictions might still be illuminating. In this model, when the buyer
has information on the seller’s cost, C, the buyer offers P = C, which is accepted by the
seller. This yields essentially perfectly unequal payoffs with the buyer receiving 100% of
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the surplus. When the buyer has no information on seller’s cost, C, the buyer’s profit
maximizing offer is P = 30 (the larger possible value of C). These offers are accepted by all
sellers.5 In this treatment, the surplus of the buyer is 100% of total surplus when C = 30,
75% when V = 90 and C = 10 and 67% when V = 70 and C = 10. Therefore, we expect
all offers to be accepted, and we expect, overall, the share of the surplus for the buyers to
be 85.4% for the seller to be 14.6%, a difference of 70.8% of the surplus.6
Therefore, the self-interested subgame perfect equilibrium predicts that: (1) information
has no value to the seller, (2) the buyer’s share of surplus increases with information, and
(3) inequality is highest when the buyer has information. In what follows, we find that all
three of these comparative statics are wrong.
It is worth noting that the design of our Ultimatum Game (i.e., the Complete Information
treatment) differs from the standard Ultimatum Game in several ways. First, the size of
the pie is determined by random draws of V and C that are associated with the buyer and
seller. It could be that this design feature on its own affects the fair outcome, as players may
feel entitled to keep part of the value generated if they get a good draw (i.e., a high value V
or a low cost C).7 Second, framing the game as a market transaction may affect results and
increase the inequality between the buyer and the seller.8 However, these two factors are
held constant across treatments, so any differences between our treatments can nevertheless
be attributed to informational differences. In addition, as we will show in the next section,
we replicate the standard Ultimatum Game results in our Complete Information treatment,
suggesting these concerns are not first order.
5For any value V , the buyer essentially decides between offering a price P of 10 or 30. An offer of P = 10
generates an automatic 50% rejection rate (whenever the cost of the seller is 30) and hence an expected
profit of V2 . An offer of P = 30 is accepted with certainty and generates profits V − 30, which is larger than
V
2 for V > 60.6Note these outcomes are nearly identical if we assume sellers reject offers of P = C, in which case buyers
offer P that are 1 unit higher and the shares of surplus going to each player change only slightly.
7While it is hard to move behavior in the Ultimatum Game away from fairly equal splits, entitlements
to parts of the pie can play a role, see Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (1997).
8See Liberman et al. (2004).
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3.3. Results
We organize our findings about how information interacts with fairness concerns, answering
three questions. First, how does information affect fairness concerns? Second, what is the
mechanism? Third, what is the value of information for each party?
All our results will use the condition with more information as control and the condition
with less information as our comparison group. In section 3.3.1 we establish a measure of
inequality and show that removing information increases inequality. In section 3.3.2 and
3.3.3 we show two major reasons for this result: (1) buyers give lower offers to uninformed
sellers and (2) uninformed sellers are more likely to accept when buyers are uninformed.
Moreover, this is consistent with buyers behaving strategically based on their beliefs and
sellers having social image of intention concerns. Finally, in section 3.3.4 we look at the value
of information for buyers and sellers and find that the value of information is asymmetric.
In total, we analyze data from 3,740 decisions made by 374 subjects (focusing on the last
10 rounds of decisions out of a total of 30 rounds). Subjects were randomly assigned to one
of the four treatments.9
3.3.1. Removing information increase inequality
While prior literature has argued that fairness concerns significantly alter bargaining out-
comes, most evidence comes from the full-information setting. Our results show that the
information structure significantly impacts both efficiency and the distribution of profits.
In particular, we find that removing information decreases the role of fairness in outcomes.
Before we assess the role of information on fairness, we define a key measure of inequity,
which we call the inequality share. Given the theoretical prediction that the buyer should
end up with all the surplus, the ideal measure should get larger as the buyer’s earning
increase relative to the seller’s earnings and be minimized when outcomes are equal. Note
9Results are from 20 experimental sessions — 12 run at the Wharton Behavioral Lab and 8 run at the
Stanford Economics Research Lab — during May 2012 (at Stanford) and June 2012 (at Wharton).
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that this leaves open the question of what to do when a buyer makes an offer that leaves the
majority of the surplus to the seller. This could be thought of as increasing inequality at
the transaction level (i.e., outcomes are less fair than an equal split for this particular buyer
and seller) or it could be thought of as decreasing inequality at the market level (i.e., since
buyers usually earn more than sellers, these overly generous offers help equalize average
earnings).10 In what follows, we take as our primary measure a third path that treats these
offers as neither increasing or decrease inequality relative to a fair split, and we explore the
other two cases in Appendix A.4.3. In particular, we define inequality share as the max of
the difference between the buyer and seller’s earnings and zero divided by the total surplus:
max{Buyer’s earnings−Seller’s earnings,0}
V−C . This measure satisfies our criteria of increasing as the
difference between buyer’s earnings and seller’s earnings increases from zero and treats all
other outcomes as being equal.11
Table 3.2 shows this inequality share as well as the average buyer and seller earnings as a
percentage of possible surplus available in a given round (i.e., V − C), and the total share
of possible surplus realized, a measure of efficiency achieved for each of the four treatments.
The top panel shows the data for all 30 rounds, the middle panel shows the data for the
first 10 rounds, and the bottom panel shows the data for the last 10 rounds.
We note that there is significant learning and experience effects between the first 10 rounds
and the last 10 rounds. Not only does the inequality share change but the total share
changes as well. This suggest that buyers are learning to make offers that are more likely
to be accepted and more unfair.12 Throughout the paper, we limit our analysis to the last
10In appendix Table A.4.2 we show that most “generous” offers occur when the buyer is uninformed of
the seller’s cost. When the buyer is informed, “generous” offers make up less than 1% of total transactions.
11Note that this definition is about transaction specific inequality. We replicate our results using
the absolute inequality share: |Buyer’s earnings−Seller’s earnings|
V−C , which is the absolute difference between
the buyer and seller’s earnings divided by the total surplus, as well as the difference inequality share:
Buyer earnings−Seller earnings
V−C , which is a measure of average inequality among all buyers and sellers. See ap-
pendix Tables A.4.8 and A.4.9 and A.4.10.
12In a regression framework, Table A.4.3 in the appendix shows that there are significant differences in
inequality share, buyer earnings, and seller earnings between the first 10 rounds and the last 10 rounds. In
particular, Table A.4.3 shows that in the final 10 rounds, inequality significantly increases when buyers or
sellers are uninformed; however, the interaction between uninformed buyers or sellers and experience (the
last 10 rounds) shows that there is a further statistically significant increase in inequality. Moreover, when
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Table 3.2: Surplus, Inequality and Total Shares
All 30 Rounds
Treatment: Buyer Seller Inequality TotalShare Share Share Share
Incomplete Information 51.67 31.67 23.23 83.33
Seller Knows 51.51 33.88 19.38 85.39
Buyer Knows 51.81 32.13 20.60 83.95
Complete Information 49.00 36.77 12.38 85.78
First 10 Rounds
Treatment: Buyer Seller Inequality TotalShare Share Share Share
Incomplete Information 47.26 31.87 20.09 79.13
Seller Knows 49.57 32.98 18.72 82.55
Buyer Knows 49.86 30.14 21.69 80.00
Complete Information 48.16 33.40 14.86 81.56
Last 10 Rounds
Treatment: Buyer Seller Inequality TotalShare Share Share Share
Incomplete Information 54.19 31.90 24.98 86.09
Seller Knows 53.83 35.11 20.14 88.94
Buyer Knows 54.89 34.50 20.60 89.39
Complete Information 49.22 39.00 10.22 88.22
Notes: Table 3.2 reports the share of total surplus (Value - Cost) that goes to the buyer and the seller. Inequality
Share is the difference in buyer share and seller share (i.e., Buyer earnings - Seller earnings) divided by the total
surplus. Total Share is the sum of buyer share and seller share. Total share is less than 100% since some offers are
rejected by the seller and lead to both players getting 0.
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10 rounds since we are interested in the extent to which our results persist in the presence
of this learning or experience. As a robustness check, we replicate all analysis using all 30
rounds and find consistent results (see Appendix A.4.2).
In the last 10 rounds of the Complete Information condition, the inequality share is 10.22%.
Removing information to one party, either the buyer or seller, doubles the inequality share
to about 20%. In addition, removing information from both parties drastically increases the
inequality share to 24.98%. This is a 14.76 percentage point or a 144% increase in inequality
compared to the Complete Information condition. Furthermore, note that total surplus is
constant across treatments, suggesting that information does not increase the likelihood of
trade, even though it dramatically changes how gains from trade are split.
Table 3.3: Inequality Shares, Seller Shares, and Buyer Shares
Dependent variable: Inequality Shares Seller Shares Buyer Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Seller No Info 0.074∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Buyer No Info 0.069∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.018 0.046∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
Both No Info -0.055∗ 0.013 -0.053∗∗
(0.031) (0.019) (0.025)
Constant 0.153∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Incomplete Information 0.148∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.025) (0.014) (0.020)
Test CI=II p-value 0.000 0.000 0.013
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Observations 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870
R-Squared 0.0299 0.0258 0.0614 0.0124 0.00855 0.0219 0.00442 0.00168 0.00976
Notes: Seller No Info denotes when a seller does not have information on the buyer’s valuation (in BK and II). Buyer No Info
denotes when the buyer does not have information on the seller’s cost (in SK and II). Both No Info denotes when both the buyer
and seller do not have information (II). Regression analysis shows Complete Information has the least inequality in payoffs, while
removing information from either the buyer or the seller leads to more inequality. Similarly, removing information from either
buyer or the seller leads a lower share of the surplus for sellers. On the other hand, removing information from sellers increases
buyer’s share. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. There are 187 clusters.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
comparing the Complete Information treatment to the Incomplete Information treatment, having uninformed
buyers and sellers increases the inequality share by 5.2 percentage points during the first 10 rounds but the
interaction between Incomplete Information and experience shows that it increases inequality share by an
additional 9.5 percentage points in the latter 10 rounds. Furthermore, looking at buyer and seller earnings
between the Incomplete Information treatment and the Complete Information treatment, we find that while
there is an increase in buyer and seller earnings in the first 10 rounds, this is not significant. On the other
hand, we see that the Incomplete Information setting significantly increases buyer earnings by an additional
4.10 experimental units and significantly reduces the sellers earnings by 3.23 experimental units in the second
half of the experiment. This suggest that there is significant learning and from the first half to the second
half of the experiment.
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Table 3.3 uses a regression framework to analyze how removing information from sellers
and buyers affects inequality share in regressions (1) to (3).13 We use dummy variables to
denote when a seller does not have information on the buyer’s valuation, when the buyer
does not have information on the seller’s cost, and when neither party has information.
Regressions (1) and (2), show that removing information from either buyers or sellers in-
creases inequality by 7 percentage points. In addition, in regression (3) we split this effect
by information setting and find that removing information from either buyers or sellers sig-
nificantly increases inequality independently. The last row of regression (3) shows that the
added effect associated with removing information from both reduces the inequality share
by a total of 5.5 percentage points and this is marginally significant but does not offset the
large gains in inequality from removing information from buyers or sellers. Thus, Complete
Information (i.e., the standard Ultimatum Game) has the least inequality in payoffs, and
removing information from either the buyer or the seller leads to more inequality. These
results demonstrate that removing information can reduce the impact of fairness concerns
on outcomes dramatically. Below, we explore why information reduces inequality.
3.3.2. Two major reasons information reduces inequality
Our experimental design allows us to explore why removing information increases inequality
by looking at offers and acceptance rates across our treatments. In this subsection, we report
on two factors driving this pattern. First, buyers, particularly high-value buyers, make lower
offers when sellers are uninformed. Second, conditional on a given offer, sellers are more
likely to accept when buyers or sellers are uninformed.
Below, we analyze our data by exploring four main comparisons: (1) SK vs CI: removing
buyers information when the seller is informed, (2) II vs BK: removing buyers information
when the seller is uninformed, (3) BK vs CI: removing sellers information when the buyer is
informed, and (4) II vs SK: removing sellers information when the buyer is uninformed. All
13Regressions (4) to (9) focus on the seller’s and buyer’s share of the surplus and will be discussed in
section 3.3.4.
78
analysis is performed using the last 10 rounds only. As a robustness check, we perform the
same analysis using data from all 30 rounds in Appendix A.4.2 and find consistent results.
We find that removing buyers information when the seller is informed and removing sellers
information, regardless whether the buyer is informed or not, significantly lowers buyer’s
offers. Moreover, conditional on offers, seller’s acceptance rate directionally increase, thus,
inequality rises through lower offers. In contrast, removing buyers information when sellers
are uninformed only directionally decreases buyer’s offers, however, conditional on offers,
uninformed sellers are significantly more likely to accept when the buyer is uninformed,
thus increasing inequality through more acceptances.
Lower offers to uninformed sellers
First, we show that buyers make lower offers when sellers are uninformed and that this
is primarily driven by high-value buyers. Figure 3.1 shows the average offer by treatment
for buyer with V = 70 (Panel A) and buyers with V = 90 (Panel B). Note that buyers
do not know the seller’s cost in treatment II and SK and buyers know the seller’s cost
in BK and CI. Buyers make lower offers when sellers are uninformed (II and BK). While
there is a small decrease in offers when V = 70 (Panel A), the decrease is substantially
larger when V = 90 (Panel B). Moreover, when sellers are not informed (in II and BK),
the average offers by high-value buyers are similar to (generous) offers of low-value buyers.
This amounts to high-value buyers mimicking offers of low-value buyers when sellers are
not informed, a result we will explore in greater detail below.
Tables 3.4 analyzes the results in Figure 3.1 in a regression framework. First, we show the
results for all buyers and then show the effect conditional on the buyer’s value. Panel A
shows the effect of removing information from buyers when the seller is informed (on the left)
and when the seller is uninformed (on the right). We find that removing buyers information
significantly decreases buyers’ offers but only when sellers are informed (i.e., comparing
SK vs CI). Regression (1) shows that when buyers are uninformed, offers decrease by 1.94
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(a) Value=70 (b) Value=90
Figure 3.1: Offer by Treatment and Value
Notes: Panel A shows the average offer by treatment for buyers with a value of 70 while Panel B shows the average
offer by treatment for buyers with a value of 90. Buyers do not have information on seller’s cost in II and SK but know
the seller’s cost in BK and CI. Buyers, particularly high-value buyers, make lower offers when sellers are uninformed.
This amounts to high-value buyers mimicking offers of low-value buyers when sellers are uninformed. Standard error
bars are shown around each mean.
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experimental units compared to a full-information setting (and this is partially significant).
Moreover, regression (3) shows that reduction in offers are driven by high-value buyers. On
average, removing information from high-value buyers decreases offers by 4.08 experimental
units when the seller is informed compared the full-information condition. Meanwhile,
regressions (4) to (6) shows that removing buyer information when the seller is uninformed
directionally decreases offers (i.e., comparing II vs BK).
Table 3.4: Offer Conditional on Value: Effect of Removing Information
Panel A: Removing Buyer’s Information | Seller’s Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Value=70 Value=90
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows -1.941∗ -0.681 -4.077∗∗∗
(0.982) (0.909) (1.178)
Constant 45.520∗∗∗ 41.544∗∗∗ 50.490∗∗∗
(0.798) (0.735) (0.882)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 91 92
Observations 920 490 430
R-Squared 0.0179 0.00351 0.0864
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Value=70 Value=90
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information -1.387 -0.957 -1.766
(1.291) (1.263) (1.603)
Constant 42.263∗∗∗ 40.657∗∗∗ 43.720∗∗∗
(0.713) (0.759) (0.804)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 950 453 497
R-Squared 0.00676 0.00375 0.0101
Panel B: Removing Seller’s Information | Buyer’s Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Value=70 Value=90
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows -3.257∗∗∗ -0.887 -6.770∗∗∗
(1.070) (1.056) (1.194)
Constant 45.520∗∗∗ 41.544∗∗∗ 50.490∗∗∗
(0.798) (0.735) (0.882)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 93 94
Observations 940 483 457
R-Squared 0.0335 0.00324 0.137
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Value=70 Value=90
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information -2.703∗∗ -1.163 -4.459∗∗∗
(1.219) (1.143) (1.591)
Constant 43.579∗∗∗ 40.862∗∗∗ 46.413∗∗∗
(0.572) (0.535) (0.781)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 930 460 470
R-Squared 0.0382 0.0106 0.0885
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed significantly decreases
buyers’ offers, in particular high-value buyers are more likely to give lower offers. Similarly, removing information
from buyers when the seller is uninformed directionally decreases buyer’s offers. Panel B shows that removing
information from sellers regardless of whether the buyer is informed or not significantly decreases buyers’ offers, in
particular high-value buyers are more likely to give lower offers. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.4 Panel B shows the effect of removing information from sellers when the buyer
is informed (on the left) and when the buyer is uninformed (on the right). We find that
removing seller information significantly decreases buyers’ offers regardless whether the
buyer is informed or not. Regression (1) shows that when sellers are uninformed, offers
significantly decrease by 3.26 experimental units compared to a full-information setting (i.e.,
BK vs CI). Consistent with previous results, regression (3) shows that reduction in offers
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are driven by high-value buyers. On average, removing information from high-value buyers
decreases offers by 6.77 experimental units when the seller is uninformed compared the
full-information condition (a 13.4% decrease). Similarly, regressions (4) and (6) shows that
when buyers and sellers are uninformed (that is, in the Incomplete Information condition),
offers significantly decrease by 2.70 experimental units and, again, these results are drive
by high-value buyers, who reduce offers by 4.46 experimental units compared to when the
seller is informed (i.e., II vs SK).
Perhaps a more practical comparison is to look at the Incomplete Information setting,
which mimics bargaining conditions in practice, to the Complete Information (i.e., Ulti-
matum Game) results we have seen in the literature. To do this, we also perform a fully
stacked regression with treatment dummies and show that removing information from both
parties (i.e., the Incomplete Information treatment) decreases offers by 4.6 experimental
units compared to Complete Information and this is significant at the 1 percent level.14
Uninformed sellers are less likely to accept when buyers are informed
Second, we find that conditional on a given offer, removing information from buyers signifi-
cantly increases seller’s acceptance rate when sellers are uninformed and this effect is driven
by high-cost sellers. We posit this is due to a combination of social image and intention
effects. Moreover, conditional on offers, removing buyer’s information when the seller is
informed or removing seller’s information, regardless whether the buyer is informed or not,
directionally increases sellers’ acceptance rate.
Tables 3.5 Panels A and B presents these results in a regression framework controlling for
the offer. First we shows the results for all sellers and then show the effect conditional on
the seller’s cost. Panel A shows the effect of removing information from buyers when the
seller is informed (on the left) and when the seller is uninformed (on the right). We find
that removing buyers information significantly increases seller’s acceptance rate but only
when sellers are uninformed. Regressions (1) to (3) shows that when buyers are uninformed,
14Regression available upon request.
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sellers are directionally more likely to accept a given offer compared to a full-information
setting. Moreover, regression (4) shows that removing buyer information when the seller is
uninformed significantly increases acceptance rate for a given offer by 7.2 percentage points
compared to when the buyer is informed. This effect is driven by high-cost sellers who
are 14.2 percentage points more likely to accept in the Incomplete Information treatment
compared to the Buyer Knows treatment (see regression (6)).
Table 3.5: Acceptance Rates Conditional on Offer: Effect of Removing Information
Panel A: Removing Buyer’s Information | Seller’s Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows 0.028 0.048 0.005
(0.041) (0.034) (0.067)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 920 450 470
R-Squared 0.270 0.312 0.231
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.072∗∗ 0.025 0.142∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.066)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 950 480 470
R-Squared 0.293 0.283 0.259
Panel B: Removing Seller’s Information | Buyer’s Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows 0.024 0.065 -0.012
(0.033) (0.040) (0.041)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 94 94
Observations 940 461 479
R-Squared 0.235 0.238 0.235
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.034 0.015 0.055
(0.036) (0.018) (0.067)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 930 469 461
R-Squared 0.302 0.304 0.222
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed directionally increases
sellers’ acceptance rate. Moreover, removing information from buyers when the seller is uninformed significantly
increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Panel B shows that removing information from sellers, regardless of whether the
buyer is informed or not, directionally increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.5 Panel B shows the effect of removing information from sellers when the buyer is
informed (on the left) and when the buyer is uninformed (on the right). Consistent with
previous results, we find that removing seller information directionally increases seller’s
acceptance rate regardless whether the buyer is informed or not.
As before, we also compare Incomplete Information setting to the Complete Information
(i.e., Ultimatum Game) results we have seen in the literature in a fully stacked regression
with treatment dummies and show that, conditional on a given offer, removing information
83
from both parties (i.e., the Incomplete Information treatment) decreases seller’s acceptance
rate by 9.6 percentage points compared to Complete Information and this is significant at
the 1 percent level.15
Note that previously we showed that buyer’s offers change under different information set-
tings, as such, it is hard to compare seller’s rejection rates due to the different offer distri-
butions across treatment. That is, treatments with more information have less instances
with less-fair offers. In appendix A.4.5 we control for differences in distribution of offers
using sample weights and replicate the analysis on seller’s acceptance rate and show that
controlling for the distribution of offers in each comparison, the magnitude of change in
acceptance rate increases (that is, sellers accept more when there is less information).
In the following subsection, we use additional belief data collected during the experiment
to explore the underlying behavioral phenomenon generating the results we just described.
3.3.3. Beliefs and Strategic Behavior
In section 3.3.2, we showed that when sellers are uninformed, buyers make lower offers and
sellers are directionally more likely to accept a given offer. We use belief data to show
that these patterns arise from buyers anticipating that sellers will accept lower offers when
uninformed.16 Furthermore, we posit that sellers accept these lower offers when buyers are
uninformed due to social image or intention concerns.
Buyer’s beliefs
We use buyer’s beliefs to show that buyers are behaving strategically in response to sellers
being uninformed. We asked buyers in each treatment, in an incentive compatible way, to
report the probability that the seller would accept a given offer. In particular, each buyer
was randomly assigned one round from the last 10 rounds and asked about the probability
15Regression available upon request.
16In this section, we will focus on buyer and sellers’ beliefs conditional on offers between 20 and 55
experimental units — where most of our data appears to be concentrated. Figure A.4.1 in the appendix
presents the CDF of offers used to elicit beliefs and shows that more than 90% of the mass of the offers lies
between 20 and 60 experimental units.
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an offer was accepted for each of the buyer-seller pairs in that round. The buyer was shown,
for each buyer-seller pair, the value of the buyer in that round, the information the buyer
had in that round (i.e., cost of the seller in BK and CI treatments), and the offer the buyer
made in that round.17
Figure A.4.2 Panel A reports the buyer’s belief probability that an offer is accepted when
the seller’s cost is 10 for the Buyer Knows and Complete Information treatments. Buyers
in the BK treatment recognize that sellers’ acceptance probability is unlikely to differ with
the buyer’s value (i.e., the gray and black solid lines practically overlap with K-S test p-
value=0.972). In addition, the reported probability of acceptance are closer to beliefs in CI
when V = 70. Panel B shows the actual acceptance rate by offer and shows that buyers
hold accurate beliefs.
In addition, buyers behave strategically based on these beliefs. Distributions of offers by
treatment and value show that buyers with a high value mimic offers of low-value buyers
when sellers are uninformed. Figure A.4.2 Panel C shows that when sellers are uninformed
(in BK), the high-value buyers’ offer distribution almost directly overlaps with the low-
value buyers’ offer distribution (both mean and standard deviation) and both lie on top of
the offer distribution of low-value buyers in CI. On other hand, when sellers are informed,
buyers’ offer distribution is shifted to the right (black dashed line) when they have a high
value. This strategic behavior is consistent with buyers optimally responding to their belief
that a seller will accept a given offer.
We find very similar results when we compare Buyer Knows and Complete Information
treatments when the seller’s cost is 30. Figure A.4.3 Panel A shows that buyers in BK
correctly believe that uninformed sellers cannot condition acceptance on the buyer’s value
(the solid lines are on top of each other). Again, the BK probabilities are nearly identical
17To ensure incentive compatibility, we used a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method for binary out-
comes (see Niehaus et al. (2012)). Buyers were explicitly instructed: “This payment method ensures that
to maximize your earnings, you should report the number that is exactly your best guess of the probability
the seller accepted the buyer?s offer.”
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to beliefs in CI for V = 70, supporting buyers’ belief that sellers in BK give buyers the
benefit of the doubt.
We also find similar evidence that buyers behave strategically based on this belief: high-
value buyers mimic offers of low-value buyers when the seller is uninformed, as shown
in Figure A.4.3 Panel C, when C = 30. When sellers are uninformed (in BK), high-value
buyers’ offer distribution is more closely aligned with the low-value buyers’ offer distribution
(smaller difference in means) and low-value BK buyers’ offer distribution lies on top of
the offer distribution of low-value buyers in CI. However, once again, we find that when
the sellers are informed (in CI), buyers’ offer distribution is shifted more heavily towards
the right (black dashed line) when they have a high value. One difference we observe
here, is that high-value Buyers in BK paired with high-cost sellers will less aggressively
mimic low-value informed buyers (i.e., the BK V = 90 distribution is right of the BK
V = 70 distribution). This may arise because high-value buyers have more to lose if an
offer is rejected. This evidence further supports the notion that buyers behave strategically
assuming seller’s acceptance rate.
We also find supporting evidence when we compare the Incomplete Information and Seller
Knows conditions. From Figure A.4.4 Panel A we can see that when offers are in the range
of 30 to 40 experimental units, buyers believe that when sellers are informed, that is in
the Seller Knows treatment, low offers from high-value buyers are less likely to be accepted
(compare gray and black dashed lines). On the other hand, in the Incomplete Information
condition, we actually find the opposite with a higher acceptance rate for the same offer
from high-value buyers (compare gray and black solid lines for offers). Actual acceptance
rates in the offer ranges of 30 to 40 experimental units does not show a distinct difference
in acceptance rate. However, buyers are still adjusting their offers based on their beliefs.
Figure A.4.4 Panel C shows that buyers are not only aware that informed sellers respond
differently compared to uninformed sellers but actually high-value buyers behave strate-
gically based on this belief by mimic offers of low-value buyers when the seller does not
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have information. Furthermore, we note that there is a larger spread in offers when for
buyers in the Incomplete Information condition (which is not seen in other treatments).
This may be due to buyers not fully realizing that having uninformed sellers (and possibly
being uninformed buyers) is actually beneficial for their outcomes.
Seller’s concerns
We also elicited and explore seller’s beliefs to try to explain why sellers are directionally
more likely to accept an offer when uninformed. After subjects played all 30 rounds of the
bargaining game, we incentivized sellers in the Incomplete Information and Buyer Knows
conditions (i.e., in each treatment where they did not know the buyer’s value) to report the
probability that the buyer had V = 70 (i.e., the low value), one by one for each offer they
received in the last 10 rounds of the game.18 Evidence from our belief elicitation suggests
that there might be simultaneity bias. Since sellers are asked to state their belief over offers
they may have accepted or rejected, they might ex-post adjust their beliefs of the buyer’s
value to justify their actions. As such, we do not use this data.
Instead, we posit that uninformed sellers are more likely to accept when buyers are unin-
formed due to a combination of social image and intention effects. That is, seller’s may care
about buyer’s intentions, accepting less-fair offers when the buyer is uninformed because
“they did not know the size of the pie”, or sellers may care about social image, unwilling to
accept less-fair offers when the buyer is aware of the equity.19
3.3.4. Value of Information
We have found that fairness concerns are significantly muted in settings when parties are
uninformed about the size of the pie. This result suggests that the Ultimatum Game —
the workhorse that has attracted significant attention and highlighted the importance of
18To ensure incentive compatibility, we used a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method for binary out-
comes (see Niehaus et al. (2012)). Sellers were explicitly instructed: “This payment method ensures that to
maximize your earnings, you should report the number that is exactly your best guess of the probability the
buyer had a value of 70 experimental units.”
19We are not able to separate these two effects.
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fairness in bargaining — is a special case at the far end of the spectrum on the impact of
fairness on bargaining outcomes.
These large increases in inequality when one or both parties are uninformed arise from both:
(1) the buyer (proposer) making less-fair offers and (2) the seller (responder) accepting
less-fair offers when less information is available. We find evidence that buyers behave
strategically based on reported beliefs that a seller will accept a given offer. That is, when
a seller is uninformed, buyers report believing that they are more likely to accept a low
offer. Buyers with a high value (i.e., a large pie) respond strategically to their belief by
mimicking the offers of buyers with a low value (i.e., small pie) when the seller is uninformed.
That uninformed sellers are more likely to accept a given offer when buyers are uninformed
suggests a role for caring about the intentions of the buyer or for social image concerns of
not wanting to accept unfair splits when the buyer is aware of the inequity.
Given the evidence, we look at the value of information for buyers and sellers and find that
the value of information is asymmetric. From Table 3.2 in section 3.3.1 we can see that
sellers always earn more when they have information about the buyer’s value (and thus the
size of the pie) — seller earnings decrease by 10% when they are uninformed (compared to
II). The buyers, meanwhile, do not gain from additional information about the size of the
pie, and they do worse with this information if the seller is also informed.
Table 3.3 investigates the effect of information on the seller’s share of possible surplus using
a regression framework. Regressions (4) to (6) show that sellers earn less when there is
less information for the seller but also with less information for the buyer. Regression (4)
shows that when the seller is uninformed, the seller’s share of possible surplus decreases
by 3.8 percentage. Regression (5) shows that when the buyer is uninformed, the seller’s
share of possible surplus also decreases by 3.1 percentage points. Moreover, comparing the
Complete Information and Incomplete Information treatment, we find that when neither
party is informed seller’s share of the possible surplus decrease by 7.1 percentage points.
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In contrast, information is not valuable and can actually harm buyers. Table 3.2 shows the
buyer’s share of possible surplus across the four treatment conditions. Buyers earns less in
Complete Information compared to all the other conditions, which are basically identical.
Table 3.3 regressions (7) to (9) show the effect of information on the buyer’s share of the
possible surplus in a regression framework. In regression (7) we find a gain of 3 percentage
points when the seller is not informed. From regression (9), note that removing buyer or
seller information lead to similar gains in profit for buyers, 4.6 and 5.7 percentage points,
respectively. We do find that when neither party is informed, buyers lose 5 percentage
points of the total surplus but this loss is offset by the gains from removing buyer and seller
information. In fact, under Incomplete Information, the buyer’s share of possible surplus
increases by 5 percentage points compared to the Complete Information treatment. Thus,
there is no gain of having information for the buyer and information can actually make the
buyer worse off. As shown in section 3.3.2, this may arise because sellers are more forgiving
of low offers when the buyer is uninformed.
The asymmetrical value of information for buyers and sellers suggest that, in a setting like
ours where there is common knowledge of which parties are informed, the seller has an
incentive to get information but the buyer has an incentive to remain uninformed. This
pattern makes the setting in which the seller is informed and the buyer is not informed —
which has not previously been studied — an “absorbing state” that might be likely to arise
if sellers and buyers had the opportunity to get additional information. As we note above,
ours is a case where who has what is common knowledge, so buyers are aware when sellers
are informed and sellers are aware when buyers are informed. We leave the case where
information acquisition is private information for future work.
3.4. General Discussion
In this paper, we introduce a new experimental paradigm that nests the standard full-
information Ultimatum Game and allows us to systematically vary the information of either
party to investigate the role of information on behavior and outcomes in a bargaining
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game. We find that fairness concerns are significantly muted when one or both parties
are uninformed. This suggests that the Ultimatum Game, which has attracted significant
attention and has highlighted the importance of fairness in bargaining, is a special case at
the far end of the spectrum on the impact of fairness on bargaining outcomes.
These large increases in inequality when one or both parties are uninformed arise from both:
(1) the buyer (proposer) making less-fair offers and (2) the seller (responder) accepting
less-fair offers when less information is available. We find evidence that buyers behave
strategically based on reported beliefs that a seller will accept a given offer. That is, when
a seller is uninformed, buyers report believing that they are more likely to accept a low
offer. Buyers with a high value (i.e., a large pie) respond strategically to their belief by
mimicking the offers of buyers with a low value (i.e., small pie) when the seller is uninformed.
That uninformed sellers are more likely to accept a given offer when buyers are uninformed
suggests a role for caring about the intentions of the buyer or for social image concerns of
not wanting to accept unfair splits when the buyer is aware of the inequity.
Finally, we find that the value of information is different for buyers and sellers. Sellers
earn more when informed, but buyers do not. The asymmetrical value of information for
buyers and sellers suggest that, in a setting like ours where there is common knowledge of
which parties are informed, the seller has an incentive to get information but the buyer has
an incentive to remain uninformed. This pattern makes the setting in which the seller is
informed and the buyer is not informed — which has not previously been studied — an




A.1. Transaction Utility and Consumer Choice: Discount and Mark-up Game
A.1.1. Supplemental Results
Table A.1.1 tests the effect of an original price by percentage below, above, or equal to the








βn+j × Selling Price Dummyj,i + i
where Purchasei is whether participants i decided to purchase the virtual product or not
in the Discount and Mark-up Game; Selling Price as % of Original Price Dummiesn,i is a
dummy for being in each discount or mark-up percentage bin; and Selling Price Dummyj,i
is a dummy for each of the selling prices. I cluster the random error, i, at the individual
level.
Figure A.1.1 and Figure A.1.2 presents the average purchasing rate by selling price as a
percentage of the original price by earnings earnings in the Discount and Mark-Up Game.
Figure A.1.1 shows the results for Study 1A: Baseline and Figure A.1.2 shows the results
for Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed.
Tables A.1.2 Panels A and B tests effect of the selling price as a percentage of the original
price (PO ) on buyer’s purchasing decision by selling price for the Study 1A: Baseline and
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, respectively.
Table A.1.3 presents the results of the Discount and Mark-Up Game in a regression frame-
work, testing the marginal effect of a perceived percentage change between the selling price
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Table A.1.1: Rate of Purchasing Good by Selling Price as a Percentage of the Original
Price
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Study 1A Study 1B
Baseline With Earnings Displayed
All Participants Pass First Try All Participants Pass First Try
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
60% Of Original Price 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
80% Of Original Price 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
90% Of Original Price 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
100% Of Original Price -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
110% Of Original Price -0.204∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
120% Of Original Price -0.271∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
140% Of Original Price -0.337∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Constant 0.829∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017)
Selling Price: $7.51 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Selling Price: $8.03 -0.221∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Selling Price: $8.42 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Ind. Clusters 178 178 174 174 180 180 173 173
Price Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5696 5696 5568 5568 5760 5760 5536 5536
R-Squared 0.132 0.195 0.126 0.190 0.0521 0.165 0.0585 0.163
Notes: Participants’ average purchase rate of the virtual product conditional on the selling price. I control for game period. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.1.1: Buyer’s Purchase Rate by Selling Price
Study 1A: Discount and Mark-up Game (Baseline)
(a) Selling Price: $6.72 (b) Selling Price: $7.51
(c) Selling Price: $8.03 (d) Selling Price: $8.42
Note: Participants’ average purchase rate of the virtual product conditional on the selling price. Robust
standard error bars clustered at the individual level are shown around each mean.
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Figure A.1.2: Buyer’s Purchase Rate by Selling Price
Study 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game (With Earnings Displayed)
(a) Selling Price: $6.72 (b) Selling Price: $7.51
(c) Selling Price: $8.03 (d) Selling Price: $8.42
Note: Participants’ average purchase rate of the virtual product conditional on earnings. Robust standard
error bars clustered at the individual level are shown around each mean.
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Table A.1.2: Buyer’s Purchase Rate by Selling Price
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Panel A: Study 1A Baseline
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Buyer’s Selling Price: $6.72 $7.51 $8.03 $8.42
Buyer’s Earnings: $2.28 $1.49 $0.97 $0.58 All
Buyer’s Share: 76% 50% 32% 19%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P
O -0.435∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗ -0.677∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 1.319∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 1.484∗∗∗ 1.396∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.055) (0.037) (0.039)
Ind. Clusters 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178
Price Dummies Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 1246 4984 4984
R-Squared 0.111 0.111 0.168 0.169 0.144 0.144 0.127 0.127 0.185 0.185
Panel B: Study 1B With Earnings Displayed
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Buyer’s Selling Price: $6.72 $7.51 $8.03 $8.42
Buyer’s Earnings: $2.28 $1.49 $0.97 $0.58 All
Buyer’s Share: 76% 50% 32% 19%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P
O -0.233∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.040) (0.040)
Constant 1.155∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ 1.322∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.036) (0.038)
Ind. Clusters 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Price Dummies Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 5040 5040
R-Squared 0.0453 0.0455 0.0633 0.0638 0.0727 0.0740 0.0617 0.0618 0.159 0.159
Notes: Participants’ average purchase rate of the virtual product conditional on the earnings. I control for game period. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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and the original price on the purchasing rate. The basic regression specification is:
Purchasei = α+ β1 × Perceived % Changei + β2 × Perceived % Change × Mark-upi
+ β3 ×Mark-upi + β4 × Selling Pricei + i
where Purchasei is whether participant i decided to purchase the item or not in the Discount
and Mark-up Game; Perceived % Changei is the perceived discount (in percentage); and
Perceived % Change × Mark-upi is the perceived mark-up (in percentage). I control for
the game period and use dummies to control for the selling price. I cluster the random
error, i at the individual level.
Table A.1.3: Perceived Percentage Change Effect on Purchasing Rate
Study 1A: Discount and Mark-up Game (Baseline)
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Buyer’s Selling Price: $6.72 $7.51 $8.03 $8.42
Buyer’s Earnings: $2.28 $1.49 $0.97 $0.58 All
Buyer’s Share: 76% 50% 32% 19%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceived % Change 0.1126∗∗∗ 0.1411∗∗∗ 0.3459∗∗∗ 0.4841∗∗∗ 0.2708∗∗∗
(0.0402) (0.0523) (0.0742) (0.0875) (0.0435)
Perceived % Change × Mark-Up -0.6557∗∗∗ -0.6892∗∗∗ -0.6950∗∗∗ -0.7540∗∗∗ -0.6981∗∗∗
(0.1284) (0.1128) (0.1262) (0.1186) (0.0732)
Mark-Up -0.0643∗∗ -0.1986∗∗∗ -0.2321∗∗∗ -0.1981∗∗∗ -0.1734∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0353) (0.0357) (0.0322) (0.0211)
Constant 0.9514∗∗∗ 0.9348∗∗∗ 0.7695∗∗∗ 0.6940∗∗∗ 0.9805∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0234) (0.0339) (0.0378) (0.0173)
Selling Price: $7.51 -0.0900∗∗∗
(0.0125)
Selling Price: $8.03 -0.2215∗∗∗
(0.0206)
Selling Price: $8.42 -0.2674∗∗∗
(0.0232)
Ind. Clusters 178 178 178 178 178
Price Dummies Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1246 1246 1246 1246 4984
R-Squared 0.127 0.200 0.163 0.139 0.200
Notes: Effect of a one percent increase in perceived discount or mark-up on participants’ purchase rate, conditional on
earnings. I control of game period and selling price. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.1.4 pools the data from Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed
and interacts the perceived percentage change with earnings displayed to shows its effect
on participants’ purchasing decisions. The basic regression specification is:
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Purchasei = α+ β1 × Perceived % Change × Mark-up × Earnings Displayedi
+ β2 × Perceived % Change × Mark-upi
+ β3 × Perceived % Change × Earnings Displayedi
+ β4 × Earnings Displayedi
+ β5 × Perceived % Changei
+ β6 ×Mark-upi
+ β7 × Selling Pricei + i
Table A.1.4: Displaying Earnings Increases Consumption Utility Salience
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Buyer’s Selling Price: $6.72 $7.51 $8.03 $8.42
Buyer’s Earnings: $2.28 $1.49 $0.97 $0.58 All
Buyer’s Share: 76% 50% 32% 19%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perceived % Change × Mark-Up × Earnings Displayed 0.4046∗∗∗ 0.5970∗∗∗ 0.4098∗∗∗ 0.4093∗∗∗ 0.4570∗∗∗
(0.1221) (0.1503) (0.1494) (0.1505) (0.1186)
Perceived % Change × Mark-Up -0.7462∗∗∗ -0.7393∗∗∗ -0.9191∗∗∗ -0.8170∗∗∗ -0.8065∗∗∗
(0.1071) (0.1109) (0.1153) (0.1173) (0.0801)
Perceived % Change × Earnings Displayed -0.1475∗∗ -0.0805 -0.0741 -0.1954∗ -0.1249∗
(0.0645) (0.0849) (0.1092) (0.1154) (0.0666)
Earnings Displayed 0.0269 -0.0001 -0.0356 -0.0529 -0.0157
(0.0191) (0.0281) (0.0424) (0.0442) (0.0267)
Perceived % Change 0.1384∗∗∗ 0.1562∗∗∗ 0.4048∗∗∗ 0.5018∗∗∗ 0.3010∗∗∗
(0.0420) (0.0571) (0.0731) (0.0872) (0.0456)
Mark-Up -0.0373∗ -0.1844∗∗∗ -0.1625∗∗∗ -0.1793∗∗∗ -0.1409∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0143)
Constant 0.9420∗∗∗ 0.9154∗∗∗ 0.7301∗∗∗ 0.6860∗∗∗ 0.9796∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0219) (0.0318) (0.0345) (0.0181)
Selling Price: $7.51 -0.0870∗∗∗
(0.0096)
Selling Price: $8.03 -0.2454∗∗∗
(0.0157)
Selling Price: $8.42 -0.3120∗∗∗
(0.0177)
Ind. Clusters 358 358 358 358 358
Price Dummies Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2506 2506 2506 2506 10024
R-Squared 0.101 0.148 0.118 0.105 0.180
Notes: Effect of displaying earnings and a one percent increase in perceived discount or mark-up on participants’ purchase rate,
conditional on earnings. I control of game period and selling price. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at
the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.1.5: Robustness Check: Lower Bound of Trade-off Between Earnings and
Perceived Mark-up
Study 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game (With Earnings Displayed)
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Mark-up 0-40% Mark-up 10-40% Only Loss Aversion Adjusted
Selling Price: All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03 All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03 All ≥ $7.51 ≥ $8.03
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Earnings (in $) 0.239∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.030) (0.047) (0.019) (0.032) (0.051) (0.018) (0.030) (0.047)
Perceived Mark-Up (in $) -0.088∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Mark-Up -0.093∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.029)
Constant 0.428∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.048) (0.055) (0.046) (0.052) (0.061) (0.041) (0.049) (0.056)
Ind. Clusters 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2880 2160 1440 2160 1620 1080 2880 2160 1440
R-Squared 0.138 0.0865 0.0325 0.126 0.0635 0.0130 0.142 0.0927 0.0370
Notes: Trade-off between earnings and perceived mark-up. I control for game period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.1.2. Regression Specification?
I note that estimates of willingness to pay may be different depending on the concavity of
the transaction utility function. In practice, a number of factors could also moderate this
behavior including the credibility of the reference price or the salience of transaction utility.
Visual analysis of Figure 1.3 suggest that the effect or transaction utility is fairly linear in
the experimental data, with the exception of a kink going from no discount or mark-up to
a perceived mark-up. As such, my trade-off analysis uses a linear regression specification.
While a willingness to sacrifice 78 cents to avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up may seem
high, note that this value may contain loss aversion over transaction utility. Using Table
1.2 regressions (4) and (7) I estimate participant’s marginal rate of substitution “removing”
loss aversion. This exercise shows that participants are willing to sacrifice $0.43 in order to
avoid a dollar of perceived mark-up in Study 1A: Baseline. Doing the same analysis using
Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, when participants are shown their potential earnings
the exchange rate is reduced to $0.19 cents (see Appendix Table A.1.5, regressions (4) and
(7)).1
1Estimates show that getting a mark-up reduces the purchase rate by 14.5 percentage points in Study
1A: Baseline and 9.3 percentage points in Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed. See Table 1.2 regression (7)
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A.1.3. Monotonic Preferences Over Transaction Utility
Given the same buyers made decisions over different levels of transaction utility, I can ex-
plore consumers preferences over perceived discounts and mark-ups. Pooling data from
Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, I find that, conditional on
selling price, 4.6% of participants never buy the virtual product. About 45.5% percent of
participants exhibit fully rational behavior and always buy regardless of the perceived dis-
count or mark-up. Conditional on earnings, 30.5% of participants have a single switching
point from buying to not buying exhibit monotonic preferences over perceived discounts
and mark-ups. The remaining 19.5% of participants have multiple switching points. Fur-
thermore, focusing on participants who had a single switching point, I find that 30% of
participants switched at the 0% to 10% mark-up range.
A.1.4. Heterogeneity of Transaction Utility Effect
Table A.1.6 Panels A and B shows the heterogeneity of transaction utility effects in a
regression framework. I am able to explore whether specific consumer traits attenuate or
amplify transaction utility effects. In particular, I look at gender and whether a participant
has taken a marketing 101 course. I also explore participants’ self-reported measures of
caring about discounts and being averse to mark-ups. To do this, I use a difference-in-
differences regression that interacts the selling price as a percentage of the original price
(PO ) and a binary (or categorical) measure of the four heterogeneity groups.
A.1.5. Mediation: Participants’ Perception of the Deal
In Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed, I also asked participants to
rate their selling price on a scale from 1-5 where 1 is a “very bad deal” and 5 is a “very good
deal”.2 While this measure was not incentivized, I use participants’ reported perceptions of
getting a good deal or a bad deal to do a mediation analysis. Figure A.1.3 in the Appendix
and Table A.1.5 regression (7) in the Appendix.
2This questions was asked on the same decision screen the buyer where buyers made their purchasing
decision. Figure A.5.2 in Appendix A.5.1 shows an example.
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Table A.1.6: Heterogeneity of Buyer’s Purchase Rate
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Panel A: Study 1A Baseline
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Group: Female Taken Care Averse Lab Last 16Participant Marketing Discount Surge Experience Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group × PO -0.2811∗∗∗ 0.2522∗∗∗ -0.1206∗∗∗ -0.1279∗∗∗ -0.0454 -0.0293
(0.1030) (0.0944) (0.0410) (0.0464) (0.0888) (0.0512)
Group 0.1546∗ -0.1357∗ 0.0765∗∗ 0.0779∗∗ 0.0172 0.0196
(0.0820) (0.0764) (0.0341) (0.0376) (0.0710) (0.0540)
P
O -0.4170∗∗∗ -0.7296∗∗∗ -0.3433∗∗∗ -0.3105∗∗ -0.6128∗∗∗ -0.6230∗∗∗
(0.0905) (0.0620) (0.1062) (0.1254) (0.0660) (0.0493)
Constant 1.4059∗∗∗ 1.5807∗∗∗ 1.3426∗∗∗ 1.3303∗∗∗ 1.5190∗∗∗ 1.5112∗∗∗
(0.0738) (0.0541) (0.0885) (0.1024) (0.0548) (0.0422)
Ind. Clusters 178 153 178 178 178 178
Price Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4984 4284 4984 4984 4984 4984
R-Squared 0.203 0.203 0.200 0.202 0.186 0.185
Panel B: Study 1B With Earnings Displayed
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Product
Group: Female Taken Care Averse Lab Last 16Participant Marketing Discount Surge Experience Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group × PO -0.1792∗∗ 0.0486 -0.0623 -0.0772∗ 0.1262 -0.0100
(0.0884) (0.1018) (0.0411) (0.0410) (0.0797) (0.0453)
Group 0.1080 0.0086 0.0324 0.0405 -0.0608 -0.0034
(0.0800) (0.0901) (0.0351) (0.0370) (0.0725) (0.0472)
P
O -0.2796∗∗∗ -0.4311∗∗∗ -0.2603∗∗∗ -0.2025∗ -0.4801∗∗∗ -0.4050∗∗∗
(0.0755) (0.0472) (0.0924) (0.1061) (0.0603) (0.0430)
Constant 1.2436∗∗∗ 1.3258∗∗∗ 1.2440∗∗∗ 1.2137∗∗∗ 1.3564∗∗∗ 1.3132∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0444) (0.0786) (0.0969) (0.0569) (0.0419)
Ind. Clusters 180 156 180 180 180 180
Price Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5040 4368 5040 5040 5040 5040
R-Squared 0.166 0.165 0.164 0.168 0.166 0.159
Notes: Participants’ average purchase rate of the virtual product conditional on the earnings. I control for game period and selling price.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.1.3: Mediation Analysis
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
(a) Study 1A: Baseline





Rating of Selling Price 
(Good Deal=5 vs Bad Deal=1) 
β=-0.14*** 
β=-2.77*** 







(b) Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed





Rating of Selling Price 
(Good Deal=5 vs Bad Deal=1) 
β=-0.01 
β=-2.21*** 







Note: Mediation analysis: using participant’s rating of the selling price. I control for game period and
selling price. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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shows that in both Study 1A: Baseline and Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed the perceived
discount or mark-up is a significant predictor of the participants’ perception of the deal:
as the selling price as a percentage of the original price (PO ) increase, participant’s rating
of the price decreases and this is significant (regression coefficient in Study 1A: Baseline is
-2.77 and coefficient in Study 1B: With Earnings Displayed is -2.21).3 Moreover, including
participant’s rating of the deal reduces the effect of selling price as a percentage of the
original price (PO ). In Study 1A: Baseline the coefficient of
P
O is reduced to -13.9 percentage
points (compared to 63.8 percentage points in a regression without the mediator). In Study
1B: With Earnings Displayed the coefficient of PO is reduced to -0.8 percentage points and
not significant (compared to 41.1 percentage points in a regression without the mediator).
This suggest, that discounts and mark-ups alter participant’s perceptions of the terms of
the transactions, even when consumption utility is constant, and this in turn distorts their
purchasing behavior.
Table A.1.7: Buyer’s Purchase Rate by Mediated by Perceived Deal
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Study 1A Study 1B
Baseline Earnings Displayed
Dependent Variable: Purchase Virtual Rate Purchase Virtual Purchase Virtual Rate Purchase VirtualProduct Deal Product Product Deal Product
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rate Deal 0.1803∗∗∗ 0.1815∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0142)
P
O -0.6380∗∗∗ -2.7685∗∗∗ -0.1388∗∗∗ -0.4101∗∗∗ -2.2136∗∗∗ -0.0082
(0.0442) (0.1052) (0.0380) (0.0396) (0.1149) (0.0337)
Constant 1.5286∗∗∗ 6.3858∗∗∗ 0.3770∗∗∗ 1.3218∗∗∗ 6.0147∗∗∗ 0.2299∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0953) (0.0838) (0.0379) (0.1080) (0.0792)
Ind. Clusters 178 178 178 180 180 180
Price Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4984 4984 4984 5040 5040 5040
R-Squared 0.185 0.468 0.290 0.159 0.389 0.288
Notes: Participants’ average purchase rate of the item conditional on the earnings. I control for game period and selling price. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3Also see Table A.1.7 regressions (2) and (5) in the Appendix.
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A.2. Transaction Utility and Consumer Choice: Coupon Game
A.2.1. Supplemental Results
Table A.2.1 presents the results of the Coupon Game in a regression framework, testing the
effect of extra earnings and extra discount gained from purchasing the coupon-trap good on
participants’ purchase decision. The basic regression specification is:
Purchasei =α+ β1 × $4.00 Extra Discount Dummyi
+ β2 × $2.00 Extra Discount Dummyi
+ β3 × -$3.00 Extra Earningsi + i
where Purchasei is whether participant i decided to purchase the coupon-trap good or not;
$4.00 Extra Discount Dummyi is a dummy for observing a decision where purchasing the
coupon-trap good leads to an extra $4.00 of discount gained; $2.00 Extra Discount Dummyi
is a dummy for observing decision where purchasing the coupon-trap good leads to using an
extra $2.00 of discount gained; -$3.00 Extra Earningsi is a dummy for observing a decision
where purchasing the coupon-trap good leads to -$3.00 in extra earnings (compared to -$1.00
in extra earnings). I cluster the random error, i, at the individual level.
A.2.2. Robustness Check: “Smarter” Cohort Only
One can consider participants who passed the comprehension check on the first try as the
“smarter” cohort of participants. Figure A.2.2 presents the average purchase rate of the
coupon-trap good for individuals who passed the comprehension questions on the first at-
tempt. Table A.2.3 presents trade-off between earnings loss and discount gain for individuals
who passed the comprehension questions on the first attempt. I find results are the same
including everyone or only participants who passed the comprehensions check the first time.
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Table A.2.1: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A Study 2B
Baseline With Earnings Displayed
All Participants Pass Comprehension All Participants Pass Comprehension
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
$4.00 Extra Discount 0.069∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.063∗ 0.053 0.054 0.094∗ 0.094∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049) (0.049)
$2.00 Extra Discount 0.025 0.023 0.009 0.005 0.034 0.032 0.021 0.021
(0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant 0.285∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.085
(0.038) (0.048) (0.051) (0.063) (0.031) (0.048) (0.035) (0.052)
-$3.00 Extra Earnings -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.007 -0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Ind. Clusters 101 101 53 53 103 103 48 48
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 606 606 318 318 618 618 288 288
R-Squared 0.00940 0.0104 0.0201 0.0229 0.00694 0.00994 0.0152 0.0153
Notes: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the virtual product that led to a $5 discount gained which, by design, led to lower
earnings. Regressions (3-4) and (7-8) show results including only participants who passed the comprehension question on the first try. I
control of the game period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.2.2: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap By Extra Earnings Lost
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A Study 2B
Baseline With Earnings Displayed
Earnings Lost: All $1.00 $3.00 All $1.00 $3.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extra Discount (in $) 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.017 0.015 0.027∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
Constant 0.241∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.049) (0.042) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038)
Ind. Clusters 101 101 101 103 103 103
Observations 606 303 303 618 309 309
R-Squared 0.00402 0.00515 0.00301 0.00319 0.00966 0.000110
Notes: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the virtual product that led to a $5 discount gained which, by design, led to lower
earnings, by extra earnings lost. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A.2.1: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
(By Extra Earnings Lost from Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good)
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
(a) Study 2A: Baseline
Earnings Lost: $1
(b) Study 2A: Baseline
Earnings Lost: $3
(c) Study 2B: Earnings Displayed
Earnings Lost: $1
(d) Study 2B: Earnings Displayed
Earnings Lost: $3
Note: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the virtual product that led to a $5 discount gained
which, by design, led to lower earnings, by extra earnings lost. Robust standard error bars clustered at
the individual level are shown around each mean.
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Figure A.2.2: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
(Smarter Cohort: Pass Comprehension on First Try Only)
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
(a) Study 2A: Baseline (b) Study 2B: Earnings Displayed
Note: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the virtual product that led to a $5 discount gained
which, by design, led to lower earnings. Results includes only participants who passed the comprehension
question on the first try only. Results are consistent with using all data. Robust standard error bars
clustered at the individual level are shown around each mean.
Table A.2.3: Rate of Purchasing the Coupon-Trap Good
(Smarter Cohort)
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase of Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A Study 2B
Baseline With Earnings Displayed
OLS Probit OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extra Earnings -0.051∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Extra Discount 0.019∗ 0.018∗ 0.027∗ 0.027∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.320∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.073) (0.059)
Ind. Clusters 53 53 48 48
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 318 318 288 288
Notes: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the item that uses up the entire value of the coupon which,
by design, leads to a lower earnings. Results includes only participants who passed the comprehension
question on the first try only. Results are consistent with using all data. I control of the game period.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.2.3. Monotonic Preferences Over Transaction Utility
Given the same buyers made decisions over different levels of transaction utility, I can
explore consumers’ preferences over different levels of extra discount gained from purchasing
the coupon-trap good. Pooling data from Study 2A: Baseline and Study 2B: With Earnings
Displayed, I find that, conditional on earnings, 63% of participants exhibit fully rational
behavior and never buy the coupon-trap good. Conditional on earnings, 15% of participants
buy the coupon-trap good once, 11% of participants buy the coupon-trap good twice, and
10% of participants always buy the coupon-trap good. Moreover, of the 26% of participants
who choose to buy the coupon-trap good at least once, 81% of them exhibit monotonic
preferences over extra discount gained. The remaining 19% of participants have multiple
switching points.
A.2.4. Heterogeneity of Transaction Utility Effect
Following Study 1, I explore consumer heterogeneity in the Coupon Game in Table A.2.4.
Looking at the same four groups as before: gender, whether a participant has taken a
marketing 101 course, and participants’ self-reported measures of caring about discounts
and being averse to mark-ups, I use a difference-in-differences regression that interacts the
extra discount if consumers purchase the coupon-trap good and a binary (or categorical)
measure of the four heterogeneity groups. I do not find statistically significant differences
between those groups, possibly due to my lack of statistical power in this game with only 6
choices per subject.
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Table A.2.4: Heterogeneity of Buyer’s Purchase Rate of Coupon-Trap Good
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
Dependent Variable: Purchase of Coupon-Trap Good
Group: Female Taken Care Averse Lab Last 3Participant Marketing Discount Surge Experience Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group × Extra Discount -0.0043 -0.0026 0.0000 0.0061 -0.0091 -0.0009
(0.0151) (0.0140) (0.0085) (0.0071) (0.0138) (0.0149)
Extra Discount 0.0203 0.0179∗∗ 0.0170 0.0011 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0176∗
(0.0130) (0.0082) (0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0076) (0.0103)
Group -0.0076 0.0689 0.0113 -0.0272 0.0446 0.0164
(0.0637) (0.0573) (0.0294) (0.0307) (0.0524) (0.0466)
-$3.00 Extra Earnings -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗∗ -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗∗ -0.0542∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0149)
Display Earnings -0.1092∗∗ -0.0975∗∗ -0.1081∗∗ -0.1061∗∗ -0.1098∗∗ -0.1090∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0446) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0452)
Constant 0.3159∗∗∗ 0.2807∗∗∗ 0.2814∗∗∗ 0.3793∗∗∗ 0.2911∗∗∗ 0.3146∗∗∗
(0.0684) (0.0472) (0.0900) (0.0962) (0.0473) (0.0470)
Ind. Clusters 204 204 204 204 204 204
Order Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224
R-Squared 0.0268 0.0315 0.0271 0.0281 0.0276 0.0266
Notes: Rate of purchasing the coupon-trap good, the item that uses up the entire value of the coupon which, by design, leads to a
lower earnings. I control of the game period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.3. The Myth of the Male Negotiator: Gender’s Effect on Negotiation Strategies
and Outcomes
Participants were randomly assigned to the Informed and Uninformed treatment at the ses-
sion level. Table A.3.1 provides summary statistics of participant’s characteristics between
these two treatments. Fifty-five men and 55 women were uninformed of their negotiating
partner’s gender and 61 men and 61 women were informed of their negotiating partner’s
gender. We find these two groups are balanced on all characteristics with the exception of
being a US citizen. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of individual controls,
including being a US citizen, and session controls.
Table A.3.1: Summary Statistics
Informed Uninformed p-valueN: 122 110
Male .5 .5 1
(.045) (.048)
Age 21.066 20.736 .584
(.428) (.421)
Non-white .721 .627 .129
(.041) (.046)
Employment Status .364 .382 .777
(.044) (.047)
Native English Speaker .843 .9 .195
(.033) (.029)
US Citizen .785 .882 .048
(.037) (.031)
Politically Liberal .861 .882 .632
(.031) (.031)
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of participant’s characteristics. Fifty-five men and 55
women were uninformed of their negotiating partner’s gender and 61 men and 61 women were informed of their
negotiating partner’s gender. When the balance test is restricted to men only, there is a marginally significant
difference in being a US citizen and a native English speaker between informed and uninformed conditions.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Figure A.3.1 summarizes the joint payoffs results in all treatments. Panel A shows results
from the control game when participants are uninformed about gender. We find that the
joint payoff is close to the mixed strategy equilibrium. Male-male and female-female pairs
payoffs are slightly higher than mixed-gender pair payoff, but not significantly so. In mixed
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gender pairs, the joint payoff is exactly divided between the two partners.
Panel B presents results when gender information is introduced in the control game. The
joint payoff of mixed-gender pairs increases sharply, but it is men who reap the rewards
from this increase. Men play more “hawkishly” when they know they’re playing female
partners, as previous literature has shown. Because women also play more dovishly against
men, this results in both more coordination (higher joint payoff) and higher payoffs for men.
Men also play slightly less hawkishly against known male partners, which increases payoffs
to male-male pairs.
Panels D show that results of introducing gender information in the negotiation game are
starkly different. As a baseline, in Panel C, when participants are uninformed, coordina-
tion is markedly higher with communication, as expected, although not quite at the fully
efficient level of 100% coordination. Furthermore, there are no notable gender asymmetries
in payoffs, indicating that one gender does not appear “better” at negotiating in this game
than the other. Importantly, in Panel D, introducing gender information does not change to
the payoff allocation between male and female partners in mixed gender pairs, in contrast
to the control game without communication. Moreover, when informed, male-male pairs
perform notably worse than all other pair types, achieving only $15 out of a joint payoff of
a possible $20.
In both the control and negotiation game, participants face three possible action choice
pairs: ($15, $5), ($15, $15), and ($5, $5). In Figure A.3.2 we plot the frequency of each
action pair by gender-pair type for the negotiation game when partners are informed (in
Panel A) versus uninformed (in Panel B) of their partner’s gender. As expected, we find high
coordination across all gender pairs with and without gender information and mis-matching
on ($5, $5) is reduced to almost zero. Furthermore more, in mixed gender pairs, frequency
of man and women choosing $15 for themselves when their partner chooses $5 (i.e., the ($15,
$5) action choice pair) is equal between the two genders. We find gender information does
not change coordination in mixed-gender pairs, and increases coordination in female-female
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Figure A.3.1: Joint Payoff by Treatment and Gender-Pair Type
(a) Negotiation: Uninformed (b) Negotiation: Informed
(c) Non-communication (control): Uninformed (d) Non-communication (control): Informed
Notes: Average joint payoff by treatment and gender-pair type. The payoff split between male and female
partners is shown in mixed-gender pairs.
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pairs. Regardless of gender information, mixed-gender pairs coordinate about 90% of the
time, mis-coordinate on ($15, $5) about 9% of the time, and mis-coordinate on ($5, $5) less
than 1% of the time.
In contrast, we find that gender information reduced coordination for male-male pairs and
increases coordination for female-female pairs. When male-male pairs are uninformed, they
coordinate 82% of the time and mis-coordination on ($15, $15) about 18% of the time.
However, introducing gender information reduced coordination for male-male pairs: choos-
ing ($15, $5) only 78% of the time and increasing mis-coordination on ($15, $15) about 22%
of the time. Meanwhile, uninformed female-female pairs coordinate 84% of the time and
mis-coordination on ($15, $15) about 15% of the time and introducing gender information
increases coordination to 92% of the time and decreases mis-coordination on ($15, $15) to
8% of the time.
Figure A.3.2: Frequency of Action Choice Pair by Gender-Pair
(a) Negotiation, Uninformed (b) Negotiation, Informed
Notes: Frequency of choice pairs by gender pair type. For mixed-gender pairs we separate the pair choice
by the frequency the men or women chose the higher payoff in the case of ($15, $5) action outcome.
Figure 2.2 in section 2.3.2.1 showed that in the informed negotiation game men’s action
when gender is known appears to invert compared to the optimal tailoring observed in the
control game. Table A.3.2 presents these results in a regression framework. Regressions (1)
and (2) present results for male participants in the informed treatment. We find that in
the negotiation game, men’s play when gender is known appears to invert from the optimal
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tailoring: they choose $15 for themselves more often against men, and less often against
women. This reversal is marginally significant without controls (see regression (1)), and
highly significant in the regression with controls (see regression (2)). Regressions (3) and
(4) show that these effects are absent in the setting with no gender information, indicating
that it is men being unable to capitalize on gender information to tailor behavior in the
negotiation game that drives their negotiation disadvantage.
Table A.3.2: Choosing $15 by Treatment and Partner Gender
(Men Only)
Dependent variable: Choosing $15
Informed Uninformed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negotiation × Partner Female -0.163∗ -0.232∗∗∗ 0.0213 0.0375
(0.0935) (0.0870) (0.0971) (0.0965)
Partner Female 0.0879 0.124∗∗ -0.0671 -0.0854
(0.0584) (0.0545) (0.0702) (0.0702)
Negotiation -0.0596 -0.161∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.183∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0886) (0.0595) (0.0808)
Constant 0.670∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.570∗
(0.0490) (0.216) (0.0477) (0.293)
Ind. Clusters 61 61 55 55
Controls YES YES
Observations 488 488 440 440
R-Squared 0.032 0.107 0.026 0.081
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Session
controls include day of the week, within day trend, and game round. Individual controls
include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin liberal, being a US citizen, being a native
English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 2.3 in section 2.3.2.2 shows that men’s tailoring of negotiation approach also goes
in the opposite direction than expected: men are substantially less likely to use aggressive
communication strategies against female compared to male partners and much more likely
to use yielding communication strategies against female compare to male partners. Table
A.3.3 shows these results in a regression framework when participants are informed (in
Panel A) and uninformed (in Panel B) of their partner’s gender. Panel A shows that men
are much less likely to use the hard commitment strategy and be a tough talker against
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Table A.3.3: Tailoring of Communication Strategies by Gender and Partner Gender
Panel A: Informed Only
Aggressive Strategies Yielding Strategies
Dependent variable: Hard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male × Partner Female -0.181∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.099 0.215∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.067) (0.064) (0.053) (0.056)
Male 0.171∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.035 -0.136∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.063) (0.048) (0.047) (0.056) (0.053) (0.046) (0.049)
Partner Female 0.034 0.030 0.032 0.026 -0.034 -0.015 -0.080∗∗ -0.067∗
(0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.047) (0.046) (0.034) (0.037)
Constant 0.098∗∗∗ -0.065 0.069∗∗∗ -0.024 0.293∗∗∗ 0.205 0.592∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.165) (0.015) (0.137) (0.037) (0.186) (0.027) (0.153)
Ind. Cluster 122 121 122 121 122 121 122 121
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 488 484 488 484 488 484 488 484
R-Squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: Uninformed Only
Aggressive Strategies Yielding Strategies
Dependent variable: Hard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male × Partner Female -0.079 -0.081 -0.055 -0.059 0.006 -0.015 0.036 0.043
(0.052) (0.051) (0.044) (0.045) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.053)
Male 0.147∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.049 -0.002 -0.005 -0.070 -0.059
(0.048) (0.046) (0.032) (0.031) (0.057) (0.057) (0.049) (0.046)
Partner Female 0.039 0.036 0.056∗ 0.053∗ 0.024 0.034 -0.006 -0.001
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant 0.079∗∗∗ -0.135 0.076∗∗∗ -0.104 0.248∗∗∗ 0.029 0.575∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.252) (0.019) (0.171) (0.040) (0.211) (0.033) (0.197)
Ind. Cluster 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
R-Squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Session controls include day of the week, within day
trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin politically liberal, being a US citizen, being a
native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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female partners and this is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, we find that results
are directionally consistent for offer $15 and statistically significant at the 1% level for
friendly negotiator. In Panel B, we check that when participants are uninformed there is
no significant tailoring of men’s strategies.
Moreover, Table A.3.4 provides a further robustness check. Here we show that men’s tai-
loring toward women is significantly different when informed versus uninformed for hard
commitment, being a tough talker, and being a friendly negotiator. This suggest that the
paradoxical tailor is driven by gender information since only when men are informed does
the decreased use of aggressive strategies and increased use of yielding strategies toward
women appear.
Table A.3.4: Use of Aggressive and Yielding Communication Strategies by Information
Treatment (Men Only)
Aggressive Strategies Yielding Strategies
Dependent variable: Hard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Partner Female × Informed -0.107∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ 0.052 0.072 0.104∗ 0.114∗∗
(0.064) (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.066) (0.066) (0.058) (0.057)
Informed 0.042 0.026 0.083 0.070 0.015 0.034 -0.048 -0.032
(0.070) (0.081) (0.052) (0.061) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055)
Partner Female -0.040 -0.037 0.001 -0.002 0.031 0.026 0.030 0.032
(0.043) (0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.038)
Constant 0.226∗∗∗ 0.209 0.141∗∗∗ 0.155 0.247∗∗∗ 0.263 0.504∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.241) (0.025) (0.194) (0.040) (0.203) (0.036) (0.179)
Ind. Cluster 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
R-Squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Session controls include day of the week,
within day trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin liberal, being a US citizen,
being a native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table A.3.5 shows that the presence of women in the negotiation significantly improves
efficiency. Having a woman in the negotiation (either on one side or both sides), in the
combined sample with both gender information treatments, leads to an approximately $2
increase in joint payoff. This effect is primarily driven by the public gender information
setting, shown in regressions (3) and (4) where negotiating pairs with at least one woman
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(female-male or female-female) earn around $3 more compared to male-male pairs. How-
ever, even in the no gender information setting, in regressions (5) and (6) the results are
directionally consistent, indicating that men’s tendency toward more aggressive commu-
nication is also associated with lower coordination in this setting. As a result, the two
settings are not statistically significantly different from one another in regressions (7) and
(8). Nevertheless, it appears that the presence of gender information exacerbates men’s
aggressive tendencies toward one another. And, the fact that it is more strongly present
when gender information is known, and associated with decreased payoffs, show that this is
not just about the optimal deployment of “driving a hard bargain,” but rather a response
to the partner’s gender.
Table A.3.5: Efficiency Impacts of Women (Negotiation Only)
Dependent variable: Payoff | Negotiation
All Informed Uninformed All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any Women 1.922∗∗ 2.134∗∗ 2.647∗∗ 3.478∗∗ 1.163 1.239 1.163 1.183
(0.856) (0.898) (1.245) (1.446) (1.183) (1.211) (1.183) (1.186)




Constant 16.040∗∗∗ 18.129∗∗∗ 15.600∗∗∗ 14.651∗∗∗ 16.471∗∗∗ 31.807∗∗∗ 16.471∗∗∗ 18.175∗∗∗
(0.795) (4.235) (1.176) (5.097) (1.073) (9.776) (1.072) (4.181)
Pair Clusters 464 464 244 244 220 220 464 464
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 244 244 220 220 464 464
R-Squared 0.015 0.056 0.028 0.082 0.005 0.108 0.017 0.060
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parenthesis. Session controls include day of the week, within
day trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin liberal, being a US citizen, being a
native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3.6 presents the probability of matching and getting the preferred payoff (that
is $15) conditional on matching by communication strategy. First, in Panel A, we look at
how aggressive and yielding communication strategies affect coordination in the negotiation
game when gender is known. We find that using the hard commitment strategy or being a
tough talker decreases the probability of coordinating by 60 percentage points. However,
this is less so when used againt female partners. In contrast, choosing to yield and offer $15
to their partner increases matching by 40 percentage points and being a friendly negotiator
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increases matching by 58 percentage points. With the effect attenuated but still increasing
coordination when used against female partners.
In Panel B, we explor how using these strategies affects getting the $15 payoff conditional
on matching. First, we find that using conditional on matching, using the hard commitment
strategy and being a touch talker is effective. However, notices that the benefits of geing
the higher payoff are exactly offset by the probability of negotiation breakdown from using
these strategies. Focusing on yielding strategies, we find that offer $15, obviously, reducing
the probabiliy of getting the higher payoff by almost 90 percentage points. Finally, being
a friendly negotiator appears very effective. While the probability of getting the $15 payoff
is reduced by 17-27 percentage points, this is a much smaller effect compared to the gains
of being a friendly negotiator and increasing effiency by 58 percentage points.
We used MTurk workers to classify the negotiations according to several definitions we
provided. Appendix A.7 provides details on the negotiation transcript coding protocol.
Table A.3.7 provides the definition and average usage rate for all strategies coded (no
including the ones presented in the main paper) by gender and partner gender. We also
perform a two-sided t-test between difference in tailoring of strategies by men and women
based on partner’s gender when participants are informed.
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Table A.3.6: Matching and Getting $15 Payoff | Matching
by Aggressive and Yielding Communication Measures
Panel A: Matching
Aggressive Strategies Yielding Strategies
Dependent variable: Hard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Strategy -0.577∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.107) (0.121) (0.118) (0.081) (0.092) (0.108) (0.111)
Strategy × Partner Female 0.334∗∗ 0.334∗∗ 0.227 0.239 -0.354∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.163) (0.157) (0.166) (0.112) (0.103) (0.119) (0.121)
Partner Female 0.004 0.023 0.033 0.051 0.218∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.062) (0.065) (0.093) (0.092)
Constant 0.935∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗
(0.040) (0.164) (0.039) (0.169) (0.062) (0.190) (0.081) (0.187)
Ind. Cluster 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
R-Squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: $15 Payoff | Matching
Aggressive Strategies Yielding Strategies
Dependent variable: Hard Commitment Tough Talker Offer $15 Friendly Negotiator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Strategy 0.601∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗ -0.273 -0.172
(0.117) (0.120) (0.114) (0.126) (0.081) (0.091) (0.206) (0.199)
Strategy × Partner Female -0.018 0.078 -0.103 -0.030 0.070 0.024 -0.073 -0.180
(0.148) (0.183) (0.201) (0.239) (0.111) (0.118) (0.238) (0.235)
Partner Female 0.030 0.002 0.040 0.011 -0.007 -0.011 0.060 0.096
(0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.074) (0.075) (0.141) (0.136)
Constant 0.408∗∗∗ 0.433 0.418∗∗∗ 0.465 0.793∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.550
(0.063) (0.323) (0.063) (0.328) (0.061) (0.301) (0.126) (0.370)
Ind. Cluster 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209 209 209
R-Squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. Session controls include day of the week,
within day trend, and game round. Individual controls include subject’s age, being nonwhite, begin liberal, being a US citizen,
being a native English speaker, employment status, and the number of sessions completed. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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This is when a person asks the other person if
















This is when a person starts the conversation
(not including saying or other pleasantries) by
offering the $15 to the other person or stating














This is when the person gives in to the other
















This is the person that starts the negotiations on
















This is when the person mentions anything
















This is when the person mentions what they
previously chose. Individuals had to negotiate
with multiple people, so sometimes they will














This is the person that introduces a random
game such as playing rock/paper/scissor (),
guessing a number, using trivia questions, using
birthday dates, or other similar games to choose















This is when the person claims to be alternating














This is a person that uses their current
(unfortunate) situation to gain sympathy from
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Notes: Average rate men and women use these communication measures in percent. Hard commit (first mover) and offer $15
(first mover) are robustness checks to the corresponding primary measures in the main paper. Ask $15 and gave in are secondary
measures for aggressive and yielding communication strategies, respectively. Started negotiation, used the word fair, mentioned
previous choices, random game, and alternating strategy are different “neutral” mechanisms. Sad story, happy emojis, and sad
emojis are “emotion” based strategies and styles. Finally, aggressive score and reached agreement are scored provided from the
MTurk worker’s perception of the negotiation as a “third party” observer. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level in parenthesis. Stars denote significant difference in tailoring of strategies by men or women based on partner’s gender.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
119
A.4. The Value of Information and the Role of Fairness in Bargaining
A.4.1. Supplemental Results
After subjects played the 30 rounds of the bargaining game, they were asked to answer a
number of additional questions, depending on their treatment and role. Table A.4.1 shows
the additional questions that each type of subject answered. Data from sellers in Part 2 is
not analyzed in this paper.
Table A.4.1: Additional Experimental Questions
Buyer Seller
II SK BK CI II SK BK CI
Part 1 Bargaining Game (30 Rounds) X X X X X X X X(30 Rounds)
Part 2
Given available information, report
the probability offers got accepted.
(10 Rounds)
X X X X
For each cost and offer, report the
probability that the buyer had
V = 70. (10 Rounds)
X X
Questions to assess seller’s perception
of a fair offer. (10 Questions) X X
Notes: After subjects played the 30 rounds of the bargaining game, they were asked to answer a number of additional
questions, depending on their treatment and role. This table shows the additional questions that each type of subject
answered. Data from sellers in Part 2 is not analyzed in this paper.
Offers made by buyers can be classified into three categories: unfair, fair, and generous. We
define a fair offer as an equal split given common knowledge with a range of ±2 experimental
units around the equal split. For example, if cost is 10 and value is 90 (giving a surplus of
70 experimental units), the equal split is 50 and the range for a fair offer is 48-52 (inclusive).
All offers below the fair range are labeled as "unfair" offers and all offers above the range
are labeled as "generous" offers. Table A.4.2 presents the rate of unfair, fair, and generous
offers by treatment. We know that a small portion of buyers give “generous” offers and
most generous offers come from treatments were the buyer is not informed. We note that
in the last 10 rounds less than 1% of offers are generous offers when the buyer is informed.
This suggests that generous offers made when the buyer is informed were a “mistake” (i.e.,
trembling hand).
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Table A.4.2: Unfair, Fair, and Generous Transactions
All Rounds
Treatment: Unfair Offers Fair Offers Generous OffersShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 71.38 19.28 9.35
Seller Knows 66.60 25.32 8.09
Buyer Knows 71.90 25.99 2.11
Complete Information 55.70 43.78 0.52
First 10 Rounds
Treatment: Unfair Offers Fair Offers Generous OffersShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 69.78 18.70 11.52
Seller Knows 68.51 22.55 8.94
Buyer Knows 73.67 22.24 4.08
Complete Information 61.11 38.22 0.67
Last 10 Rounds
Treatment: Unfair Offers Fair Offers Generous OffersShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 71.52 19.57 8.91
Seller Knows 64.26 28.30 7.45
Buyer Knows 71.02 28.16 0.82
Complete Information 50.44 49.56 0.00
Notes: A fair offer is defined as an equal split given common knowledge with a range of ±2 around the equal split.
For example, if cost is 10 and value is 90, the equal split is 50 and the range for a fair offer is 48-52 (inclusive). All
offers below the fair range are "Unfair" offers and all offers above the range are "Generous" offers.
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We note that there is significant learning and experience effects between the first 10 rounds
and the last 10 rounds suggesting that buyers are learning to make offers that are more likely
to be accepted and more unfair. Table A.4.3 shows this in a regression framework. We find
significant differences in inequality share, buyer earnings, and seller earnings between the
first 10 rounds and the last 10 rounds. In particular, in the final 10 rounds, inequality sig-
nificantly increases when buyers or sellers are uninformed; however, the interaction between
uninformed buyers or sellers and experience (the last 10 rounds) shows that there is a fur-
ther statistically significant increase in inequality. Moreover, when comparing the Complete
Information treatment to the Incomplete Information treatment, having uninformed buyers
and sellers increases the inequality share by 5.2 percentage points during the first 10 rounds
but the interaction between Incomplete Information and experience shows that it increases
inequality share by an additional 9.5 percentage points in the latter 10 rounds. Furthermore,
looking at buyer and seller earnings between the Incomplete Information treatment and the
Complete Information treatment, we find that while there is an increase in buyer and seller
earnings in the first 10 rounds, this is not significant. On the other hand, we see that the
Incomplete Information setting significantly increases buyer earnings by an additional 4.10
experimental units and significantly reduces the sellers earnings by 3.23 experimental units
in the second half of the experiment. This suggest that there is significant learning and
from the first half to the second half of the experiment.
We know that removing information from buyers or sellers decreases offers and increases
acceptance rate. To compare the effect of buyers’ and sellers’ actions on the inequality share,
we compare the ex-ante and ex-post inequality share across treatments to the subgame-
perfect equilibrium predictions (in the absence of fairness concerns). We define the ex-ante
inequality share as the possible inequality share produced by the buyer’s offer (but before the
seller accepts or rejects it) and the ex-post inequality share is realized inequality share after
the seller has responded to the offer. We focus our analysis on the last 10 rounds. Recall
that subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts the inequality share is 100% when the buyer is
informed (in BK and CI) and 70.8% when the buyer is uninformed (in II and SK). First,
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Table A.4.3: Learning and Experience (First vs Last 10 Rounds)
Dependent variable: Inequality Share Seller Earnings Buyer Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Seller No Info × Last 10 Round 0.033∗∗ 0.035 -1.048 -0.964 2.161∗∗ 2.644∗
(0.016) (0.023) (0.764) (0.901) (1.009) (1.450)
Buyer No Info × Last 10 Round 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -2.096∗∗∗ -1.982∗ 1.825∗ 2.326
(0.016) (0.022) (0.752) (1.089) (1.009) (1.526)
Both No Info × Last 10 Round -0.001 -0.283 -0.870
(0.031) (1.500) (1.998)
Seller No Info 0.041∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -1.004 -1.417 0.997 2.492∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.679) (0.930) (0.840) (1.095)
Buyer No Info 0.010 0.039∗ 1.594∗∗ 1.104 -0.579 0.989
(0.017) (0.023) (0.675) (0.882) (0.846) (1.047)
Both No Info -0.055∗ 0.913 -3.035∗
(0.033) (1.337) (1.666)
Last 10 Round -0.015 -0.028∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ 2.418∗∗∗ 2.929∗∗∗ 3.431∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗ 1.859∗∗ 0.480
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.556) (0.450) (0.692) (0.771) (0.733) (1.113)
Constant 0.168∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 20.017∗∗∗ 18.715∗∗∗ 19.453∗∗∗ 28.874∗∗∗ 29.668∗∗∗ 28.369∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.445) (0.474) (0.598) (0.528) (0.568) (0.678)
Incomplete Information 0.052∗∗∗ 0.601 0.446
(0.025) (0.927) (1.184)
Test CI=II p-value 0.038 0.517 0.707
Incomplete Information × Last 10 Round 0.095∗∗∗ -3.229∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗
(0.022) (1.102) (1.428)
Test CI=II p-value 0.000 0.004 0.005
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Observations 3740 3740 3740 3740 3740 3740 3740 3740 3740
R-Squared 0.0183 0.0123 0.0352 0.00975 0.00783 0.0122 0.0118 0.00772 0.0155
Notes: Table A.4.3 shows that buyers and sellers are learning across rounds. In particular, in the final 10 rounds, inequality significantly increases when buyers or
sellers are uninformed; however, the interaction between uninformed buyers or sellers and experience (the last 10 rounds) shows that there is a further statistically
significant increase in inequality. We find similar results for seller’s and buyer’s earnings. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
under Complete Information, we know that the final inequality share is 89.8 percentage
points lower than predicted. We find that 95% of this reduction is due to buyer’s more fair
offers and 5% is due to the seller’s response. When we remove information from the seller
(i.e., in BK) we find that the final inequality share is 79.4 percentage points lower than
predicted and, again, 95% of this reduction is due to buyer’s more fair offers and 5% is due
to the seller’s response. In contrast, when we remove information from the buyer (i.e., in
SK) we find that the final inequality share is 50.66 percentage points lower than predicted
and 90% of this reduction is due to the buyer and 10% is due to the seller. Finally, in the
Incomplete Information treatment, the final inequality share is only 45.8 percentage points
lower than predicted and only 76% of this reduction is due to the buyer and while 24% is
due to the seller.
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Table A.4.4: Ex-ante and Ex-post Inequality Shares
All Rounds
Treatment: Ex-Ante Ex-Post DifferenceShare Share
Incomplete Information 35.99 23.23 12.76
Seller Knows 27.46 19.38 8.08
Buyer Knows 27.47 20.60 6.88
Complete Information 18.48 12.38 6.11
First 10 Rounds
Treatment: Ex-Ante Ex-Post DifferenceShare Share
Incomplete Information 35.27 20.09 15.18
Seller Knows 29.48 18.72 10.76
Buyer Knows 31.86 21.69 10.17
Complete Information 24.20 14.86 9.34
Last 10 Rounds
Treatment: Ex-Ante Ex-Post DifferenceShare Share
Incomplete Information 35.79 24.98 10.82
Seller Knows 25.29 20.14 5.15
Buyer Knows 24.60 20.60 4.00
Complete Information 14.25 10.22 4.03
Notes: Table A.4.4 reports the ex-ante and ex-post inequality share. We define the ex-ante inequality share as the
possible inequality share produced by the buyer’s offer (but before the seller accepts or rejects it) and the ex-post
inequality share is realized inequality share after the seller has responded to the offer.
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A.4.2. Robustness check: analysis using all 30 rounds
Subjects played 30 rounds of the bargaining game. We note that there is significant learning
and experience effects between the first 10 rounds and the last 10 rounds suggesting that
buyers are learning to make offers that are more likely to be accepted and more unfair.
Throughout the paper, we limit our analysis to the last 10 rounds since we are interested
in the extent to which our results persist in the presence of this learning or experience. As
a robustness check, we replicate all analysis using all 30 rounds and find consistent results.
Table A.4.5: Inequality Shares, Seller Shares, and Buyer Shares
(All 30 Rounds)
Dependent variable: Inequality Shares Seller Shares Buyer Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Seller No Info 0.059∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ 0.015 0.028∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Buyer No Info 0.046∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ -0.016∗ -0.029∗∗ 0.011 0.025∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Both No Info -0.044 0.024 -0.026
(0.027) (0.017) (0.020)
Constant 0.160∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Incomplete Information 0.109∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.022) (0.012) (0.015)
Test CI=II p-value 0.000 0.000 0.081
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
Observations 5610 5610 5610 5610 5610 5610 5610 5610 5610
R-Squared 0.0179 0.0109 0.0320 0.00836 0.00179 0.0114 0.000869 0.000509 0.00213
Notes: Seller No Info denotes when a seller does not have information on the buyer’s valuation (in BK and II). Buyer No Info
denotes when the buyer does not have information on the seller’s cost (in SK and II). Both No Info denotes when both the buyer
and seller do not have information (II). Regression analysis shows Complete Information has the least inequality in payoffs, while
removing information from either the buyer or the seller leads to more inequality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level. There are 187 clusters. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4.6: Offer Conditional on Value: Effect of Removing Information
(All 30 Rounds)
Panel A: Removing Buyer’s Information | Seller’s Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Value=70 Value=90
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows -1.287 -0.390 -2.210∗
(0.916) (0.800) (1.212)
Constant 44.236∗∗∗ 40.814∗∗∗ 48.079∗∗∗
(0.772) (0.617) (1.041)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 2760 1470 1290
R-Squared 0.00637 0.000936 0.0171
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Value=70 Value=90
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information -0.392 -0.401 -0.353
(1.272) (1.189) (1.525)
Constant 41.225∗∗∗ 39.632∗∗∗ 42.780∗∗∗
(0.634) (0.693) (0.731)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 2850 1414 1436
R-Squared 0.000418 0.000492 0.000323
Panel B: Removing Seller’s Information | Buyer’s Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Value=70 Value=90
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows -3.011∗∗∗ -1.181 -5.299∗∗∗
(0.999) (0.927) (1.272)
Constant 44.236∗∗∗ 40.814∗∗∗ 48.079∗∗∗
(0.772) (0.617) (1.041)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 94 94
Observations 2820 1440 1380
R-Squared 0.0226 0.00438 0.0639
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Value=70 Value=90
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information -2.116∗ -1.192 -3.442∗∗
(1.209) (1.093) (1.475)
Constant 42.949∗∗∗ 40.423∗∗∗ 45.869∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.510) (0.620)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 2790 1444 1346
R-Squared 0.0188 0.00830 0.0435
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed directionally decreases
buyers’ offers, in particular high-value buyers are more likely to give lower offers (marginally significant). Similarly,
removing information from buyers when the seller is uninformed directionally decreases buyer’s offers. Panel B
shows that removing information from sellers regardless of whether the buyer is informed or not significantly
decreases buyers’ offers, in particular high-value buyers are more likely to give lower offers. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4.7: Acceptance Rates Conditional on Offer: Effect of Removing Information
(All 30 Rounds)
Panel A: Removing Buyer’s Information | Seller Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows 0.025 0.024 0.026
(0.034) (0.025) (0.049)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 2760 1371 1389
R-Squared 0.258 0.259 0.234
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.074∗∗ 0.022 0.136∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.047)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 2850 1478 1372
R-Squared 0.265 0.248 0.245
Panel B: Removing Seller’s Information | Buyer Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows 0.010 0.062∗ -0.043
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 94 94
Observations 2820 1436 1384
R-Squared 0.200 0.238 0.171
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.044 0.006 0.083
(0.032) (0.020) (0.053)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 2790 1413 1377
R-Squared 0.306 0.172 0.254
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed directionally increases
sellers’ acceptance rate. Moreover, removing information from buyers when the seller is uninformed significantly
increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Panel B shows that removing information from sellers, regardless of whether the
buyer is informed or not, directionally increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.4.3. Alternate Measures of Inequality
We find that a small number of buyers are “generous” and give the seller a larger portion
of the shares. Table A.4.2 shows that these “generous” offers occur mainly when the buyer
is not informed of the seller’s cost and occur less than 1% of the times when the buyer is
informed. Generous offers from buyers can be seen as increasing inequality at the transac-
tional level or reducing inequality (against sellers) at the market level. Here we define two
alternative inequality share measures to accounts for those two scenarios.
First, absolute inequality share is defined as the absolute difference between the buyer and
seller’s earnings divided by the total surplus: |Buyer’s earnings−Seller’s earnings|V−C . Second, differ-
ence inequality share is defined as the of average inequality among all buyers and sellers:
Buyer earnings−Seller earnings
V−C .
As a robustness check, we replicate all analysis using these two alternate definitions and find
consistent results: removing information increases inequality, is robust to both alternative
definitions. The absolute inequality share provides a measure of inequality at the transaction
level; however, because it treats any unequal split — whether for or against the seller —
as inequality, it introduces generous buyers as inequality, increasing effects. On the other
hand, the difference inequality share measure reduces inequality at the market level — as
inequality working for the seller cancels out some of the inequality working against the seller
— but not at the transaction level, thus it downward biases our results.
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Table A.4.8: Alternate Measures of Inequality Shares
All 30 Rounds
Treatment: Inequality Absolute Inequality Difference InequalityShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 23.23 26.46 20.00
Seller Knows 19.38 21.14 17.62
Buyer Knows 20.60 21.51 19.68
Complete Information 12.38 12.52 12.23
First 10 Rounds
Treatment: Inequality Absolute Inequality Difference InequalityShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 20.09 24.79 15.39
Seller Knows 18.72 20.84 16.59
Buyer Knows 21.69 23.67 19.71
Complete Information 14.86 14.95 14.76
Last 10 Rounds
Treatment: Inequality Absolute Inequality Difference InequalityShare Share Share
Incomplete Information 24.98 27.66 22.29
Seller Knows 20.14 21.56 18.72
Buyer Knows 20.60 20.82 20.39
Complete Information 10.22 10.22 10.22
Notes: Table A.4.8 provides the key and alternative measures of inequity. We define our key measure of inequity,
the inequality share, as the maximum of the difference between the buyer and seller’s earnings or zero divided by the
total surplus: max{Buyer earnings−Seller earnings,0}
V−C . This measure allows for only (unfair) inequality towards the buyer
— so the best the seller can do to reduce inequality is reject an offer — thus allowing us to compare the equity of
outcomes across information conditions. Alternate measures of inequality share are (1) the absolute inequality share:
|Buyer earnings−Seller earnings|
V−C , which is the difference between the buyer and seller’s earnings divided by the total
surplus, and (2) the difference inequality share: Buyer earnings−Seller earnings
V−C , which is a measure of average inequality
among all buyers and sellers. The absolute inequality share provides a measure of inequality at the transaction level;
however, because it treats any unequal split — whether for or against the seller — as inequality, it introduces generous
buyers as inequality, increasing effects. On the other hand, the difference inequality share measure reduces inequality
at the market level — as inequality working for the seller cancels out some of the inequality working against the seller
— but not at the transaction level, thus it downward biases our results.
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Table A.4.9: Absolute Inequality Shares = |BuyerEarnings−SellerEarnings|V−C
Dependent variable: Absolute Inequality Share
Last 10 Rounds All 30 Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Seller No Info 0.081∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020)
Buyer No Info 0.088∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017)
Both No Info -0.045 -0.037
(0.028) (0.026)
Constant 0.160∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Incomplete Information 0.174∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020)
Test CI=II p-value 0.000 0.000
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 187 187 187 187 187 187
Observations 1870 1870 1870 5610 5610 5610
R-Squared 0.0366 0.0433 0.0849 0.0246 0.0218 0.0494
Notes: Regression analysis shows Complete Information has the least inequality in payoffs while removing
information from either the buyer or the seller leads to more inequality. The absolute inequality share provides
a measure of inequality at the transaction level; however, because it treats any unequal split — whether for or
against the seller — as inequality, it introduces generous buyers as inequality, increasing effects compared to
our key measure of inequality share. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. There are 187 clusters.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.4.10: Difference Inequality Shares = BuyerEarnings−SellerEarningsV−C
Dependent variable: Difference Inequality Share
Last 10 Rounds All 30 Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Seller No Info 0.067∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Buyer No Info 0.050∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.027 0.054∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019)
Both No Info -0.066∗ -0.051
(0.037) (0.034)
Constant 0.146∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Incomplete Information 0.121∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029)
Test CI=II p-value 0.000 0.008
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 187 187 187 187 187 187
Observations 1870 1870 1870 5610 5610 5610
R-Squared 0.0214 0.0116 0.0389 0.00965 0.00296 0.0155
Notes: Regression analysis shows Complete Information has the least inequality in payoffs while removing
information from either the buyer or the seller directionally leads to more inequality. The difference inequality
share measure reduces inequality at the market level — as inequality working for the seller cancels out some of
the inequality working against the seller — but not at the transaction level, thus it downward biases our results
compared to our key measure of inequality share. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. There are
187 clusters. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.4.4. Buyers’ Beliefs and Strategic Behavior
We use buyer’s beliefs to show that buyers are behaving strategically in response to sellers
being uninformed. We asked buyers in each treatment, in an incentive compatible way, to
report the probability that the seller would accept a given offer. In particular, each buyer
was randomly assigned one round from the last 10 rounds and asked about the probability
an offer was accepted for each of the buyer-seller pairs in that round. This provides a
“clean” measure of probability belief of acceptance since buyers are making judgment on
offers by other buyers reducing the possibility of simultaneity bias in beliefs and offers.
Buyers report believing that when a seller is uninformed, they are much more likely to
accept an offer. In fact, the belief probability is similar to the belief probability if the seller
were informed and the buyer had a low value. High-value buyers respond to this belief
strategically by mimicking offers of low-value buyers when the seller is uninformed.
Figure A.4.1 presents the CDF of offers used to elicit beliefs and shows that more than 90%
of the mass of the offers lies between 20 and 60 experimental units.
We find that removing sellers information when the buyer is informed changes the belief
probability that an offer will be accept based on buyer’s value. Figure A.4.2 and A.4.3
reports the buyer’s belief that an offer was accepted in Panel A; the actual rate that an
offer was accepted in Panel B; and the normal density function of offers in Panel C; for
low-cost and high-cost sellers, respectively.
Panel A shows that buyers report believing that an offer is more likely to be accepted when
the seller is uninformed (see solid grey and black lines). When the seller is uninformed,
buyers (correctly) believe that seller’s acceptance rate will not change based on buyers
value (see solid grey and black lines overlap). When the seller is uninformed, buyers belief
that seller’s acceptance rate is closer to the belief probability when the seller is informed
but the buyer has a low value (see solid lines are closer to the grey dash line). Panel C
131
Figure A.4.1: CDF of Offers Used to Elicit Beliefs
(a) Incomplete Information, Cost=10 (b) Incomplete Information, Cost=30
(c) Seller Knows, Cost=10 (d) Seller Knows, Cost=30
(e) Buyer Knows, Cost=10 (f) Buyer Knows, Cost=30
(g) Complete Information, Cost=10 (h) Complete Information, Cost=30
Notes: Table A.4.1 presents the CDF of offers used to elicit beliefs and shows that more than 90% of the
mass of the offers lies between 20 and 60 experimental units.
Source: Experimental Data.
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presents the normal density function of offers by value and suggests that high-value buyers
mimic the offers of low-value buyer when sellers are uninformed. Notice, when the seller
is uninformed, buyers’ offer distribution overlap, regardless of value and they also overlap
the offers of low-value buyers when sellers are informed (see solid grey and black lines are
on top of each other and on top of dashed grey line). When the seller is informed, buyers’
offer distribution shifts to the right but only for high-value buyers (see dashed black line).
We also find supporting evidence when we compare the Incomplete Information and Seller
Knows conditions. Figure A.4.4 reports the buyer’s belief that an offer was accepted in
Panel A; the actual rate that an offer was accepted in Panel B; and the normal density
function of offers in Panel C.
Panel A we can see that when offers are in the range of 30 to 40 experimental units, buyers
believe that when sellers are informed, that is in the Seller Knows treatment, low offers
from high-value buyers are less likely to be accepted (compare gray and black dashed lines).
On the other hand, in the Incomplete Information condition, we actually find the opposite
with a higher acceptance rate for the same offer from high-value buyers (compare gray
and black solid lines for offers). Actual acceptance rates in the offer ranges of 30 to 40
experimental units does not show a distinct difference in acceptance rate. However, buyers
are still adjusting their offers based on their beliefs. Panel C shows that buyers are not
only aware that informed sellers respond differently compared to uninformed sellers but
actually high-value buyers behave strategically based on this belief by mimic offers of low-
value buyers when the seller does not have information. Furthermore, we note that there
is a larger spread in offers when for buyers in the Incomplete Information condition (which
is not seen in other treatments). This may be due to buyers not fully realizing that having
uninformed sellers (and possibly being uninformed buyers) is actually beneficial for their
outcomes.
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Figure A.4.2: Buyer’s Belief and Strategic Behavior
(BK vs CI | Cost=10)
(a) Buyer Belief Offer was Accepted (b) Actual Rate Offer was Accepted
(c) Normal Density Function of Offers by Value
Notes: Panel A reports the buyer’s belief probability that an offer is accepted when the seller’s cost is 10
for the Buyer Knows and Complete Information treatments. Buyers in the BK treatment recognize that
sellers’ acceptance probability is unlikely to differ with the buyer’s value (i.e., the gray and black solid lines
practically overlap with K-S test p-value=0.972). In addition, the reported probability of acceptance are
nearly identical to beliefs in CI when V = 70. This latter result suggests buyers believe sellers in BK give
buyers the “benefit of the doubt,” thinking like they always have V = 70. Panel C, shows that buyers are
not only aware that informed sellers respond differently compared to uninformed sellers but also behave
strategically based on this belief. Distribution of offers by treatment and value show that buyers with a
high value mimic offers of low-value buyers when sellers are uninformed.
Source: Experimental Data.
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Figure A.4.3: Buyer’s Belief and Strategic Behavior
(BK vs CI | Cost=30)
(a) Buyer Belief Offer was Accepted (b) Actual Rate Offer was Accepted
(c) Normal Density Function of Offers by Value
Notes: Panel A compare Buyer Knows and Complete Information treatments conditional on the seller’s
cost being 30. Buyers in BK correctly realize that uninformed sellers cannot condition acceptance on the
buyer’s value (the solid lines are on top of each other) and the BK probabilities are nearly identical to
beliefs in CI for V = 70, supporting buyers’ belief that sellers in BK give buyers the benefit of the doubt.
Panel C shows that buyers behave strategically based on this belief: high-value buyers mimic offers of
low-value buyers when the seller is uninformed.
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Figure A.4.4: Buyer’s Belief and Strategic Behavior
(II vs SK)
(a) Buyer Belief Offer was Accepted (b) Actual Rate Offer was Accepted
(c) Normal Density Function of Offers by Value
Notes: Panel A we can see that when offers are in the range of 30 to 40 experimental units, buyers believe
that when sellers are informed, that is in the Seller Knows treatment, low offers from high-value buyers
are less likely to be accepted (compare gray and black dashed lines). On the other hand, in the Incomplete
Information condition, we actually find the opposite with a higher acceptance rate for the same offer from
high-value buyers (compare gray and black solid lines for offers). Panel C shows that buyers are not only
aware that informed sellers respond differently compared to uninformed sellers but actually high-value
buyers behave strategically based on this belief by mimic offers of low-value buyers when the seller does
not have information.
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A.4.5. Seller’s Acceptance Rate Weighted by Offers
We know that giving information to buyers and sellers can change the buyer’s offer. As
such, it is hard to compare the seller’s rejection rates when offer distributions are not the
same across treatment. In this section, we use sample weights to control for this. Below I
describe each method in more detail and show previous results are amplified after controlling
for offer distribution differences.
A.4.5.1. Using Sampling Weights by Offer
First, in order to control the offer distributions, we construct a sampling weight consisting
of the ratio of the percentage of a given offer, conditional on buyer’s value and seller’s cost,
in the treatment with less information over the percentage of specific offer, conditional on
buyer’s value and seller’s cost, in the treatment with more information. This implies that
all observations in the “control” group (that is, the treatment with less information) have
a sampling weight of 1, observations that appears more often in the treatment with more
information compared to the control group receive a weight less than 1, and observations
that appeared less often in the treatment with more information compared to the control
group receive a weight greater than 1.
For example, let us assume that we are comparing II and SK and there are 100 observations
in each treatment conditional on value and cost, and an offer of 15 experimental units
appeared 25 times in II and 10 times in SK. This means that, conditional on value and
cost, all observations with an offer of 15 experimental units receive a weight=1 in II and
weight= 0.250.1 = 2.5 in SK.
Then we run the exact same regressions specified in Table 5 and Table 6 controlling for
the sampling weights. Note that this method creates “missing” weights for any offer that
appeared in one treatment but not the other, essentially dropping it from the regression.
It also might place a lot of weight on the outcome of a single observation. For example,
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if an offer of 20 experimental units appeared 10 times in II where it was accepted half the
time and rejected half the time and 1 time in SK where it was accepted, then the sampling
weight will put a weight of 10 on the observation in SK, making it appear as if it is an offer
of 20 experimental units is accepted more often in SK. In order to minimize the number
of observation dropped and overweighting outcomes from observations that appeared very
infrequently, we use offer “bins" to construct sampling weights (see Tables D3 and D4).
Table A.4.11: Acceptance Rates Conditional on Offer: Effect of Removing Information
(Controlling for Sampling Weights By Offer Conditional on Value and Cost)
Panel A: Removing Buyer Information | Seller Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows 0.081 0.037 0.134
(0.050) (0.032) (0.095)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 902 434 468
R-Squared 0.242 0.135 0.193
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.124∗∗∗ 0.029 0.256∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032) (0.083)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 934 471 463
R-Squared 0.386 0.214 0.341
Panel B: Removing Seller Information | Buyer Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows 0.036 0.081∗ -0.001
(0.034) (0.045) (0.044)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 94 94
Observations 932 457 475
R-Squared 0.248 0.284 0.224
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.053 0.008 0.104
(0.037) (0.018) (0.073)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 912 457 455
R-Squared 0.379 0.260 0.301
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed directionally increases
sellers’ acceptance rate. Moreover, removing information from buyers when the seller is uninformed significantly
increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Panel B shows that removing information from sellers, regardless of whether the
buyer is informed or not, directionally increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.4.5.2. Using Sampling Weights by Offer Bins
In order to construct sampling weights based on offer bins, we first generate a new variable
that allocates each offer into a bin, where bins are defined in 5 unit increments (that is,
offers of 10-15 units are in bin 0, offers of 16-20 units are in bin 1, and so on) and then
construct sampling weights in the same method as previously described.
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Table A.4.12: Acceptance Rates Conditional on Offer: Effect of Removing Information
(Controlling for Sampling Weights By Offer Bins Conditional on Value and Cost)
Panel A: Removing Buyer Information | Seller Information Setting
When Seller Informed: SK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Seller Knows 0.085∗ 0.048 0.133
(0.050) (0.035) (0.096)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 915 445 470
R-Squared 0.243 0.163 0.195
When Seller Uninformed: II vs BK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.144∗∗∗ 0.033 0.287∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.032) (0.082)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 95 95 95
Observations 950 480 470
R-Squared 0.416 0.238 0.368
Panel B: Removing Seller Information | Buyer Information Setting
When Buyer Informed: BK vs CI
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(1) (2) (3)
Buyer Knows 0.040 0.091∗ -0.000
(0.036) (0.050) (0.045)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 94 94 94
Observations 940 461 479
R-Squared 0.245 0.275 0.226
When Buyer Uninformed: II vs SK
All Cost=10 Cost=30
(4) (5) (6)
Incomplete Information 0.045 0.006 0.089
(0.037) (0.021) (0.072)
Number of Buyers (Clusters) 93 93 93
Observations 930 469 461
R-Squared 0.355 0.286 0.278
Notes: Panel A the shows that removing information from buyers when the seller is informed directionally increases
sellers’ acceptance rate. Moreover, removing information from buyers when the seller is uninformed significantly
increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Panel B shows that removing information from sellers, regardless of whether the
buyer is informed or not, directionally increases sellers’ acceptance rate. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.5. Transaction Utility and Consumer Choice Experimental Protocol
After consenting to participate in this study, each participant is informed that they might
receive a free drink of choice and additional bonus payment on top of their $10 participation
fee. Participants read instructions and participate in the Coffee Drink Experiment followed
by the Discount and Mark-up Game and the Coupon Game. Below are the instructions for
the Discount and Mark-up Game and the Coupon Game used in this paper.
General Instructions
This is part 2 of the Decision Making Study. In this part of the study you will be partici-
pating in two games (Game A and Game B) in which you play the role of a buyer. Below
is a brief description of each game.
• Game A: As a buyer in Game A, you will encounter a store. You will review the price
of 32 items in the store and decide if you would like to purchase the item or not. As
such, you will be playing a total of 32 rounds in Game A.
• Game B: As a buyer in Game B, you will review the prices of two items and decide
which item you would like to purchase. You will be playing a total of 6 rounds in
Game B.
At the end of the session, the lab coordinator will randomly select one participant to be the
buyer for each of the two games. If you are randomly selected to be the buyer, then one of
your rounds in that game will be randomly selected for bonus payment.
Please click “Next” to read the instructions for Game A.
A.5.1. Discount and Mark-up Game
Game A: Instructions
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In this game you play the role of a buyer. As a buyer, you will encounter a store. You will
review the price of 32 items in the store and decide if you would like to purchase the item
or not. As such, you will be playing a total of 32 rounds in Game A.
In this game, you will value each item at the store at $9.00 while the seller has a cost of
$6.00.
For each item, you will be told how much you value (V) the item. Then the computer will
determine the price (P) of the item for you. The computer will give you either a price with
a discount (that is, a mark-down on the original price), a price with an inflated price (that
is, a mark-up on the original price), or the original price (that is, neither a discounted nor
marked-up price). The computer may also show you the original price other participants
in this study have been offered for each of the items. You will decide whether or not you
want to purchase the each item at the price the computer selected for you.
Game A: Earnings and Bonus Payment
Your earnings will be determined in the following way: if you, as the buyer, decide to
purchase the item, you will earn the difference between your value of the item and the price
the computer selected for you, that is your earnings will equal V-P, and the seller will earn
the price (P) you accepted to pay minus their cost (C). If you decide to not purchase the
item, both you and the seller will earn $0.00.
At the end of the session, the lab coordinator will randomly select one participant to be the
buyer in Game A. If you are randomly selected to be the buyer, then one of your rounds in
Game A will be randomly selected for bonus payment. You will receive your earnings from
that round. The lab coordinator will also randomly select a different participant to be the
seller. If you are randomly selected to be the seller, your earnings will not depend on your
decisions.
Note: you should make all your decisions assuming you are the buyer.
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Each round is independent of the others. Note that the price may be different from item to
item. Please make each of your choices carefully. Remember, you may be selected as the
buyer, in which case one of your rounds will be selected for payment. Since only one round
is randomly chosen for payment you should treat each round as if it is the one and only
round chosen for payment.
Please click “Next”.
Figure A.5.1: Comprehension Questions
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
Game A
You have entered Game A. In this game, the computer may show you the original price
that other participants in this study have been offered for each of the items, your value (V)
of the item (that is, how much you value the item), and the price (P) the computer selected
for you. The computer will give you either a price with a discount (that is, a mark-down on
the original price), a price with an inflated price (that is, a mark-up on the original price),
or the original price (that is, neither a discounted nor marked-up price). You will decide
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whether or not you want to purchase the each item at the price the computer selected for
you.
You will be asked whether you want to buy each of the 32 different items.
Figure A.5.2: Example of Study 1 Participant’s Decision Screen
Study 1A & 1B: Discount and Mark-up Game
(a) Study 1A: Baseline




In this game you play the role of a buyer. As a buyer, you will review the original prices of
two items and decide which item you would like to purchase. You can only buy one item
in each round. You will be playing a total of 6 rounds in Game B.
In this game, you will value item Y at $6.00 and item Z at $8.00. You have received a
“$5.00 off the original price” discount coupon valid for one item.
For both, item Y and item Z, the computer will show you how much you value each item.
You will also be shown the original price of item Y and the original price of item Z. Since you
have received a “$5.00 off the original price” discount coupon valid for one item, the price
that you pay will be the original price of the item minus $5.00. You will decide whether
you want to use the “$5.00 off the original price” discount coupon to purchase item Y or
item Z.
Game B: Earnings and Bonus Payment
Your earnings will be determined in the following way: if you, as the buyer, decide to use
the “$5.00 off the original price” discount coupon to purchase item Y, you will earn the
difference between your value of item Y and the price that you will pay after the $5.00
discount (i.e., the original price of item Y minus $5.00). You will not receive credit back
if the value of the coupon exceeds the original price (that is, the price you pay cannot be
a negative value). Similarly, if you decide to use the “$5.00 off the original price” discount
coupon to purchase item Z, you will earn the difference between your value of item Z and
the price that you will pay after the $5.00 discount (i.e., the original price of item Z minus
$5.00). You will not receive credit back if the value of the coupon exceeds the original price
(that is, the price you pay cannot be a negative value).
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At the end of the session, the lab coordinator will randomly select one participant to be the
buyer in Game B. If you are randomly selected to be the buyer, then one of your rounds in
Game B will be randomly selected for bonus payment. You will receive your earnings from
that round.
Each round is independent of the others. Note that the price may be different from item to
item. Please make each of your choices carefully. Remember, you may be selected as the
buyer, in which case one of your rounds will be selected for payment. Since only one round
is randomly chosen for payment you should treat each round as if it is the one and only
round chosen for payment.
Please click “Next” to Begin.
Figure A.5.3: Comprehension Questions
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
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Figure A.5.4: Example of Study 2 Participants’ Decision Screen
Study 2A & 2B: Coupon Game
(a) Study 2A: Baseline
(b) Study 2B: With Earnings Displayed
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A.6. The Myth of the Male Negotiator Experimental Protocol
The full experimental protocol was as follows. Randomization of the informed and unin-
formed treatment was at the session level. Figure A.6.1 shows the timeline of events. After
consenting to participate in this study, each participant read the general instructions, went
through two practice rounds with the computer to understand the game and proceeded to
the actual control and negotiation games. All subjects participated in four rounds of the
control game followed by four rounds of the negotiation game. In addition, participants
also went through two “add-on” rounds. Results from the add-on round are not included in
this paper but instructions have been included for completeness. Below are the instructions
used in this paper.




































RANDOMIZE IF GENDER INFORMATION IS PUBLIC 
CONSENT, INSTRUCTIONS, PRESURVEY, PRACTICE ROUNDS 
POST-SURVEY & PAYOFFS 
RANDOM PARTNER 





DISPLAY PARTNER INFO: 
GENDER 






DISPLAY PARTNER INFO: 
NO GENDER 
UNINFORMED INFORMED 
ADD-ON ROUNDS* ADD-ON ROUNDS* 
Experimental Instructions: Choice Study
We will now go through the instructions for the experiment in more detail. Note that this
study involves bonus payment, and so understanding the instructions carefully
will allow you to maximize your earnings.
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Experiment policies
This experiment is being done by economists Corinne Low and Zheng Jai Huang. It is the
policy of economists that participants cannot be deceived at any point throughout
the experiment. Therefore, the instructions described are exactly the way the experiment
will proceed, and you will be paid.
Please don’t talk or gesture to any participants in the lab, nor should you do anything
on the computers other than the experiment, as this could interfere with the validity of
the results. We greatly appreciate you offering your full attention for the duration of the
experiment.
Experiment stages
This experiment will have three stages. There will be an opportunity to earn bonus pay at
each of the stages.
1. First, you will take a brief survey.
2. Then you will be asked to make 10 rounds of decisions. You will be randomly assigned
a different partner in the lab in each round. At the end of the study, a computer will
randomly determine which round will count towards your bonus pay.
3. Finally, you will take a brief post-survey.
Stage 1
We will now complete a survey. Please answer the questions truthfully to the best of your
ability.
Please note, some of this information will be shared with your partners, anonymously, in
the next stage of the experiment.
Please you click next, and you will begin the survey.
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(Note from the experimenter: Participants saw the following questions. Each questions was
in its own window. Included are the choices provided to the participant when applicable.)
• What is your major?
• Why do you participate in WBL experiments? (Check ALL that apply.) [Answer
options: (1) They’re interesting; (2) To make extra money; (3) Course Credit; (4)
Other, please specify.]
• What is your gender? [Answer choices: male, female]
• Are you right- or left-handed? [Answer choices: left, right]
• Please type this word as quickly and accurately as you can in the box below:
shenanigans
Hit “OK” immediately after finishing.
• What month were you born in? [Answer choices: January to December]
• Lay your right hand flat on the table. Is your index finger (next to thumb) or your
ring finger (next to pinky) longer? [Answer choices: (1) Index is longer; (2) Ring is
longer; (3) Same length]
• Please answer yes/no to the following:
– Can you roll your tongue (shape tongue into “u” shape)?
– Do you have a “hitchhiker” thumb (extend thumb as far as you can - you have
hitchhiker thumbs if the top segment bends past 45 degrees)?
– Are you an only child?
• What is your favorite color?
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• Finally as bonus payment for this part of the study, you will receive $1.00. You can
either take that dollar as-is, or put some portion of it into a lottery. Money placed in
the lottery will be worth 0 with 50% probability and 2.5x its value with 50%
probability (decided randomly by the computer). How much of your $1.00 would
you like to place in the lottery? [Answer choices: $0 to $1.00 in 5 cents increments.]
General Instructions
You will play 10 different rounds and will be randomly assigned a different partner in each
round. Results from each round will be saved and stored in the system.
One of the 10 rounds will be randomly chosen by the computer and you will receive the full
payoff of that round as your bonus payment. Thus, you should play each round as
though you will be paid for that round, as it may be selected at the end.
In each rounds, you and your partner will choose how to split $20, with the caveat that
there are only two possible ways to split it: Either you can take $15, and your partner takes
$5, OR you can take $5, and your partner takes $15. But, if you do not agree on how to
split it, you each get $0.
Please click “Page 2 of Instructions”.
General Instructions (continued)
To clarify further, in each round, you and your partner will be shown the same two choices:
• $15 for yourself ($5 for partner)
• $5 for yourself ($15 for partner)
If one of you chooses $15, and one chooses $5, you will each receive this payoff. If both of
you choose the same amount for yourself, however, you will each get $0.
Let’s review each possible scenario:
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• If you choose $15 for yourself ($5 for partner)
– . . . And your partner “agrees,” by choosing $5 for themselves, you get $15
(partner gets $5)
– . . . And your partner “disagrees,” by also choosing $15 for themselves, you each
get $0
• If you choose $5 for yourself ($15 for partner)
– . . . And your partner “agrees,” by choosing $15 for themselves, you get $5
(partner gets $15)
– . . . And your partner “disagrees,” by also choosing $5 for themselves, you each
get $0
You and your partner must make this choice simultaneously, so you cannot see what they
are choosing while you make your choice.
For whichever round is randomly chosen for payment, you will receive the entire
amount of the game’s outcome, either $15, $5, or $0.
Please click next, and we will give you a chance to practice the game.
Practice Rounds
We will now do two practice rounds. In these rounds, you will not have a real partner;
instead, the computer will choose your “partner’s” choices randomly.
The payoffs from the practice rounds will NOT count towards your final earnings.
When you hit next, you will be taken to the practice rounds.
(Note to experimenter: To help participants understand the game, outcomes from the prac-
tice rounds were shown after each round. Figure A.6.2 Panel A shows an example of the
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participant’s choice screen during the practice rounds. Panel B shows an example of the
outcome screen during the practice rounds.)






Now that we have practiced, you will be paired with a partner and we will start the exper-
iment.
152
In the next 4 rounds, you will be shown some information about your partner first, then
you will be shown the decision screen where you can make your choice. You will each pick
simultaneously whether to choose $15 or $5 for yourself without knowing what the other
person is choosing.
The outcome of these rounds will be stored in the system, and you will only be told your
results when all 10 rounds are completed. Remember, any round could be randomly chosen
to determine your bonus payment, so you would play each round as though real money is
on the table.
Note that you will be randomly paired with a DIFFERENT partner in each
round.
Please click Next to begin.
(Note to experimenter: Below are the two sequential screens participants saw: (1) partic-
ipants saw the partner information screen for 15 seconds; (2) participants saw the choice
screen. Gender information was randomized at the session level. Participants either saw
the partner information sheet with or without gender for all rounds. Figure A.6.3 Panels
A and B shows an example of the partner information sheet with and without gender infor-
mation. Note that the only difference between the two screens is that gender is show as the
first characteristic in the Informed treatment. Figure A.6.4 shows an example of the choice
window in the control game. Note that the partner information sheet and payoff rules are
restated.)
Instructions: Rounds 5-8
In the next 4 rounds, Rounds 5-8, you will be allowed to communicate with your partner
prior to making your decision. This time, after you view the information about your partner,
you will have the opportunity to discuss your choice with your partner for 2.5 minutes before
you each choose.
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Figure A.6.4: Example of Choice Window
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When the 2.5 minutes are up, you will each pick simultaneously whether to choose $15 or
$5 out of the $20 for yourself without knowing what the other person is choosing.
To repeat, the pattern is:
1. View information about partner
2. Communicate with partner via chat for 2.5 minutes
3. Make choice
Important note about chat communication: The chat window allows you to discuss your
choice with your partner. However, you may not:
• Reveal identifiable information about yourself
• Ask others to reveal identifiable information
• Make arrangements to discuss or meet outside the lab.
(Failure to comply with this will affect your future ability to participate in WBL studies)
The outcome of these rounds will be stored in the system, and you will only be told your
results when all games are completed. Remember, any round could be randomly chosen to
determine your bonus payment, so you would play each round as though real money is on
the table.
Note that you will be randomly paired with a DIFFERENT partner in each
round.
Please click Next to begin.
(Note to experimenter: Below are the three sequential screens participants saw: (1) partner
information screen; (2) chat window; (3) choice window. Figure A.6.5 Panels A, B, and
C shows these three windows sequentially. Notice that the screens (and thus the game) is
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identical to the control game with the exception that participants are able to (free-form) chat
and negotiate with their partners for 2.5 minutes before proceeding the choice window where
decisions are made simultaneously.)
(Note to experimenter: Results from Rounds 9 and 10 (the “add-on” rounds) are not included
in this paper, but instructions are included for completion.)
Instructions: Round 9
We will now proceed to Round 9.
In this round, you will have the opportunity to choose whether you would like to com-
municate with your partner or not. This time, after you view the information about your
partner, you will choose whether you would like to:
• Not communicate with your partner (like in rounds 1-4)
• Communicate with your partner (like in rounds 5-8)
Both you and your partner will make this choice. Then, the computer will choose randomly
whether your choice your your partner’s choice will be used to determine the game ou will
actually play. With a 50% chance, your choice will be used, and you will play the game you
have chosen. And with a 50% chance your partner’s choice will be used, and you will play
the game they have chosen.
The sequence of the round will be:
1. Participants are matched randomly with a partner.
2. You will be shown some information about your partner.
3. Each partner chooses whether they would like to communicate or not communicate
with their partner.
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4. A computer will randomly decided if you or your partner’s choice of game will be
used.
5. You will play the chosen round.
As in the previous rounds, you will be shown the decision screen where you can make your
choice. You will each pick simultaneously whether to choose $15 or $5 out of the $20 for
yourself without knowing what the other person is choosing.
The outcome of these rounds will be stored in the system, and you will only be told your
results when all games are completed. Remember, any round could be randomly chosen to
determine your bonus payment, so you should play each round as though real money is on
the table.
Note that you will be randomly paired with a DIFFERENT partner in each
round.
Please click Next to begin.
Note to experimenter: Participants saw three sequential screens: (1) participants saw the
partner information screen for 15 seconds; (2) participants choose whether they want to
play the control or negotiation game with their randomly assigned partner; (3) participants
are told whether they are playing the control or negotiation game and proceed accordingly.
Below is an example of the screen where participants choose which game they wished to play
with their partner. Figure A.6.6 shows an example of the screen where participants are able
to choose if they want to play the negotiation game or the control game (i.e., step 2).
Instructions: Round 10
For the 10th round, you will choose one of your previous rounds to “count” an extra time,
and therefore have an extra chance of being randomly drawn for payment. You get to
choose whether you want a random round from rounds 1-4 (with no communication) or
rounds 5-8 (with communication) to fill this extra “slot.” This round will be saved in the
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Figure A.6.6: Example of Game Choice Window
 
system and may be randomly picked as your bonus payment. Please choose if you would
like this random round to be picked from:
• Rounds 1-4 (with no communication)
• Rounds 5-8 (with communication)
Note to experimenter: Figure A.6.7 shows an example of the screen where participants are
able to choose if they want their random round (which will count twice) to come from the
negotiation game or the control game.
(Notes to the experimenter: after all 10 rounds were played, participants saw the outcome
of all 10 rounds. Afterwards they answered a post-survey. Figure A.6.8 shows an example
of this screen with the outcome of all 10 rounds.)
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Figure A.6.7: Example of Round 10 Choice Window
 




You will now be asked to complete a brief post-survey, and then will learn you final earnings.
Remember, a computer will randomly choose one of the 10 rounds you played and the payoffs
in that round will be your bonus earnings for this lab session.
Please click next to be taken to the post-survey.
• What did you think the experiment was about?
• In rounds 1-9, you were partnered with someone in the lab. How many of your partners
do you think were women? [Answer choices from 0 to 9.]
• Please answer the following questions from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. [An-
swer choices were on a 5-point likert scale: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree Not
Disagree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.]
– Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies, that
favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”
– In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.
– Women are too easily offended.
– Women should be cherished and protected by men.
– When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about
being discriminated against.
– Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide finan-
cially for the women in their lives.
• For each of the following information you learned about your partners, say how much it
influenced your interactions: [Answer choices were on a 5-point likert scale: Influenced
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a lot, Influenced a little, Influenced in some period, Did no influence very much, Did




– Month of birth
– Ability to roll tongue
– “Hitchhiker” thumb
• Did your mother work full-time outside the home when you were growing up? [Answer
choices: yes, no]
• Do you have any other comments about this study?
(Notes to the experimenter: after the post-survey, the computer randomly selected the round
for bonus payment and final payoffs were revealed. Figure A.6.9 shows an example of the
final payoff screen.)
Figure A.6.9: Example of Final Payoff Window
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A.7. Negotiation Transcript Classification Protocol
After all sessions were finished, we had MTurk workers classify different communication
strategies. Each MTurk worker reviewed 15 randomly selected negotiation transcripts. To
ensure high quality of work, MTurk workers reviewed the communication strategy definitions
and had to answer all 8 comprehension questions correctly to continue. Additionally, workers
where also asked an attention question and if any worker failed to pass the attention question
we discarded their work. Below are the specific instructions provided to MTurk workers.
General Instructions:
In this survey you will be asked to read through 16 different conversations and answer some
questions regarding each conversation. Each conversation has only two people: Person A
and Person B. Person A and Person B are negotiating over how to split $20 dollars, BUT
there are only two possible way to split it: $15 for one person and $5 for the other, or the
reverse. If they do not agree, then they will both get $0.
Note: In this survey you will be asked comprehension questions and attention questions.
Please read all instructions and materials carefully. If you fail the comprehension question,
you will not be allowed to continue with the HIT. If you fail the attention questions, your
work will be rejected. There is a probability that we will check a randomly selected question.
If we find your work was not completed accurately, we may reject your work.
Definitions:
Before you begin, we will define some negotiation strategies that you will help
identify in the 16 conversations. Please read through each of the definitions
and examples carefully. (Do not worry if you are unable to memorize or remember all
the definitions, these will be provided again later.)
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Hard commitment: this is when a person starts the conversation (not including saying
“hi” or other pleasantries) stating that they will pick $15 for themselves regardless of what
the other person is choosing. They have set their mind to this outcome and will not change.
• Example 1: “Hi, I’m always choosing 15 not matter what, that is my strategy.”
• Example 2: “I’m letting you know that I’m picking 15 regardless of what you do.”
Tough talker: this is when person is a tough negotiator and fights for the $15. They are
trying hard to convince the other person to take $5. This may happen at any point in
the conversation. They will use a strong tone and may seem “pushy” or “mean.” (Note:
Someone using a tough talker strategy may also be playing a hard commitment strategy.)
• Example 1: “It’s my turn to take $15, I let the other person have theirs”
Asked for the $15: this is when a person asks the other person if they can take the $15
at any point in the conversation.
• Example 1: “Can I pick $15?”
• Example 2: “Would it be ok if I pick 15?”
Led with a concession: this is when a person starts the conversation (not including saying
“hi” or other pleasantries) by offering the $15 to the other person or stating that they will
take $5.
• Example 1: “Hi, you can take the $15” or “Hi, I’ll pick $5”
• Example 2: “Hi, you can pick which one you want, I’ll pick the other option.”
Offered the $15: this is when a person offers $15 to the other person or offers to pick the
$5 at any point in the conversation. (Note: someone offering $15 may also be doing a “led
with a concession” strategy.)
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• Example 1: “Ok, you can pick $15”
• Example 2: “I’ll just take the $5”
Friendly negotiator: this is when the person tries to be friendly and build a relationship
with the other person in order to gain their trust. We provided each person some information
about the other person (e.g., birthday month, can they roll their tongue, do they have
hitchhiker thumbs, etc) – many times, the person will comment on one of these traits.
• Example 1: “Hi, how is your day going?”
• Example 2: “Happy birthday month! Oh look, we both have hitchhiker thumbs!”
âĂŃ Started negotiations: this is the person that starts the negotiations on how to split
the money, not including saying “hi” or other pleasantries.
• Example 1: “We should discuss this so we can cooperate and get something. How do
you want to split this?”
• Example 2: “Any ideas on what we should do?”
Random game: this is the person that introduces a random game such as playing rock/paper/scissor
(“rps”), guessing a number, using trivia questions, using birthday dates, or other similar
games to choose who picks $15 for themselves.
• Example 1: “What if we play rps?”
• Example 2: “How about I think of a number, 0 or 1, and if you guess it you get $15.
I promise to tell the truth”
• Example 3: “We were both born in June! Let’s do birth dates, the closest one wins
$15?”
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Sad story: this is a person that uses their current (unfortunate) situation to gain sympathy
from the other person and tries to get the $15.
• Example 1: “I really need the money, my fridge broke so I need to buy food.”
• Example 2: “I’m having a terrible day, I just failed my midterm.”
• Example 3: “I’m poor, I need the money for food and to pay for college.”
Happy emojis: this is when a person uses any sort of happy “emojis” or smiley faces.
• Example 1: “:)”
• Example 2: “:D”
Sad/angry emojis: this is when a person uses any sort of sad or angry “emojis”.
• Example 1: “:(”
• Example 2: “>:(”
Mentioned the word fair: this is when the person mentions anything about trying to
make a fair split
• Example 1: “How can we do this fairly?”
• Example 2: “I’ll pick $5, its fair since you picked $5 before”
• Example 3: “I don’t know how to split this in a fair way.”
Mentioned previous choices/outcomes: this is when the person mentions what they
previously chose. Individuals had to negotiate with multiple people, so sometimes they will
mention what their previous choice was.
• Example 1: “I chose 5, 15, 5 in the previous rounds”
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• Example 2: “But I’ve picked 5 in the last 2 rounds too”
Alternating strategy: this is when the person claims to be alternating between 5 and 15
and that this is their strategy.
• Example 1: “I’m alternating between 5 and 15”
• Example 2: “My strategy is to pick 5 on even rounds and 15 on odd rounds”
Gave-in: this is when the person gives in to the other person’s ask or demands after there
is an initial negotiation or back-and-forth.
• Example 1: Person A: “Can I pick 15?”
– Person A: “Can I pick 15?”
– Person B: “I would like 15 as well. Why do you want 15?”
– Person A: “Honestly, I need it to buy food.”
– Person B: “Oh, me too. This is hard...Ok, you can take the $15.”
• (In this example, Person B is “giving in”.)
Comprehension Check:
Before you begin, we will let you practice. Please read the conversation below and answer
the questions carefully. If you have any question, please refer to the definitions and examples
above.
If you are unable to correctly identify the negotiation strategies in the following practice
conversation, you will not be allowed to proceed with the task and you will not receive
payment for this HIT.
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(Notes for the experimenter: In order to ensure the highest quality of data, MTurk workers
had to pass both comprehension checks to proceed to the actual classification. Figures A.7.1
and A.7.2 shows a screenshot of both comprehension questions. Failure to pass the compre-
hension check meant the MTurk worker would not be allowed to proceed and would have to
“return” the task. MTurk workers who passed the comprehension question proceeded to the
actual negotiation analysis (see Figure A.7.3). Each MTurk worker analyzed 7 negotiations
(see Figure A.7.4 for example). Then they saw an attention check question (disguised as an
8th conversation) followed by 8 more actual negotiations. Figure A.7.5 show an example of
the attention check question.)
Figure A.7.1: Example of Comprehension Check 1
 
(Notes for the experimenter: At the end, MTurk workers answered a demographics question.
Once MTurker workers submitted the completed task, the attention question was checked and
any worker who failed the attention check was told so and their work was discarded.)
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Figure A.7.2: Example of Comprehension Check 2
 
Figure A.7.3: Example of Comprehension Check Passing/Failure Message
(a) Comprehension Check: Failure Message
 
(b) Comprehension Check: Passing Message 
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Figure A.7.4: Example of Negotiation Transcript Classification
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Figure A.7.5: Example of Attention Question
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MTurk Worker Demographics Survey:
You have now completed identifying all 16 negotiations conversations. Please answer the
following questions. Afterwards, you will be told your completion code.
• What is your gender? [Answer choices: male, female]
• What is your year of birth?
• What is your employment status? [Answer choices: (1) unemployed; (2) full-time
employment (3) part-time employment]
• Are you a native English speaker? [Answer choices: yes, no]
• Please choose the answer that best describes your political ideology. [Answer choices:
(1) very liberal; (2) somewhat liberal; (3) slightly liberal; (4) Neither liberal nor con-
servative; (5) slightly conservative; (6) somewhat conservative; (7) very conservative]
• What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled,
highest degree received. [Answer choices: (1) Some high school, no diploma; (2) High
school graduate, diploma or equivalent (for example, GED); (3) Some college credit, no
degree; (4) Trade/technical/vocational training; (5) Associate degree; (6) Bachelor’s
degree; (7) Master’s degree; (8) Professional degree (for example, JD or MD); (8)
Doctorate degree (Ph.D)]
• Please specify your ethnicity. [Answer choices: (1) Caucasian; (2) Hispanic or Latino;
(3) Black/African American; (4) Native American/American Indian; (5) Asian/Pacific
Islander; (6) Middle Eastern; (7) Other (please specify)]
• Please let us know what you thought of the survey. Was anything confusing?
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A.8. The Value of Information and Role of Fairness in Bargaining Experimental
Protocol
After consenting to participate in this study, the experimenter read the instructions out
loud and participants followed along. Buyers (proposers) and sellers (responders) meet in
a given round with the opportunity to trade. It is common knowledge that the buyer’s
value for the good V is either 70 or 90 experimental units (each with 50% chance) and that
the seller’s cost to produce the good C is either 10 or 30 experimental units (each with
50% chance). In each round, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer P to the seller to
purchase the good. If the offer is accepted, the buyer receives piB = V − P and the seller
receives piS = P − C, where piB and piS are denoted in experimental units. If the offer is
rejected, both players get 0 experimental units, so piB = 0 and piS = 0. The seller cannot
accept an offer for which P < C.
Afterwards, participants were randomly assigned to be a buyer or a seller. They maintain
this role for the remainder of the experiment. Figure A.8.1 shows how participants’ screens
for role assignment.
The experimental design varies what information players have about the realization of the
value V and cost C. Randomization of treatment was performed at the session level. The
buyer always knows her value and the seller always knows his cost. In the Incomplete
Information treatment, this is all the players know. In additional treatments, we provide
additional information (about V and C) to either: the buyer, the seller, or both. In all
treatments, the information structure is common knowledge. Figure A.8.2 shows an example
of the buyer’s offer screen and the seller’s acceptance screen for the Complete Information
treatment. Figure A.8.3 shows an example of the buyer’s offer screen and the seller’s
acceptance screen for the Incomplete Information treatment.
Subjects receive the outcome of bargaining game at the end of each round. Subjects are
informed or reminded at the end of each round only of their own action and the action
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Figure A.8.2: Example of Complete Information (CI) Buyer and Seller Screens
(a) Buyer’s Offer Decision Screen
 
(b) Seller’s Accept Decision Screen
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Figure A.8.3: Example of Incomplete Information (II) Buyer and Seller Screens
(a) Buyer’s Offer Decision Screen
 
(b) Seller’s Accept Decision Screen
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of their partner, as well as the information they had in that round. Figure A.8.4 shows
an example of the buyer’s and seller’s outcome screen for that round for the Complete
Information treatment. Figure A.8.5 shows an example of the buyer’s and seller’s outcome
screen for the Incomplete Information treatment.
Figure A.8.4: Example of Complete Information (CI) Outcome Screens
(a) Buyer’s Outcome Screen
 
(b) Seller’s Outcome Screen
 
Subjects play a total of 30 rounds of the bargaining game. After the 30 rounds, subjects
answer additional questions that depend on their treatment and role. In this paper, we
will focus on one of these questions. Buyers in all information conditions were asked in an
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Figure A.8.5: Example of Incomplete Information (II) Outcome Screens
(a) Buyer’s Outcome Screen
 
(b) Seller’s Outcome Screen
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incentive compatible way to report the probability that offers made by other buyers in their
treatment were accepted by sellers.
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